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ART. I. THE AGENCY OF MIRACULOUS POWERS IN THE  
ESTABLISHMENT AND PROPAGATION OF CHRISTIANITY.

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IN investigating this subject,—although it might be interesting to contemplate first those miraculous powers, which, as its own appropriate and inherent attributes, resided in the person, and as the natural manifestations of inward character were exhibited in the life, of Christ,\*—our purpose at present relates only to those employed after his ascension. In fact, the work of establishing and propagating Christianity cannot, with strict propriety, be said to have been commenced by Christ himself. His mission was rather to reveal, authenticate, and exemplify—or, to speak more truly, to originate the new religion in its abstract form. Even into the minds of the Apostles, though they were constantly in the society of our Saviour, Christianity, in its fulness and completeness, was not infused, till after He had returned to Heaven, resumed His seat at the Father's right hand, and sent forth the Spirit. It *could* not be: for until then, the Christian religion in its entirety and perfection had no existence. The example, teachings, and miracles of Christ, form a part, and an essential part, of Christianity; but *only*

\* Olshausen finely remarks, that "Christ himself was the *répée*, his miracles the natural *épya* of his nature."—*Biblische Commentar. B. I. S. 257.*



a part nevertheless. As the *Saviour*, he fully \* reveals himself only in Gethsemane and on the Cross. While as the "*Son of God with power*," he does not stand fully confessed, till he rises from the tomb. Lastly, though he might manifest himself as "the Way and the Truth" on earth, as "the Life" his appropriate place of revealing himself could be no other than the mediatorial throne, whereon he seated himself as the Dispenser of the Spirit of life—the vital Principle of the individual believer and the collective Church. It was not, then, till his earthly career had entirely closed, and he had returned to Heaven, that the Christian system was complete. We regard the miraculous works done by our Saviour as part and parcel of Christianity itself. Supernatural powers operative in its establishment and propagation, were not conferred till the day of Pentecost. So that in omitting a formal investigation of the history, aim and efficacy of our Saviour's miracles, we only confine ourselves within the proper limits of our subject.

This omission doubtless diminishes somewhat the compass and attractiveness of the theme before us: still it remains one of great importance and of deep interest. If, as Chrysostom has said, "Christianity had been spread over the world without miracles, the miracle would have been greater than any recorded in the New Testament;" it is surely desirable to know as accurately as may be, the manner and measure of their operation.

The inquiry first suggesting itself, respects the *nature* of the supernatural endowments bestowed upon the Apostles and their contemporary fellow-Christians. Leaving the generic term *Charismata* (or Gifts), by which appellation the miraculous powers under consideration are usually designated, for the present undefined, we propose first to consider them as briefly as possible in detail.

The endowment whose display followed more closely than that of any other upon the descent of the Holy Ghost, has usually been deemed more remarkable, and perhaps more important than any other, or at least an indispensable prerequisite to the useful exercise of all the rest, in a

\* We say *fully*: Christ *began* his work of atonement and suffering when he began to live. "His whole life," it has been well remarked, "as well as his death, was self-sacrificing love." "His character in all its elements was manifested *progressively*."



word, emphatically *the* Charisma of the Apostolic Age.\* To form a theory in respect to the *Gift of Tongues*, which shall satisfactorily explain all the facts relative to the subject, is a matter of no inconsiderable difficulty. Interpreters of the New Testament in this country and in England have, it is true, very generally agreed to consider it a mere faculty to employ unvernacular and previously unlearned languages. They have experienced no perplexity, because they have taken it for granted, that the second chapter of Acts fully elucidates the whole subject: and hence, however they may have put 1 Corinthians, xiv, to the torture, have allowed themselves no compunction. But in Germany there has long been quite a variety of opinions. The German interpreters have endeavoured to base their views, not upon the one passage or the other, solely, but upon both. And although with several the result has been, to adopt the same theory that is current among us, many others have rejected it as entirely untenable. It is however far easier to pull down, than to build up. And the theories proposed by Eichhorn, Bardili, Herder, and others, are about as objectionable as that which they chiefly oppose. Still some benefit has resulted from the discussion. This at least has been made amply evident,—particularly by Bleek in an article published in the “*Theologische Studien und Kritiken*” in 1829, and by Neander in his “*Geschichte der Pflanzung und Leitung des Christlichen Kirche durch die Apostel*,”—that the old theory does not sufficiently and proportionably regard all the facts in the case. The probability is, that the truth in this instance, as in so many others, lies midway between the two extremes.

In *one* thing, all without exception, it is believed, who dissent from the old opinion, (saving the Rationalists, and even they in part,) are agreed: that, whatever were the outward manifestations, the person who possessed the Gift of Tongues was largely under the influence of the Holy Ghost, and, when uttering himself, was in a condition of high, ecstatic, and supernatural inward excitement.† In fact, no one can doubt of this, who will carefully study all the passages relating to the subject. On the day of Pente-

\* Matthew Henry goes so far as to consider it a fulfilment of the prediction in John 14: 12.—Comm. on Acts 2.

† The Rationalists admit the excitement, but deny its supernatural origin.



cost, it was simultaneously with being "filled with the Holy Ghost," that the Apostles and Disciples spake with tongues: and so apparent was their enthusiasm, that they were accused of being drunken. Acts 2: 4, 13.—Cornelius and his household were not only largely under the influence of the Spirit when they spake with tongues, but were also giving the first expression, in lofty ascriptions of praise to God, to their feelings of joy at finding themselves new creatures in Christ Jesus. Acts 10: 44—46. The Corinthian speaking in an unknown tongue was speaking "mysteries in the Spirit," in such a manner that no man, but only God, could understand him:—so ecstatic were his feelings, so busy was his "spirit," and so unfruitful his "understanding," that even he himself was unable to give subsequently any intelligible account of what he had been saying, and it was necessary that another, specially empowered by the Holy Ghost for this very purpose, should interpret his discourse. 1 Cor. 14: 2, 14, 27.

If now it be admitted that such was the condition of the *γλώσσαις λαλῶν*, the subject is relieved of much of its difficulty. Neander\* deems it very strange, supposing the old theory correct, "that men in the first glow of conversion," (as Cornelius and his family) "could find pleasure in a miracle of such mere outward display (*epideiktischen Wunder*) as the speaking in foreign languages."† But if the Gift of Tongues involved a high measure of inspiration, and enabled them to pour forth their warm feelings in burning words, "to concentrate, as it were, the whole might of the inwardly operative Spirit, and embody it in speech,"—it need not surprise us that they employed it, even though it obliged them to employ other accents than those of their vernacular tongue.

It has been thought unaccountable,‡ that Peter, in repelling the accusation of drunkenness, should have made no direct allusion to the precise nature of the gift conferred, and should not have quoted a passage from the Old Testament, bearing more directly upon the matter in hand (for example Isa. 28: 11, 12). But if we have a right idea of the Gift, Peter's allusion was to that element of it, which

\* Gesch. der Pflanz. u. Leit. &c. B. I. S. 10.

† Neander, Gesch. der Pf. u. Leit. &c. B. I. S. 11. Bleek über das *γλῶσσαις λαλεῖν* in Theol. Stud. u. Krit. 1829, B. I. S. 18.

‡ This we consider one of the most important of the objections to the old theory. We commend it to careful consideration.



chiefly or solely occasioned the accusation of drunkenness ; and the quotation was perfectly applicable.

But the most perplexing difficulties connected with the old theory, respect 1 Cor. 14. In what consisted the necessity of the charisma of Interpretation, is a problem which has been found of no easy solution. *Platt*\* attempts to account for it, but without success. *Doddridge* † proposes a solution which he himself confesses to be "a pretty singular one:" but this too is unsatisfactory. Others, with Henry, ‡ have made the Gift of *ἑρμηνεία* a faculty of interpreting, not tongues, but scripture. But if by inspiration the *γλώσσαις λαλῶν* was elevated far above himself and his fellow Christians, and both his conceptions and his language were raised far above their ordinary level, it is easily conceivable, that God only could understand him, and that an inspired interpreter should be requisite.

Still another and not less puzzling difficulty, and one which we have seen no attempt to solve, arising from the common theory, connects itself with almost the whole chapter. If the condition of the *γλώσσαις λαλῶν* were extraordinary only in this respect, that he was empowered to speak in foreign languages ; how is it to be accounted for, that the wise, the judicious, the inspired Apostle of the Gentiles, should recommend in that chapter a course so obviously repugnant to the plainest dictates of common sense ? The main source of the difficulty in the Corinthian Church, according to the old theory, was briefly this ; that in meetings for mutual edification, some of their number, having the Gift of Tongues, from pride or ostentation, prayed or exhorted in a foreign language, so that none present were able to understand them without the aid of an Interpreter. The injunction that Paul gives, is, that they should always keep silence unless an interpreter were at hand. But common sense would say, "If you wish to edify your brethren by leading their devotions, or by addressing to them the word of exhortation, do so : but by all means do so in your own vernacular tongue." The course recommended by Paul, was certainly very circuitous and very needless. A strange method indeed it were, in endeavouring to promote the edification of an American church, to address them

\* Vorlesungen über die beiden Briefe Pauli an die Corinthier, S. 331.

† Family Expositor on the passage. ‡ On the passage.



through the Arabic language, for instance, and an interpreter!—Now if the illumination and elevation of the mind, the strengthening and deepening of the affections, and the influx of thought from the Source of all wisdom and knowledge, were essential elements in this charisma, then evidently there would be propriety in Paul's injunction;—because the speaking with tongues, and the employment of an interpreter, were the only method, however circuitous, of attaining an end in the highest degree desirable.

Among other objections to the common theory, in connection with this chapter, one of no little strength is drawn from the peculiar phraseology used in the 14th and 15th verses: "My *Spirit* (πνεῦμα) prayeth, but my *understanding* (νοῦς) is unfruitful"—which seems very strange, to say the least, if referred to a mere praying in an unvernacular tongue. It admits of an easy explanation, if we introduce the modification proposed,—as has been already intimated.

With the charisma of Tongues, other charismata were sometimes connected, which greatly augmented its value and utility. Paul directs the Corinthian γλώσσαις λαλῶν, to pray that he might interpret, 1 Cor. 14: 13; from which it would seem probable, that the Gift of ἑρμηνεία was sometimes associated with that of Tongues. From Acts 19: 6, it appears that the Gifts of *Prophecy* and Tongues were occasionally, and probably often, conjoined. In this case, the charisma of ἑρμηνεία of course was needless—that of prophecy so modifying the discourse of the γλώσσαις λαλῶν, as to render it perfectly intelligible.

This latter fact accounts for a statement in Acts 2: 11, which otherwise it would be hard to reconcile with some of the statements in Corinthians:—that the γλώσσαις λαλόντες were *distinctly understood* to speak forth "the wonderful works of God." For it was a characteristic of the Prophet, as we shall see hereafter, to speak with clear consciousness of the outward world, and with particular reference to the intelligence, and inward state generally, of his auditors. And while, therefore, in this case, the Gift of Tongues exhibited itself so far as to allow the employment of foreign languages, and so far also as greatly to elevate and excite the Apostles and Disciples, (to a point above even the ordinary prophetic state); its operation was so far modified by the Gift of Prophecy, that every thing said was intelligible to those addressed.



We are now prepared to estimate the *utility* of the Charisma of Tongues. When *unconjoined* with those of Prophecy or Interpretation, it could subserve the benefit of only the individual upon whom it was conferred:—he that spake in an unknown tongue, “edified himself,” 1 Cor. 14: 4: the Church he did not edify, unless through the medium of an interpreter. In case an interpreter was present, two important objects were effected by its employment:—the church was edified, and unbelievers by so remarkable a *δημωσον*, were convinced of the Divine Origin of Christianity. The singular adaptation of the Charisma of Tongues, aided by that of interpretation in another person, to accomplish the latter of these two objects, is worthy of notice. During its exercise, the *γλώσσαις λαλῶν* “was probably in a condition very similar to that of a person in an ecstasy or trance: his demeanor showed that something extraordinary was taking place within him: his countenance was lighted up,—his whole being elevated.”\* His supernaturally excited feelings and lofty conceptions, poured themselves forth in a lava-like torrent of words—those words uttered in an unwonted idiom—or if vernacular to some of his auditors, still unintelligible to them, as much as to the rest. All look on and listen with amazement. All but *one* feel their entire incompetency to conceive his meaning. Imagine then their amazement, when, after the *γλώσσαις λαλῶν* has ceased speaking, that *one*—the *ἑρμηνευτῆς* repeats, and repeats intelligibly, the whole discourse. The previously unbelieving now distinctly behold the finger of God, and the Gospel message finds ready access to their hearts.

When the Gifts of Tongues and Interpretation were *conjoined*, the exhibition was even more impressive. For the co-existence of these correlative, but apparently incompatible powers, in the same individual, far more gloriously marked the presence of a Divine energy, than their separate

\* Comp. Olshausen *über die Sprachengabe in Theol. Stud. u. Krit.* 1831, B. 1: S. 570.—Respecting the *γλ. λαλ.* as compared with the *ἐν ἐκστάσει εἶναι*, he remarks as follows. “That which distinguishes the *γλώσσαις λαλῶν* from the *ἐν ἐκστάσει εἶναι*, (the latter being the genius under which the former is to be regraded as a species,) is this: that in the Gift of Tongues, the whole might of the inwardly operative Spirit, as it were, concentrate itself in discourse. The *ἐκστασις* was designed more for the individual himself, to whom it was imparted: it was therefore a purely inward process, Acts 10: 10 seq: 2 Cor. 12: 2 seq, often without speech, and when with, only as something apparently incidental.”



existence in different individuals. And in this case the utility of each Charisma was obviously enhanced.

But the utility of the Charisma was greatest, when it was associated with that of Prophecy. Then the intense fervour, the high imaginings, or rather beholdings, and the rapid and impassioned utterance peculiar to the Gift of tongues, all became available to the purposes of prophetic discourse. Then the accents of the speaker were not a mere spontaneous outburst of joys too rapturous to be pent up within. Nor were they the media of his high and privileged communings with Jehovah. By the introduction of the prophetic element, they were adapted for *effect*—they took a form and shape corresponding to the understanding and feelings of the auditors. They were “*πτεροειντα ερση* :”—and as the kite or the eagle *from aloft* descends and descends to seize its prey ; so they, although issuing from the high and ethereal regions the *γλωσσαισ λαλῶν* was wont to frequent, yet descending on that account with all the more impetus and rapidity, while at the same time under the sure guidance of the keen and penetrating prophetic eye, reached at once the inmost heart of the hearer.

Such, doubtless, was sometimes the instrumentality employed by the Apostles, in preaching the Gospel to the Heathen. Thus preached, well might it “*pierce to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and be a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart.*”

How much this Charisma was actually employed in the propagation of the Gospel, it is impossible fully to ascertain. In its lowest and uncompound form, it was probably found, together with its correlative *ερμηνεία*, in most of the primitive churches, and in their meetings for religious improvement was employed, to some considerable extent, to open an avenue to the bosoms of unbelievers assembling with them, or incidentally entering their places of worship. Connected with the gift of *ερμηνεία* in the same person, it was probably more rare.—In its alliance with that of Prophecy, as possessed by the Apostles, there is not the slightest evidence that it was employed with any frequency. Indeed, in this form, the endowment or faculty itself was occasional rather than permanent.\* The extraordinary nature of the

\* Many writers have thought it occasional and intermittent in all its forms. But this is a point involved, and for ought we can see, destined to be perpetually in obscurity.



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Charisma, if nothing more, would lead to the belief that its exercise was infrequent.—It has generally been supposed that it was of great and common use to the Apostles and others, in preaching the Gospel to the Heathen. But of this there is no evidence. If such were actually the case, it is very strange, to say the least, that no mention is any where made in the New Testament of the circumstance. When we are informed of excursions made by the Apostles into places without the limits of Judæa, there is not the slightest intimation given, that they availed themselves of any other than their native tongue. So far as any evidence at all bearing upon the question appears, it leads to just the opposite conclusion. For in some cases it seems that the aid of an interpreter, in the ordinary sense, was requisite.\* Moreover, as Olshausen well remarks,† the Gift was conferred upon many, whose destination was evidently not to preach the Gospel to all nations. Besides, "Christianity had its first principal sphere of operation among nations belonging to the Roman Empire, where the knowledge of the Greek and Roman languages was all that was necessary to the Apostles—which languages, as they were continually requisite in the intercourse of civil and commercial life, could not have been unknown to the Jews."‡

\* We insert this fact here because, although it is not derived from the New Testament, yet it relates to one of the Apostles. It is a tradition of very early origin, and very generally received by the ancient Church, that Peter while at Rome employed Mark as an interpreter. See Neander's *Gesch. der. Pfl. u. Leit. &c.*, B. I. S. 9, and Bleek *üb. γλ. λαλ.* Th. Stud. u. Krit. 1829, B. I. S. 26.

† *Commentar.* B. 2. S. 585.

‡ *Gesch. der Pflanz. u. Leit. &c.*, B. I. S. 9.—Compare with this extract from Neander, and our whole paragraph, the following passage from Dr. Jortin, "Remarks on Eccl. History," Vol. I. p. 35, ed. London, 1805. We have underscored a few sentences.—"The first miracle after the ascension of Christ, namely, the Gift of Tongues, was of singular and extraordinary service to Christianity. It increased the number of believers at Jerusalem, and engaged the admiration and favour of the people so much, that the enemies of Christ could not accomplish their designs against the disciples; and it served to convey the Gospel to distant regions.

It has been said that the Gift of Tongues continued for a considerable time to be absolutely necessary for the spreading of Christianity; *but it is to be observed the Scriptures never say so.* We may therefore judge for ourselves how far it was needful.

Now at the time of Pentecost there was a great resort of Jews and proselytes from various and remote countries. The Gift of Tongues conferred upon the disciples served to convince and convert many of these persons, and these persons served to carry Christianity with them to their several homes. Afterwards the Ethiopian Eunuch, Cornelius the Roman Centurion, Sergius Paulus the Proconsul, Dyonysius the Areopagite, and many others were converted. *By these persons, and by the travels of some*



Respecting the continuance of the Charisma of Tongues, little, so far as we are aware, can be learned from Church History. A passage in Irenæus,\* makes it evident that it remained in the Church down to his times. And there is some probability that it exhibited itself in those of Tertullian. It seems to have ceased earlier than other Charismata.†

Besides the γλώσσαις λαλόντες, there were two additional classes of men in the primitive church, who were endowed with peculiar powers of discourse. The Charisma conferred upon one of these classes was that of *Prophecy*.

The signification of the word προφήτης in the New Testament, is probably the same with that of נביא in the Old. This has been well stated by Koppe‡ as follows. "Whoever is singularly, and in a manner foreign from the ordinary habits of men, operated upon by a Divine power,—whether he predicts future events, or discloses the secret designs of other men, or prays with a remarkable, and to those about him, seemingly præternatural force and fervency of mind, or, urged by a sudden impulse of the Divine Spirit, rises up to teach, exhort and console, or finally chants a hymn, which, either on account of its novelty, or the fervour with which it is recited, bears the impress of a Divine origin,—is called προφήτης." Dr. Bleek§ remarks finely upon the subject a little more at length. "There is no reason why προφητεύειν here (1 Cor. 14.) and generally, where it is used in the New Testament of Christian Pro-

of the Apostles and of their disciples, Christianity was spread in the Roman Empire and in the East: and then the Greek language, together with human industry in learning other tongues, might be sufficient to convey the Gospel as far and as soon as Providence intended."

\* It is as follows. "We hear many brethren in the Church having prophetic gifts, and speaking with all kinds of tongues through the Spirit, and bringing to light the hidden things of men's hearts for their benefit (ἐπὶ τῷ συμφέροντι,) and unfolding the mysteries of God." Vid. Neander's *Gesch. der Pflanz. u. Leit. &c.*, pp. 14. 15 (note), and "Denkwürdigkeiten." B. I. S. 404.

† The best treatise by far, as we think, upon the Gift of Tongues, is that of Olshausen to which reference has already been made, and to which the foregoing paragraphs are largely indebted. After a careful consultation of other treatises upon the subject, and some considerable perplexed thinking, we receive his theory with great satisfaction; still in some points we are obliged to dissent from him.—See also his commentary on the second chapter of Acts.

‡ "De Prophetis inter primos Christianos." Koppe's "Novum Testamentum Græce," vol. 6. p. 300.

§ Ueber das γλ. λαλ. Th. Stud. u. Krit. 1829, B. I. S. 58.



phets, should be understood in a sense at all different from that which it has, when applied to the Old Testament Prophets. It designated the impartation of knowledge which can be acquired in none of the natural ways, neither through tradition, nor through sensuous perception, nor through reflection, but only by immediate revelation. It matters not whether any thing future was in this way imparted, or any thing otherwise concealed, which it was the pleasure of the Deity to make known to man. The idea of Old Testament Prophecy is not limited barely to the unveiling of the future, nor is this essential to it: and in that of New Testament Prophecy, although a reference to the future, to events predetermined by Jehovah, is not excluded, it is still less the principal thing; which is rather, as it would seem, the disclosure of the secrets of men's hearts, and the utterance of appropriate instructions, monitions and warnings. Only the *προφήτης* must always speak by means of a Divine revelation especially afforded him. In respect to the Old Testament Prophets, we always find them exercising their functions in a full and clear consciousness: of whatever nature was the revelation which they received, and were to impart, there always remained to them a perfect collectedness of mind (*Besonnenheit*), and a clear consciousness of the outward world around them, and their connexion with it.\* On this account the prophet needed no interpreter for his declarations, but could utter these very sayings as clearly and intelligibly as the object of prophecy was revealed to him. It was in perfect consistency with this, that the prophets had not to announce what was received at the very moment of its reception;—they might equally well defer its announcement until sometime afterwards: since, as in a state of prophetic inspiration, perfect clearness and collectedness was retained, so there was also after its cessation, a perfectly clear recollection of what had

\* Hengstenberg's view of the prophetic state differs from this *toto cælo*. See his "Christologie," Th. I. S. 293 ff. Upon the whole we prefer the one here given—our reasons are developed in the sequel. Yet Hengstenberg's view must be admitted and Bleek's modified in some very important respects. It is clear to us, that *some* of the Old Testament prophets (as Daniel and Ezekiel), and perhaps *some* of the New Testament Prophets, received many, if not all of their revelations in a trance-like and ecstatic state. And perhaps *all* the prophets were *sometimes* in such a state. But to maintain that such was always the case, as Hengstenberg does, appears to us inconsistent with a right conception of their peculiar functions.



been revealed. In all this the Hebrew Prophet differed from the Heathen μάντις.\* With the Christian Prophets the case was however precisely the same, as we may clearly learn from the hints of Paul. The main difference between the προφήτης and the γλώσσαις λαλῶν in the Christian Church of the Apostolic Age, was this: that the former in receiving a revelation retained a perfect clearness of consciousness; the latter never did, never at least in the same degree. The one had it therefore much more in his power than the other, to hold forth and apply the contents of the received revelation in the most salutary manner for the edification of the church. Hence it need occasion no surprize, that Paul gives the preference to the Gift of Prophecy."

Admirable, and full, and in most respects true, as is this latter description of the prophetic state, we must be permitted to think that, in one respect at least, it needs essential modification. That the prophet was usually in the full exercise of his intellectual powers, cannot be reasonably doubted; but that he was as calm and cool as would seem to be implied in this representation,† is not so obvious. A very cursory perusal only of the Old Testament prophecies is necessary to make it apparent, that the prophetic state involved *feeling* of great intenseness, and perhaps as the predominant element. We cannot conceive the contrary for a moment. The foresight of a joyous or terrific future, could not but awaken vivid emotions of gladness or grief. The wicked thoughts of the human heart exposed fully to the prophet's view in the strong light of Heaven, would rouse a holy, but yet an intense indignation. If inspired to chant the high praises of Jehovah, then again the prophet's emotions must have been deep and rapturous. And proportionably earnest and severe were his rebukes and threatnings of Divine

\* "According to Plato (in the *Timæus*,) the μάντις—he to whom the name was rightfully applied, and with whom the μαντική was something true and divinely imparted—was never ἐκκενός, in a condition of collectedness and of clear consciousness, and therefore was unable himself to judge of that which in the state of inspiration he had seen or declared. This was the province of a separate office, that of the interpreter, the προφήτης who was appointed to judge of and interpret the annunciations of the μάντις. Many however falsely apply the appellation μάντις to the προφήτης. No one can well fail of observing the entire correspondence between the relation of the μάντις to the προφήτης with Plato, and that of the γλώσσαις λαλῶν to the ἑρμηνεύτης γλωσσῶν with Paul. Bleek *ub. γλ. λαλ.*

† The sentiment is more clearly expressed in other passages of Bleek's treatise. Olshausen (*ub die Sprachengabe*, S. 569) says that the Prophet, with tranquil and collected mind, taught the Divine."



judgements—impressive and stimulating his monitions and exhortations—sweetly consolatory his “comfortable words.”

Hence, as it is not supposable that he was always in this condition of high excitation, or in fact could be in the constant reception of revelations, which were, in part at least, causes of excitement, the probability is, that when the Prophet, as a Prophet, spake in the Christian assembly, it was on the sudden experience of an impulse from the Holy Ghost.

As the charisma of Tongues is said by the Apostle to be a sign to the unbelieving, so on the other hand the charisma of Prophecy is said to be a sign to the believing. (1 Cor. 14 : 22).\* This statement induces the inference, that the prophetic Gift was bestowed mainly for the edification of the Church ; and that the prophetic annunciations, rebukes, warnings, and consolations, were ordinarily addressed to believers. As the design of the prophetic office under the Old Dispensation, was, to enforce the claims of the Theocracy, to keep its institutions and privileges, its rights and ceremonies, enshrined in the hearts of the Jewish people, bitterly to reproach them when indifferent or intractable, and recall them to their duty :—so, under the New Dispensation, it was the province of the Prophet, sacredly to guard the interests of the primitive church, by following the Brethren from time to time, according to their collective or individual condition, with solace or reproof, with stimulus or with menace.

The Charisma which is termed *διάκρισις πνευμάτων*, was given to secure the church against abuses of the prophetic Gift, and against the wiles of false prophets. The province of its possessor, was to distinguish between what was human and what Divine in the discourses of the true Prophet, and to divest the imposter of his disguises.†

The *second* additional class of men in the Primitive Church, whose charisma was such as to exhibit itself in oral discourse, was that of the *διδάσκαλοι*. Of these may be truly said, what Olshausen has, as we think, erroneously said of the Prophets, that it was their office “with tranquil and collected mind, and with Divine power, to teach the divine.” There seem to have been two orders of the *διδάσκαλοι*, the

\* Most Commentators give the explanation of the passage which is here adopted. Platt (“Vorlesungen &c.” in locum) proposes a different, but unnatural and unsatisfactory one.

† Comp. Platt's Vorlesungen &c. S. 282. 283.



one having the word of wisdom (λόγος σοφίας), the other the word of knowledge (λόγος γνσεωώς). 1 Cor. 12 : 8. The latter taught the truths of Christianity *theoretically*, the former, *practically*. Or rather the latter discoursed concerning the great Christian doctrines, particularly the high and mysterious things of redemption, relatively to these interpreting the Old Testament Scriptures, and the life and teachings, the sufferings, death, resurrection and ascension of the Redeemer. The latter inculcated the practical duties of the Christian religion, explaining their nature, and how they might and might not be modified by the peculiar circumstances of believers in the Apostolic Age.\*—The Evangelists seem to have belonged to the class of διδάσκαλοι. They were distinguished by being itinerary, while the ordinary διδάσκαλοι were attached permanently to particular churches. Perhaps in their teachings the theoretic and practical were combined, and combined to just such an extent as these elements in Christianity do naturally combine. It was sufficient for their object (the first conversion of Pagan unbelievers), to tell the simple Gospel story. Those to whom they discoursed, not having previously known "the first principles" of Christianity, were in no condition "to go on unto perfection,"—to be indoctrinated systematically in its truths.

It requires but little reflection and research to discover the indispensableness of the Charismata of Prophecy and of Teaching, not only to the prosperity, but to the very preservation of the Church. Most of its members were received from the very bosom of Heathenism. They had, indeed, become "new creatures in Christ Jesus." But they were not created *mature* in knowledge, in wisdom, in moral habits—they were *new* creatures, emphatically. Just now they were merged in all the ignorance and vice of Paganism. The story of Christ crucified was told them, and with

\* 1 Cor. 12 : 8. has received divers interpretations. Platt explains σοφία as we explain γνσεως, and vice versa. Neander (Gesch. der Pflanz. u. Leit. &c., B. I. S. 120) adopts the interpretation that we follow. Robinson in his Lex. of the New Testament prefers this. Macknight refers λογ. σοφ. to "the doctrine of the Gospel," and λογ. γν. to "the complete knowledge of the former revelations recorded in the writings of Moses and the prophets," and considers the former "peculiar to the Apostles," and the latter to a class of men whom he calls "the superiour prophets."

It is very probable that the Prophet sometimes possessed one or the other or both of these λόγοι. But we think it much more reasonable to suppose them to belong *appropriately* and usually only to the διδάσκαλοι.



loving hearts they fell at his feet. The change was vast ; but it was speedily effected, and in this simple way. They came into the church knowing scarcely any thing respecting the true religion, save that same touching story. The Old Testament Scriptures they perhaps had never seen, certainly never read. In order to attain any thing like the stature of men, they had to be taught what these reveal—a very important part of the history of redemption. More especially had they to learn, the peculiar doctrines and spirit and duties of Christianity, as exemplified and inculcated by Christ himself. Oral instruction was perhaps the only, at all events the best method of teaching that could be employed. Hence the necessity of inspired teachers. Competent *uninspired* teachers were not to be found. For, to say nothing of the fact that Christians were gathered mostly from the poor and illiterate, whence could the most learned and talented inform themselves sufficiently in regard to the New Religion ! The Gospels and the Epistles were not then written, or, if written, were not in general circulation. The Apostles were burdened with labours of other kinds too abundant to allow of a sufficient number of teachers being duly indoctrinated by them.—Nor was it in the power of the Apostles, charged, as they were, with the general supervision of the primitive Churches, to remain with particular churches long enough to perform the work of the *οὐδῶσκαλος* themselves.—Inspired teachers then were indispensable. How salutary must have been their influence !—not only in the positive infusion of knowledge respecting the doctrines and duties of Christianity ; but also in guarding against the admixture of the false with the true, and the inroads of error in other shapes, to which the primitive Churches, owing to the previous characters, associations and habits of their members, and to the powerful and beguiling influences always at work in the world around them, were so fearfully exposed.

Invaluable, however, as were the instructions of the *οὐδῶσκαλοι*, their efforts could not wholly avail to the maintenance of purity in faith and life. The weight of example and temptation without, so corrupt was the state of Heathen society, was too great to be successfully resisted by their quiet teachings. Although in consequence of the faithful discharge of their functions, the “*meliora*” were approved, through the assault of outward seduction, or the promptings of inward



passion, the "deteriora" were followed, and some of their fellow-Christians—perchance the whole (particular) Church—were in imminent danger of wandering from the fold, and perhaps of ultimate apostacy. *Then* it was necessary that the delinquents should hear a voice more thrilling than theirs. At this juncture, the *Prophet's* sympathies are powerfully wrought upon. He contemplates the peril of his brethren—of the Church—and starts back with indignation, with grief, with terror. He longs to exert himself to arrest the danger. Suddenly "the hand of the Lord" is upon him. The secret motives and designs of his brethren are more fully disclosed to him, and with acute and divinely imparted foresight he vividly beholds all the consequences of their past and prospective procedures. His emotions are still more intensely excited. At length, impelled irresistibly by the Divine Spirit, his bosom full of burning emotion, but his intellectual eye clearly and intently surveying all the crime and peril of the case, fixing itself also upon the means fittest to accomplish the recovery of his sinning brethren, he addresses them in heart-stirring accents of mingled rebuke and threatening, of grief and love, which, as the voice of God, penetrate the inmost depths of their souls. Their repentings are enkindled, the storm passes away, the horizon is again cloudless and serene.—Or, from the pressure of outward persecution or inward perplexities, there is despondency in the hearts of some of his brethren. This suffered to remain, (its *causes* in that troublous time could not but do so,) it might prove hardly less prejudicial to the interests of the Church, than the other source of difficulty. Delightful in this instance the work of the Prophet, as distressful in the other! He is allowed to gaze at glorious scenes in the future history of the Church. Even the veil which separates this from the invisible world is torn away, and his undazzled though enraptured eye, lingeringly rests upon all the effulgent attractions of the Heavenly State. And now, with emotions elevated to the highest point, but yet with his intellectual and rational powers in full exercise, and fully appreciating and sympathising with the condition and feelings of his dejected brethren, he communicates to them his own bright visions. Gloom and despondency flee away to their appropriate dwelling-place in the realm of "chaos and old night."—Or there is a more vast and sublime end to be effected. The Prophet Agabus goes through with his symbolic procedure, and utters his pre-



diction—and there is exhibited, for the ennobling and rejoicing of the universal Church down to the end of time, and for the gratification of its divine Head, the sublime spectacle of a Paul, unmanned not by the entreaties and tears of affection which his pre-eminent excellencies had elicited, daunted not in the certain prospect of incarceration and death, but exclaiming with inimitable pathos, “What mean ye to weep and break my heart? for I am ready not to be bound only, but also to die at Jerusalem, for the name of the Lord Jesus.”

Acts 21: 10–13.

Besides the Charismata which have now been enumerated, pertaining to the ministration of the word, there are some others, the design of which was, to secure a judicial administration of Ecclesiastical concerns. One class of these, the *κυβερνήσεις*, was bestowed upon the *πρεσβύτεροι* or *ἐπίσκοποι*, and qualified them for the governmental supervision of the churches. A second species of Charismata under this genus was conferred upon the Deacons, and were entitled *ἀντιλήψεις*. It was their province to superintend the outward concerns of the churches, provide and prepare places of assembly, and especially to relieve the wants of the poor, and minister to the necessities of the sick, those both of body and of spirit.

These two sorts of Charismata also were rendered needful by the peculiar circumstances of the Primitive Church. Had its governing officers not been possessed of extraordinary wisdom and prudence, many unworthy members would have received a nominal admission into the fold of Christ. Unless they had been continually under the guidance of such men, the primitive Churches would doubtless much sooner have engrafted upon the simple form of church polity, which appropriately belongs to Christianity, those unhallowed and ambitious imitations of the kingdoms of this world, and those heathenish rites and usages which were its curse in after centuries. There was necessary, too, a supernatural judgment and discrimination, in order to the exercise of a salutary and equitable care of the poor and the sick, of whom so many were found in the primitive Churches.

A last class of supernaturally endowed persons, consisted of those who had the power of working miracles. A part of these seem to have possessed only the power to heal ordinary diseases, while the endowments of the rest enabled them to cast out devils, and perform other kinds of miracles.\*

\*Macknight translates the *ἐνεργήματα ἐνδύμενον* of 1 Cor. 12: 10, “inworkings of powers,” supposing it to refer to the prerogative of conferring



The indispensableness of these, as of all the other Charismata, to the primitive laborers in the propagation of Christianity must have arisen from the unique character of the times which, in this connexion, demands a closer inspection, not only as to its manifestations, but also as to its root. At present it is acknowledged practicable, on all hands, to effect the promulgation of the gospel, without miraculous aids: and, indeed, their co-operation is rather deprecated than desired: for it seems befitting, that, in all ordinary circumstances, the truth should prevail by its own might, strengthened only by the inward operations of the Spirit. The peculiar feature of the Apostolic Age,—which also marked that of Christ's abode on earth, stands out too prominently, to admit of a moment's doubt in respect to it. As the kingdom of Heaven appeared in an outwardly feeble and incipient form, so the kingdom of Darkness exhibited itself at its culminating point, and in its full potency. The Arch-Fiend had previously, through the cruel edict of Herod, attempted (like his bestial representative in the case of the infant Hercules) to strangle the young Jesus in his cradle. Now, in the Apostolic Age, he attempts the same thing in respect to the religion he came to originate. And while the previous history of the world had been such as to prepare the way for the coming of the Messiah, we cannot but think it was such as also to expose the world, in the Messianic and Apostolic times, peculiarly to the assaults of Satan. It felt itself wretched and helpless. A thousand methods of moral and physical renovation had been tried, but all had been futile. And there was an almost universal degradation of spirit, and in those countries, at least, where the Gospel was first to be propagated, a prevalent morbidness of body. And there was consequently in the universal heart a sense of despondency, almost of despair, and a craving for redemption, which made the Messiah emphatically "the desire of all nations." But yet, this same

Charismata, with which the Apostles were invested. And after a more careful examination of his arguments, than we had bestowed upon them when the above was written, we feel strongly inclined to depart from the common rendering. The strict etymological meaning of *ἐκβάλλω* and its derivatives is certainly preferable in the majority of cases where they are used. Dr. Macknight is evidently in error when he says that *ἐκβάλλω* is never used in the sense of *ποιέω*—for such is its meaning unquestionably in Phil. 2: 13, in the second of the two cases where it is there used. But yet "inwork" seems to us often the preferable meaning, and, for the reasons that Dr. Macknight alleges, particularly in this passage. Then the *χαρισματα ἐκβάλλον* would include the power of expelling demons. But Neander, Flatt, and Robinson (see Lexicon on the word) prefer, indeed seem to know no other than the rendering of the text.



craving for redemption was far from involving a clear knowledge of the sort of deliverer needed. It prompted its subjects to lay hold of *any* new means of rescue, real or pretended, that should offer itself.\* Hence the easy prevalence of fanaticism and superstition. And although there was much of this while our Saviour remained on earth, it had a far wider sway after his ascension. While on earth, he himself was the grand mark at which the Fiendish Power aimed its poisonous shafts. But after he had again seated himself at the Father's right hand, where they could not reach him, *man* in his naked and defenceless state, became the object of assault, and was made the dupe of every sort of imposture. Among the Jews, (as Christ predicted,) one and another asserted Messianic claims to the delusion and ruin of their adherents. Among the Gentiles, sorcery and magic were extensively practised for the removal of disease, and the support of idolatrous falsehood and absurdity. In every way, the Father of lies was exerting himself to the full measure of his vast energies: and the outward and sensuous, always predominant enough over the inward and spiritual, in their influence upon man, became, in the Apostolic Age, almost the sole avenue to the heart.

The frame of mind generally prevalent among men was, therefore, such as imperatively to demand the power to work miracles, in the presence of any one who would catch their attention, engage their feelings, and initiate them into the doctrines of a new religion.

Such, we think, must have been some of the principal reasons operative with the great Head of the Church for endowing the Apostles and primitive Christians with the power of working miracles. It was not, that the native constitution of the human mind was such, that their testimony respecting the facts and truths of the Christian religion *could* not otherwise be believed.† The first preachers of the

\* Comp. Neander, *Gesch. der Ch. Rel. u. Kirche*, B. I, § 63.

† A similar statement may with equal truth be made respecting our Saviour's miracles.—They may be regarded under three distinct aspects:

In the first place *as fulfilling in a very important particular, the Messianic predictions of the Old Testament*. Thus regarded, they must be acknowledged to have been absolutely indispensable to produce (among the Jews at least) conviction of his Messiahship.

Our Saviour's miracles may, *secondly*, be contemplated *as exhibitions of Divine benevolence*. And without them as such, we freely confess that his claims to be the Son of God, appearing in the flesh to redeem the world, could not have been substantiated. If the sick had been suffered to



Gospel were palpably ingenuous, honest, and veracious men. A moment's candid contemplation of their characters, as visible in their efforts from day to day, would have been sufficient to produce conviction of their entire freedom from sordid or ambitious motives, and their whole-hearted desire to promote the highest benefit of their race. This exhibition of character ought of itself to have secured the belief of their

remain unhealed, and the demoniac had been left unrescued from his fearful and agonizing thralldom under the Fiendish Power, there would have been an exhibition of character palpably incompatible with benevolence; and faith in his redemptive character must at once have been paralyzed. As God, seated on the throne of universal empire, and ordering in mysterious sovereignty, the affairs of this lower world, he might previously to his incarnation, and may now, allow the continuance of human suffering, and at the same time be confessedly and unimpeachably benevolent. But *in the form of man*,—with human sympathies, which he professed to have—moving about among men, how could he but perform miracles for the alleviation or removal of human woe? Philanthropy, we say it with reverence, rendered *obligatory* upon him the working of miracles, no less than it demands of ordinary men the common offices of charity.

The miracles of our Saviour may be regarded, *thirdly*, as *evidential of inherent divine power*. It is the opinion of many writers, that in *this* aspect of them also, they were strictly and absolutely indispensable to the authentication of His claims and announcements: and because such are the laws of the human mind, that those claims and announcements *could* not otherwise be relied upon. This undoubtedly is the meaning of Less (Ueber die Religion, B. 2, S. 202), when he roundly asserts, with particular reference to our Saviour's miracles, that "no other means could be devised by which God could rationally convince us men, that He has sent us any one as a Teacher." Perhaps in a very qualified form this remark may apply to others; but it is certainly inapplicable to Jesus Christ. There were apparent in his life and teachings, an unearthliness, a purity, an exaltation, a depth and compass of benevolence, which wore the impress of a character not only superhuman, but divine. And clothed upon, though he was, with the humble and obseuring garb of humanity, still to the eye undarkened by the film of passion or prejudice, that impress was visible and resplendent. (Ullman, one of the most charming of present German writers, as we think, has remarked, *that the strongest proof of the Divine existence, is to be derived from the historic moral character of Christ*. "Theologische Aphorismen" in Theol. Stud. u. Krit. 1835, B. 2.) This he often asserted. He blamed the Jews for seeking miracles as if they were the grand and only credentials of his divine mission. He declared, that whoever was of the truth, spontaneously heard its voice.—His teachings might, therefore, independently of his miracles, considered merely as evidences of divine power, have been reasonably relied on, and his claims acknowledged.

Nothing, therefore, in the laws of human belief inherent in the mind, rendered miracles *necessary* in order to substantiate the claims of the Messiah, except so far as they had been predicted, and in so far as they constituted evidences of his God-like benevolence. In their separate and appropriate character, as *miracles*, they were rendered indispensable, only on account of the darkening and sensualizing effects of sin.

Extreme, however, begets extreme: and the argumentative value of our Saviour's miracles has been *under-rated* as well as *over-rated*. On the ground that there has been an exhibition in the world of supernatural *diabolic* agency, it has been affirmed that of themselves they entirely fail to



story, even had it been one of seeming extravagance and improbability. And superadded to the still more convincing *internal* evidence of the truths which fell from their lips,—evidence whose cogency would have been thrillingly felt in every susceptibility of the heart, had access to it once been allowed; it constituted an overwhelming mass of proof. *Then it should have been acknowledged, as it is now, irresistible.*

demonstrate his divine mission and character.—That Satanic miracles have been wrought is sufficiently evident. But who does not at once recoil from the idea, that either in number, in variety, or in grandeur, (to say nothing now of *benevolent* design and efficacy, which is wholly unpredictable of them,) they ever have equalled, or ever can equal, the supernatural works of the Son of God! How revolting is it to every noble-minded Christian, to place the few, puny and contemptible miracles which have been effected by the powers of Darkness, working in darkness, in comparison with the constant, every-day, but richly-diversified, wondrous, and effulgent *toys* of our Saviour!—the blind, empiric, childish tampering of Diabolic Agency with some few of the powers of nature that are a little concealed from human ken, in comparison with *His* profound knowledge of the abstrusest laws of both material and spiritual worlds; his ready and lordly control over their mightiest energies; his free and fountain-like pouring forth of revivifying, creative efficiency!—The hypothesis that miraculous energies of this exalted character might exist in a creature unholy and diabolical, carries an absurdity upon the very face of it:—they have in them an inherent, an inextinguishable, a resistless *implication* of holiness and benevolence and divinity.—No! our Saviour's miracles, in their appropriate character as miracles, constitute a rich co-ordinate proof of his Divine mission and Divine nature.

And though the spiritual mind may see in the moral excellencies of Christ enough to induce its implicit reliance on him, yet a feeling deep within it, and deeper in proportion as it is more spiritual, thrillingly responds to His exhibitions of supernatural power. It is the love of completeness and perfection—the feeling that would have an outward and worthy manifestation of the inward nature. To *infer* the existence of latent power is not enough. Holiness is developed in the life—and benevolence, and heroism, and every other sublime trait. Power unmanifested, and that love of completeness and perfection—that delight in beholding the outward correspondent to and worthy of the inward—is left inquiet and unsatisfied. There seems an incongruity, a deficiency, where *every thing* should be God-like. This was in *part* our meaning, when we affirmed (p. 3.) miracles to be part and parcel of Christianity.

After all, our Saviour's miracles *as* miracles, are but *inferiour* proofs of his divine legation and essence. They are right revealings of divine power—but also of divine power *in the service of divine love*. The vision may be caught a moment by the vivid flashings of the *power*, but the spiritual eye will longest and most delightfully fasten itself upon the *love* to which that flashing as an index ever points.

One thought more which these remarks suggest, and we complete a brief sketch of our views respecting this interesting topic. God, says John, *is* love. It is his very essence. By His love, far more than by any thing else, he is exalted above all that is human—all that is angelic. If Jesus Christ be the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person—if he be the *Way*, the *Truth*, and the *Life*—in one word the divine Re-



Christianity would nevertheless have been but slowly and feebly diffused, had not those who were engaged in its propagation been furnished with supernatural powers. "In the beginning," says Origen, "men were moved to forsake the religion of their fathers, and embrace one strange to them, more by miracles than by hortative addresses. It is not probable that the Apostles of Jesus, unlettered and ignorant men, in the annunciation of Christianity, could have relied upon anything else than the power conferred upon them, and the grace accompanying the divine word; nor is it probable, that their hearers could have been persuaded to abandon the time-hallowed usages of their native lands, had they not been attracted to doctrines so strange to them, and so remote from their wonted opinions, by a credibly supernatural power, and by miracles."

The *method* in which the miracles of the Apostles and others actually operated in the advancement of Christianity, may be very accurately gathered from the narrations in the Acts, and from the analogy of our Saviour's miracles, as well as from the records of early Ecclesiastical History. Their *chief* moral efficacy was felt in the persons of those upon whom they had been wrought. As already intimated, we think ourselves authorized to believe that the number of sufferers under bodily diseases, and from the possession of Demons, was from the advent of our Saviour until the close of the Apostolic age, very considerable—greater by far than it is wont to be in countries of an equal population with those wherein these miracles were performed. And consequently were these, or a part of these, the only persons on whom they were operative, in inducing them to embrace the gospel, their subservience to its propagation could not but have been very important.

To illustrate the influence of miracles upon such persons, we quote a graphic passage from Neander's Church History. "The Christian falls in with an unfortunate man under the enthrallment of blind, heathenish superstition, who is sick in body and soul. In vain at the temple of Æscula-

deemer of the world; the *proof* of the fact—the *grand and crowning* proof, must be sought in the infinitude and matchlessness of his benevolence. One would think that in this sinful world, where the manifestations of power are so common, but those of disinterested love are so rare, this proof would be universally and intuitively available. Alas! it is not so. The very fact that ought to make it first and greatest, does in reality make it last and least.



pius, where at that period so many sought their restoration in dreams sent by the God of the healing art—in vain from heathen priests and sorcerers, with their multifarious magic formulas and amulets, had he looked for healing. The Christian admonishes him to seek help, not from powerless, lifeless idols, (or, according to the customary opinion of Christians, from evil spirits,) but turning to the Almighty God, to rely upon Him, alone able to give aid, and hearing those who invoked him in the name of Jesus, by whom he had redeemed man from the misery of sin. The Christian uses no magic formula, no amulet, but invoking God through Christ, lays his hands upon the sick man's head, in trustful confidence in his Saviour. The sick person is healed, and the corporeal restoration becomes the means of a spiritual one."

"There were especially in that time of fermentation, when the cords of spiritual and moral life were sundered, a multitude of persons in such a condition of physical and spiritual ailment, as to find their whole inward being deranged. Invaded by a hostile power to which their will was subjugated, they felt themselves drawn blindly hither and thither, and suffered an inexplicable anguish. . . . Those unfortunates believed themselves possessed by evil spirits, and it was the general opinion that such was the case.\* Both among the heathen and the Jews, many pretended, by various fumigations and embrocations, and botanical preparations, and amulets, and conjurations of the evil spirits, with mysteriously sounding formulas, to be able to cast them out. Sometimes such means as had a natural medicinal power, or others operating upon the imagination, so energetic in such states of mind, for a moment cured the sick person of his conceit, or deluded him with promises of future relief. At all events these people did harm, confirming men as they did in their superstition, and in their unholy character throughout, and conflicting with the kingdom of lies, by means of lying wonders (*Kräfte der Lüge*)—expelling one devil by another. Their jugglery reached not the inward ground of the evil, which lay deeper, and at which alone true healing could commence. . . . An unfortunate of this description, after seeking help in vain from such exor-

\* If Neander mean to imply that there was no real possession, we cannot endorse this sentence. But from other passages in his writings, we are inclined to think that he is orthodox.



cists, comes to a pious Christian. The latter considers him possessed, and feels no concern to investigate the more proximate cause of the calamity. He knows that his Redeemer has vanquished the Prince of Darkness, and that to Him all the might of evil, however exhibiting itself, must submit. He invokes Him, and the power of the Divine Spirit which is in Him. His prayer, drawing down the energies of Heaven, inworks deeply upon the interior distracted nature of the diseased man. Inward rest succeeds the inwardly raging storm: and by thus experiencing in himself the efficacy of the divine power of Christianity, his faith is awakened, and now for the first time fully freed from the dominion of evil, he is, by the illuminating and sanctifying power of truth, fundamentally and forever healed, so that the evil spirit returning to his house, never again finds it swept and garnished for himself."\*

The question, how long the power of working miracles continued in the Church, has been much disputed, and probably can never be entirely settled. If it were conferred only through the medium of the Apostles, the latest survivor of whom died A.D. 96, they probably ceased about the middle of the second century. That this was the case may be argued with considerable plausibility from Acts 8: 5-17, and Rom. 1: 11. From the former of these passages, we learn that Peter and John were sent by the rest of the Apostles to Samaria, for the express purpose apparently of laying their hands upon the Samaritan converts, and conferring the Holy Ghost, although they were then enjoying the labours of the evangelist Philip, one of the most spiritual of the primitive disciples, and himself a miracle-worker. In the latter, Paul expresses a desire to visit the church at Rome, in order that he might communicate to some of its members supernatural powers. To these passages, *Less*, in a discussion of the general subject† (of miracles), adds Ephesians 4: 11-16 as a basis of argumentation. In this chapter it is clearly asserted, (among the English interpreters, Macknight at least so explains the passage,) that when the Church had attained a mature and stable organization, the mission of the Charismata would be accomplished. This organization *Less* thinks, was actually attained through the labours of the

\* Allg. Ges ch. der Ch. Rel. u. Kirche, B. 1, S. 63 ff. Comp. Neander's Denkwürdigkeiten, B. 1, S. 237 ff.

† *Less*, über die Religion, B. 2, S. 450 ff.



Apostles and those instructed and endowed by them, and denies, therefore, the continuance of supernatural powers after they had left the world. The argument drawn from these passages, though of considerable strength, is not absolutely conclusive. There is not, indeed, the slightest evidence, either from the N. T. or from Ecclesiastical History, so far as we are aware, that any other men save the Apostles could impart miraculous gifts.\* But they were in some instances received directly from Heaven, as on the day of Pentecost and in the case of Cornelius. It is true there were peculiar reasons why the Charismata should be thus received at these particular times. But so there might have been for their communication in the same way at other times.

The testimony of Church History respecting the continuance of the power of working miracles beyond the first half of the second century, is hardly more, perhaps even considerably less, decisive than that of the New Testament.

One thing, however, is certain. The extreme limit of the duration of the power in question, is such as not to include any part of the fifth century.† Augustine, who was made bishop of Hippo in A.D. 398, speaks of them as belonging to the past. Chrysostom, who was contemporary, is explicit in affirming that in this age they had ceased. "Signs," says he, "are for unbelievers, not for believers, as we are: nor is that any unkindness to us, but God rather does us honour in withdrawing the evidence of miracles." Again, "The Apostles wrought miracles in their time, but now they are passed and gone." Again, "God has ceased to work miracles."‡

If now we ascend to the former part of the fourth century, we find Eusebius of Cesarea, about A.D. 315, speaks of miracles as being performed in his time, but yet as being few, and (in one passage) of little importance—though he elsewhere states that Christians expelled devils in the name of Christ.\*\* Coming to a still earlier date, we hear Origen A.D. 230, declaring himself thus: "Miraculous works of the

\* Paul's reception of the Holy Ghost, by the imposition of Ananias' hands cannot *justly* be urged to the contrary.

† Mosheim, however, supposes that some miracle *did* occur in the fifth century. Murdock's Mosh. vol. I, p. 375.

‡ See these and other passages to the same effect, quoted in Lardner's Works, London ed., 1829, vol. 4, pp. 565. 566.

\*\* Lardner, vol. 4, p. 90.



Holy Spirit were, in the beginning, during the ministry of Jesus, and after his ascension, performed in great numbers : afterwards they were fewer : yet now there are traces of them in the cases of a few persons whose souls have been purified by the Divine word, and a life thence proceeding.\* This he says, in controverting what Celsus had written some fifty years before : who, however, seemed to admit miracles were performed in his times, though he ascribed them to magical practices.†

Such is the very respectable testimony to the continuance of miracles, till some time in the first half of the fourth century. And were these, and a few similar statements, all that are to be found in the patristical writings upon the subject, perhaps little hesitation would be felt in yielding them implicit credence. But there is a mass of testimony additional to this, wearing an aspect anything but that of similar judgement and sobriety. For instance, only some twenty or thirty years before Augustine and Chrysostom affirmed, that miracles in their time belonged to the past, (and as we should infer from their language, a past somewhat remote‡) Epiphanius represents them to have occurred very frequently at the time he lived, and to have been, many of them, of a very wonderful character.|| In the same manner, while Origen was declaring so explicitly the extreme fewness of the exhibitions of miraculous power in his age, Gregory of Neocesarea, his own pupil, was performing, according to his biographers, so great a variety of miracles, and these of so marvellous a nature, as to procure for himself the emphatic cognomen of *Thaumaturgus*, or wonder-worker.§ Nor is the trustworthiness of these accounts invalidated simply by the length of their catalogues of miracles. The miracles themselves, a vast proportion of them, strike us at once as absurd and ridiculous.

Another ground of hesitation consists in the singular fact, "that the miracles mentioned by the Apologists and ancient fathers of the second and third centuries, are usually healing

\* Quoted in Neander's *Denkwürdigkeiten*, B. I, §. 401.

† Lardner's Works, vol. 7, pp. 255, 266.

‡ The second of the above quotations from Chrysostom might afford a strong argument that in his belief miracles were wrought only by the Apostles.

|| See the "Jewish credulity" of the man caustically remarked upon in *Less, über die Religion*, B. 2, §. 258.

§ For an account of a specimen-miracle, see Lardner's Works, vol. 2, pp. 613, 614.



the sick and casting out evil spirits, miracles in which there is room for some error and deception: we hear nothing of causing the blind to see, the deaf to hear, the lame to walk, the lepers to be cleansed.\*

An additional and sad fact bearing upon the matter in hand, and tending to render us very cautious in receiving much of what the fathers say respecting miracles is this: that at least as soon† as the commencement of the second century, the system of pious frauds was introduced, founded upon the principle that deception is lawful, if only used to advance the kingdom of Christ.

If, besides, it be recollected, how extensively the love of the marvellous has always prevailed, and how easily some little story (*cresens eundo*) is magnified into one of huge dimensions, still greater reason will appear for skepticism.

But strong as are the motives to universal unbelief, those to partial faith are in our view still stronger.

In the first place, some of the accounts of miracles bear evident internal marks of truth. Origen, for instance, in the quotation above adduced, however fanciful he may have been in some of his opinions upon other matters, exhibits a judgement, caution and moderateness of statement, which certainly bespeak its credibility. So of Eusebius and others.

In the next place, to use the words of Dr. Jortin,‡ “the general good character of these ancient Christians, which yet is always to be understood with some exceptions, their low and afflicted state, their pious behaviour under it, their want of a divine support and encouragement to keep them constant to their profession, their remote situation from each other in various parts of the known world, their great numbers, and their success in converting multitudes, their open appeals to the Pagans in their apologies, and the knowledge which the Pagans probably had of these appeals, the persons who attest these things, some of whom were confessors and martyrs, others learned, ingenious, and of a fair character, incline us to believe that miracles did not entirely cease in those times, and that Christians could not continue together in carrying on impostures, or be able to impose them upon those whom they had converted or be imposed upon themselves by dishonest brethren. It is strange that they should

\* Jortin's Remarks on Eccl. Hist., vol. 1, p. 275.

† Comp. Murdock's Mosheim, vol. 1, p. 88.

‡ Remarks on Ec. Hist., vol. 1, p. 273.



have been able to maintain so good a reputation as they did amongst the more moderate and unprejudiced Pagans, and have had the success amongst them which they had, if they were so disposed to forging and to defending forged miracles."

According to the accounts (he adds) which the writers of the second and third centuries have given us of these miracles, it appears not that they were performed in an absurd and superstitious way, but usually by plain, and religious, and apostolical methods, as by prayer and invocation of Jesus: nor doth it appear that they were usually wrought for lucre or to vest extraordinary authority in any person, or to augment the power of the clergy, or to decide the religious controversies, or to run down anything called heresy and heterodoxy, or to establish any new doctrine, or to encourage and recommend voluntary and foolish austerities, a solitary life, vows of celibacy and virginity, worshipping of wood, rags and bones, invocation of saints, &c.\*

Upon the whole, the opinion is reasonable, that miracles did not entirely cease until the time of Constantine. As to the thousands of miracles which are related to have occurred subsequently, their defence "shall be left to those who are inclined to undertake it, at the hazard of misapplying their pains. One sort of miracle seems to have been much wanted, and that was, to cast the *romantic devil* out of the Christians of those times: but this kind goeth not out so easily, and stands in awe of no exorcisms."†

In taking this prolix, but, considering the multitude of points involved in the subject, cursory and very imperfect survey of the agency of the charismata bestowed upon the primitive Church, in the advancement of Christianity, we have seen that some were designed more directly to subserve the interests of the believing, and others those of the unbelieving. While in this respect, however, their aims were dissimilar, they were both, as is very apparent, largely and benignly co-operative in enlarging and perfecting the glorious kingdom of the Redeemer.

And though various in their more specific forms and modes of operation, yet the origin of all was the same—the

\* Still the good Doctor, at the conclusion of his discussion, desires to be ranked among the "doubters."

† Dr. Jortin, Rem. on E. H., vol. I, p. 285. Comp. with the view we have taken of the general subject, the valuable note on pp. 125, 126, of Murdock's Mosheim, vol. I.



Holy Ghost. 1 Cor. 12: 4. The energy of the Spirit did not, however, manifest itself in equal *degrees* in all these diversified Gifts. In some, divine power appeared as the grand, resplendent, and indeed almost only element, operating in a sort of arbitrary connexion with human agency: (although even here the native or acquired character of certain individuals, as admitting of very strong *faith*, might constitute a kind of basis to build upon.) Such were the Charismata of healing and of working other descriptions of outward miracles. With these are probably to be classed the Charismata of Tongues and of Prophecy, with the correlate of the former. In others, divine power was no less active, and could not but have been recognized as being so, but more in co-operation with the ordinary powers. Its effect in this case was not so much to *create* something before unpossessed, as to strengthen, elevate, and purify what was already existent and operative. Such were the gifts of *διδασκαλία*, *κυβερνήσις*, &c. It is indeed remarked by the Apostle, "All these worketh the self-same Spirit, dividing to every man severally *as he will*." 1 Cor. 12: 11. But this statement cannot imply that contrarily to the usual method of Divine procedure, no regard was had to the peculiar characteristics of individuals. The *διδασκαλος* had doubtless, as the result of his own powers and acquisitions, a degree of "aptness to teach" previously to the reception of the Charisma; and the supernaturally gifted Almoner (Deacon) had natively a great degree of the milk of human kindness, and was practised in beneficent efforts.



## ART. II. PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE AUXILIARY TO CHRISTIANITY IN PAGAN LANDS.

By Cyrus Hamlin, Waterford, Me.

It is a just remark of Schlegel that, without the Christian system, "the whole history of the world would be nought else than an insoluble enigma—an inextricable labyrinth—a huge pile of the blocks and fragments of an unfinished edifice—and the great tragedy of humanity would remain devoid of all proper result." Moral and political movements are rapidly developing this inseparable connexion of Christianity with the history and destinies of the world; and are presenting indications, that the Christian faith is to extend its power through all lands, and into all departments of human activity.

It is the duty of the Church to understand and direct these movements, or to avail herself of their impulses, so as to accelerate her own advancement. She must study the *moral*, *intellectual*, and *political*, as well as the physical geography of the world, that she may wisely adapt her measures to the end proposed—the world's conversion. Her reliance is indeed to be placed on the influences of the Holy Spirit, accompanying the faithful preaching of the doctrines of the cross. The gospel will cease to be the power of God unto salvation, when human instrumentality, instead of the Divine Spirit, and a worldly wisdom, instead of the ordinances of God, shall be relied upon to secure success.

But, although the outward form and inward power of Christianity will remain the same, the means of hastening her progress will in some respects vary, as the heathen world puts on new aspects and passes into new eras of its history. When she first announced herself to the Pagan world, a system of external agency was required to promote her interests, which would be ill-adapted to the present age. The universal mind was then disposed to some form of religious faith. It was the testimony of St. Paul that it was "too religious."

There was a perverse seeking after God, or rather an intense activity of the religious sentiment which appeared in



the splendour and magnificence of idolatrous rites, and combined itself with every form and manifestation of human virtue and human depravity. That expectation of a Divine deliverer, which sprang out of the primitive revelation and the Jewish prophecies, had inwoven itself with all the systems of religion, and prepared the world for its consummation in the advent of Jesus Christ. To this posture of the universal mind, the use of miracles was admirably adapted. It was an agency which the world was prepared to receive with the profoundest reverence and awe. It was looking for supernatural manifestations from all its deities, and would have regarded a religion without miracles, as a religion without a God. The rapid success of the primitive faith may doubtless be ascribed in part to the skilful adaptation of miraculous agency to the state, the *attitude* of the pagan mind.

But the heathen world has now passed into a new era. It is the era, not of faith, but of unbelief. That thirsting after Divinity which constituted the life and power of heathen systems, has been quenched in almost universal skepticism. Idolatry is now an exanimate form. Its temples are abandoned, its altars and its idols prostrate, its feasts deserted, and where it still retains the flickering breath of an exhausted life, it is held back from its grave by some traitorous Christian power. The triumphal cars of India's gods are decaying by their temples, except when the mercenary bayonets of the *British Government* compel the natives to drag them forth, with Satanic rites, to insult Jehovah. It is not the free-will of the idolator, but *the lash of the British soldier*, which moves the nerves that impel them in the unblest procession. The fact that Asiatic idolatry is dependent for its existence upon English government is the highest demonstration that its vital power is gone. And the heathen world is every where in a transitional state from idolatry to skepticism. It is in a waiting attitude to receive some new system. In this transitional movement, Christianity may be most successfully presented, and *Philosophy* and *Science* are peculiarly adapted to aid her progress, and to become, in this age, the same auxiliaries which miracles were in a former and different age. For in that transition, the mind is still conscious of restless, unsatisfied wants. The bonds of superstition are relaxed, the mind is liberalized, and takes a wider range of thought, and begins to ques-



tion nature and its own consciousness. Let the system of our holy faith now be presented, with its sublime mysteries, its divine harmony and simplicity, and let science present the parallel harmonies of the material world, and a true and a just philosophy direct the mind to its own consciousness, and thus from out "the triple fount of truth"—revelation—the universe—and inward experience—pour the waters of life upon the soul, and it will be emancipated from the pagan's gloom and the sceptic's doubts. The intellectual reception of the gospel will be secured, and the way prepared for the saving influences of the Spirit.

In the primitive and superstitious age, the mind was intent upon the spiritual world. It loved supernatural attestations to truth, and miracles had a consequent power to command its faith.

In the present sceptical age, the mind is inclined to materialism. As it emerges from idolatry, and finally assumes the attitude of fixed unbelief, it will neglect its consciousness, and its inward cravings after spiritual light and freedom, and will assimilate itself to the outward world. When, therefore, philosophy presents the outward world in the full power of its evidence against unbelief, and makes it radiant with the proofs of the Christian scheme, it meets the mind with that same correspondency of evidence to its inward state which was secured in the superstitious age by miracles.

Idolatry and scepticism are unnatural and discordant states of the soul's faculties. Faith is their perfected and harmonized state. It restores them to the peacefulness of a blessed union with the universe and its author. Christianity may, therefore, be presented to the heathen mind emerging from idolatry, as the heavenly guide of the intellectual as well as the moral powers, fitted to restore the mind to a true philosophy as well as a true religion, and to harmonize all the antagonisms of human nature. A correct science finds a power to aid Christianity in the fact that the science of the pagan world is false and pernicious, and is so intimately connected with its religion, that both must stand or fall together. Demonstrate the falseness of its science, and its religion can claim no respect. And the Christian philosopher, like Henry Martyn, and many who have followed him, has therefore been able to meet the proud and learned Persian, and the Indian Brahmins with weapons which they



could neither parry nor resist, and which compelled them to acknowledge the superiour claims of the Christian faith.

In the accomplishment of their divine mission to the heathen world, science and philosophy must be more strictly *analogical*. The visible things in this world are manifestations of the invisible things of the spiritual world. They are the shadows of eternal truths darkly falling upon the human mind. The same Author, whose wisdom and love reared the structure of Christianity, reared also the structures of the visible worlds, and sealed upon them the impresses of this wisdom and love—created the human powers and faculties with wants to be answered by Christianity alone, and instituted a providential government whose unfolding plans and policy perpetually recognize the Christian faith. Every where there are clasps and fixtures which bind the visible to the invisible. It is the high office of science, as she wakes up the heathen mind to thought, to present these analogies which are confirmatory of revealed religion, and those facts which attest the truth of the historic statements of the inspired record. And a true philosophy may so propose all the objects of knowledge as to show that the mind cannot apprehend them, in their deepest import, without abandoning paganism and unbelief—that in order to understand and interpret the universe, it must first admit the faith of Christianity; and still further, that it cannot interpret itself except by a philosophy based upon that faith. Our holy religion shall thus gather to herself all the analogies of nature, and the confirmation of universal science, and shall inweave them with the web of her own divine texture, and form for the human soul a vestment of truth, woven without seam, throughout. The true philosopher will rejoice that science is assuming the form which will best adapt her to the purposes of Christianity in her aggressions upon the false science and religion of paganism, and that schools of learning, are springing up in the Moslem's capital, in the dominions of the Pacha of Egypt, in the Presidencies of India, in the borders of China, along the coasts of Africa, and amid the islands of the ocean. May they become orbs of light, whose effulgence shall be the glory of all lands.

Let it not be thought that philosophy is intended to be exalted above revealed truths. She would then go forth to bewildered man only to dazzle and blind. Such a usurpation has always been destructive to religious and intellectual



growth and freedom. It once arrested the triumphs of our divine faith over the idolatrous world. For, when Christianity first began to subvert the systems of heathen philosophy, and, in the struggle between them, to enlist on each side the powers of the noblest minds, instead of planting herself firmly on her own basis of truth, she subjected her dogmas to the Platonic and mystic systems, and thus quenched her light in the darkness of the middle ages. There is hardly an error of those times which cannot be traced to this usurpation of philosophy over revealed truth. Should it be allowed again, it must be attended with a similar disastrous influence upon the purity, and power, and progress of Christianity, and the advancement of science, in pagan lands.

Christianity was designed to be the mistress, not the handmaid, of philosophy and the sciences. Her verities belong to a higher realm of truth, up to which she would attract the human spirit. They are adapted to the deeper and nobler wants of our nature, and should command the assent of the mind like the axioms of mathematical science. We receive them on the authority of the Omniscient mind, and build our faith upon them with a reverence as much deeper than that we render to mathematical truth as the intuitive insight of Deity is clearer than human knowledge.

It is a false theory that science and philosophy must *precede* Christianity in heathen lands, and that the pagan mind must first be civilized in order to be Christianized. Christianity must begin, though science in a humbler sphere may aid it. Revealed truths, in ennobling the mind, and in preparing it for a high temporal, no less than an eternal destiny, may claim the precedence of every other influence. For they alone place the mind in the *true attitude* for the attainment of all truth. In the history of philosophy, nothing has been more variously demonstrated than that the disposition of the mind with respect to the objects of knowledge determines the success of its efforts.

The mind filled with the prejudices of scepticism, or with the gloom and superstition of idolatry, or guided by an arrogant, sensual philosophy, can effect nothing noble. It has none of that prophetic insight by which the bounds of knowledge have been enlarged, and wider regions of truth laid open to philosophy and science. It has no harmony nor sympathy with the laws which pervade the moral and ma-



terial universe; and when they are obscure, and difficult to be detected, it mistakes them. No philosophy reared upon an anti-Christian basis, ever made the mind fruitful in discovery. It deprives it of the highest incitements to effort, and places it in an arid desert, amid sands, and silence, and a stifled air, where it hears not the voices of nature, and receives no refreshing, invigorating impulses. And the precise point, therefore, at which the pre-eminence of theological truth appears, is not only in its higher nature, but in this bringing of the mind to the right stand-point from whence to survey all other truth. And then it fills it with principles instinct with suggestive meaning as to what it should anticipate in its investigations. Both Leibnitz and Keppler acknowledge that *metaphysical* and *theological* conceptions guided them to their sublimest discoveries—indicated to them the right path, and the only path which could have led to the result.

And it is a noble fact for our argument, that a *profoundly theological age has always been a profoundly scientific age*. When reverence for revelation has been deepest, science has made her greatest discoveries, and pushed her researches most successfully into new and obscure fields of observation. The revival of learning in Europe originated in the theological spirit of the times. In religious freedom, the mind first received its freedom of universal thought, and its impulse towards the attainment of universal truth.

It is easy to trace the connectives, and to prove the relation of cause and effect between the religious movement and the scientific movement to which we refer. They were schools of philosophy, founded at Oxford, Paris, Cologne, Bologna, and other places, which broke the darkness of centuries, and introduced a better science and philosophy. This connexion is traceable in the writings of the early philosophers. Gallileo, Keppler, Newton, Leibnitz, Pascal, bowed in deepest reverence to revealed truth, and by that their minds were tuned to the harmonies of nature. And nature loved them as her own sons, and at their gentlest touch, unclasped for them her secret mysteries. And thus that philosophy which had been

“baptized  
In the pure fountain of eternal love,”



achieved the divinest triumphs on the fields of human science.

On the other hand, the science and philosophy of a material, sceptical age, just so far as they have participated in these characteristics, have always been false, shallow, and unproductive. Such philosophy deprives the most gifted mind of that aggressive greatness which those chieftains of truth possessed. In its own theory, it boasts of freeing the mind from the shackles of religion. In its actual influence, as a fact of history, it invariably prepares the mind for the grossest fanaticism and superstition. Upon France it has shed its widest, selectest influence. And there St. Simonism, and some of the old systems which Christianity beheaded, have risen from the dead, and are showing forth their mighty works. No soil but that of *sceptic* France could nourish such fanaticism in the nineteenth century.

When, therefore, philosophy and science are defended as auxiliaries to Christianity, it is in their subordination and dependency, not in their self-arrogated rank of reason first, revelation afterwards.

A providential plan of universal freedom to the nations, and of the wider extension of the Christian faith and of true philosophy, has begun to unfold itself to human observation. A correct delineation of its rudimental, germinant principles, would sustain the views which have been presented. For as the tender plant, at its first springing from the earth, has mysteriously wrapped up within itself the germs of its future growth and power which may develop themselves in the lofty oak, or perchance in some poisonous, unseemly weed, so every great historic movement has, in its embryo state, the germs of its future developements for good or evil.

In both the scientific and theological world, there are these rudimental characteristics, displaying themselves in the turmoil of our times. It is true there may be a shallow theology throwing up its foam on the waves of excitement, which, allying itself with fanatical and agrarian doctrines, may think to reform the world with volleys of vituperation. But there are signs of a deeper, better spirit pervading sacred science. It places its reliance on the truths and methods of Divine wisdom and appointment, to renovate our lapsed and disordered state, and challenges for them the homage and fealty of philosophy and science.

In philosophy, too, there is a parallel movement; it is



throwing off the sensual material systems, which have long enchained it, and is aspiring after something higher and nobler. Its attributes are seen in the writings of a Schlegel, a Cousin, and others of kindred claim, who, with the deepest insight into the mysteries of our nature as developed in history and in consciousness, still acknowledge the unassailable authority of revealed truth.

One consummation is still waited for. It is to see these parallel movements of sacred and profane learning receive a more attractive influence for each other, to see them unite in one broad and deep channel, and flow on, with confluent streams, to bless the world. And then, in that millenium of theology, philosophy, and the sciences, our holy religion will go forth and address herself to the world, attended not as formerly, with rites and shadows, and a visible presence of glory, nor as once with miraculous gifts and heavy judgements, nor as in later and darker times, with trumpet-blast and the war tramp of embattled hosts; but with a peaceful and spiritual array, with science and a renovated philosophy as her handmaids and ministering spirits, and a Divine power to secure her conquests over the universal mind.

It becomes the theologian, if he would hasten this consummation, and guide to their proper result those movements which involve the moral destinies of the world, to study the philosophy as well as the Christianity of his times, to analyze and expose its elements, and recall it to due and reverential obedience to the Christian faith—its safest guide—lest the public mind be allured away from the green pastures and living waters of God's eternal truth. And it becomes him farther to bind theology to the word of God, lest, like an archangel ruined, it should be transformed into a seducing spirit to delude, instead of saving the world.



## ART. III. EPOCH OF THE CREATION.

Remarks on the theories of Buckland and other Geologists, respecting the date of the Creation.

It is not the fashion with philosophes, latterly, to pretend that any of the discoveries or principles of science are directly at variance with the sacred writings; but there are not wanting those who, from time to time, promulgate theories to which the inspired oracles can be rendered conformable only by new and forced interpretations. There have, indeed, been sundry examples of this nature in earlier, as well as in later times, and in respect both to physical and metaphysical subjects. Of such examples none, perhaps, have been presented with more confident assurance, or with less show of reason, than the hypothesis of geologists respecting the creation.

Is the earth indeed some millions or millions of millions of ages more ancient than the date of the creation of which we have an account in the inspired record? and have the researches of geologists, within the brief space of thirty or forty years clearly established this theory? We trow not, and we wish to submit to our readers some observations on the subject, for the purpose of cautioning them against yielding their assent to assumptions and conjectures, which so widely conflict with the statements and implications of Divine Truth; and are adapted to shock the popular faith with respect to the termination, as well as the commencement of the Earth's history.

This geological theory is by its authors assumed as requisite to account for the changes which have taken place in the earth since its creation. We hope to make it appear that while the theory sets aside, to say the least, the obvious import of the sacred narrative, and renders highly dubious the question of a *creation* of the earth at any epoch however remote, it is in itself contradictory and incredible.\*

\* "The present extended knowledge of geology has rendered it highly probable that the earth was originally an ignited mass, in a state of fluidity, ignited to the very surface, and by its rotation in that state took its present form, as the result of the mutual attraction of its parts and of its



It must be observed that those geologists who profess respect for the Mosaic record, and yet agree in assigning to the creation an indefinite antiquity, do by no means agree in their methods of bringing the Scripture account into harmony with their theory.

"Several hypotheses," says Professor Buckland, "have been proposed, with a view of reconciling the phenomena of geology, with the brief account of creation which we find in the Mosaic narrative. Some have attempted to ascribe the formation of all the stratified rocks to the effects of the Mosaic Deluge; an opinion which is irreconcilable with the enormous thickness, and almost infinite subdivisions of these strata, and with the numerous and regular successions which they contain of the remains of animals and vegetables, differing more and more widely from existing species, as the strata

rotary motion. This must be conceded if we do not admit the choice of a permanent axis of rotation. *It is therefore in the progress through countless ages of the changes on the surface, from the chaotic or primary formation of the geologists, to the most interesting state of the surface as it now exists, that we trace the endless arguments for design.* However difficult at first sight to be explained, these changes will, when understood, show one uniform system, in which all things work together for good.

"If we consider the state of the surface before its cooling in a great degree, it must have been wholly unfitted for animal and vegetable life. The admission of this state necessarily lets in the *posterior and successive creation* of vegetables and animals. From the vestiges which remain, we may conclude, with the highest degree of probability, that for a very long period, the surface was only adapted for vegetables and the lowest description of animal life; afterwards for animals of an amphibious nature, and such as could exist only on the marshy shores of lakes, or in places occasionally covered with water. By degrees this state of surface gave way to others more fitted for a further supply of animals to be created. The principal origin of these changes appears to have been provided in the powers attached to the substances, of whatever nature they may be, existing in the interior of the earth; but these powers have been merely mechanical, and could not originate organized vegetables and animals. The class of changes at the surface, constituting the tertiary formations of the geologist, appear to have been that which was followed by the introduction of a great variety of large animals, many of which are now extinct. The surface was still to be further improved by making it fitted for a wide extension of animals and of their food. This has been done by the means afforded for the extension and spreading of alluvial matter, so admirably adapted for the growth of plants, and therefore for the existence of animal life. The changes of surface alluded to are all parts of the same design. Between the successive changes, great intervals appear to have elapsed. *The imagination is able to form no conception of the length of time since the chaotic state began to change.* Notwithstanding the time that must have existed between each change, one uniform plan can be discovered. The animals which we must admit to have been *successively created*, show by their organization the same creator." &c. &c. If the reader doubts about this extract, it can be shown to him in print.



*ta in which we find them are placed at greater depths. The fact that a large proportion of these remains belong to extinct genera, and almost all of them to extinct species, that lived and multiplied and died on or near the spots where they are now found, shows that the strata in which they occur were deposited slowly and gradually, during long periods of time, and at widely distant intervals. These extinct animals and vegetables could therefore have formed no part of the creation with which we are immediately connected."* After noticing and rejecting the hypothesis that these strata were formed at the bottom of the sea during the interval between the creation of man and the Mosaic deluge, he proceeds; "A third opinion has been suggested, both by learned theologians and by geologists, and on grounds independent of one another; viz., that the days of the Mosaic creation need not be understood to imply the same length of time which is now occupied by a single revolution of the globe, but successive periods, each of great extent: and it has been asserted that the order of succession of the organic remains of a former world, accords with the order of creation recorded in Genesis. This assertion, though to a certain degree apparently correct, is not entirely supported by geological facts, since it appears that the most ancient marine animals occur in the same division of the lowest transition strata with the earliest remains of vegetables; so that the evidences of organic remains, as far as it goes, shows the origin of plants and animals to have been contemporaneous: if any creation of vegetables preceded that of animals, no evidence of such an event has yet been discovered by the researches of geology." But, he adds, there will be no necessity of this interpretation, in order to reconcile the text of Genesis with physical appearances, if it can be shown that the time indicated by the phenomena of geology may be found in the undefined interval, following the announcement of the first verse; and then gives his opinion "in favour of the hypothesis which supposes the word '*beginning*' as applied by Moses in the first verse of the book of Genesis, to express an undefined period of time, *which was antecedent to the last great change that affected the surface of the earth, and to the creation of its present animal and vegetable inhabitants; during which period a long series of operations and revolutions may have been going on; which as they were wholly unconnected with the history of the human race, are passed*



over in silence by the sacred historian, whose only concern with them was barely to state, that the matter of the universe is not eternal and self-existent, but was originally created by the power of the Almighty."—"It is no where affirmed that God created the heavens and the earth in the *first day*, but in the *beginning*; this *beginning* may have been an epoch at an unmeasured distance, followed by periods of undefined duration, during which all the physical operations disclosed by geology were going on."—"No limit is fixed to the time during which these intermediate events *may have been going on: millions of millions of years may have occupied the indefinite interval* between the beginning, in which God created the heavens and the earth, and the evening or the commencement of the first day of the Mosaic narrative. The second verse *may describe* the condition of the earth on the evening of this first day. This first evening *may be considered* as the termination of the indefinite time which followed the *primeval creation* announced in the first verse, and as the commencement of the first of the six succeeding days, in which *the earth was to be fitted up, and peopled in a manner fit for the reception of mankind*. We have in this second verse a distinct mention of earth and waters, as already existing, and involved in darkness; their condition also is described as a state of confusion and emptiness, (*tohu, bohu*) words which are usually interpreted by the vague and indefinite Greek term *chaos*, and which *may be geologically considered* as designating the wreck and ruins of a former world. *At this intermediate point of time, the preceding undefined geological periods had terminated, a new series of events commenced, and the work of the first morning of this new creation was the calling forth of light from a temporary darkness, which had overspread the ruins of the ancient earth.*"

Such, as it is properly characterized by the author, is the *hypothesis* which he advances in opposition to the received and obvious interpretation of the Mosaic record. Whether it is more plausible or less fanciful than either of the other theories referred to, we shall not stop to inquire. This is the most recent hypothesis, and differs materially from that formerly published by the same author. His ingenuity, however, was severely tasked to get over the unequivocal assertion that *light* was produced on the first day specified by Moses; for according to his hypothesis, light had existed



long and long before, viz., during the preceding undefined geological periods. He is obliged, however, finally to conclude that light was not created at all, either then or before; "it being probably not a material substance, but only an effect of undulations of ether, excited by the sun, electricity," &c; and thus all that is meant in the record of the first day is, that light was called forth from a temporary darkness, which had overspread the ruins of the ancient earth. "If," says he, "*we suppose* all the heavenly bodies and the earth, to have been created at the indefinitely distant time, designated by the word beginning, and that the darkness described on the evening of the first day, *was a temporary darkness, produced by an accumulation of dense vapours 'upon the face of the deep;' an incipient dispersion of these vapours may have re-admitted light to the earth upon the first day, whilst the exciting cause of light was still obscured; and the further purification of the atmosphere upon the fourth day, may have caused the sun and moon and stars to re-appear, in the firmament of heaven, to assume their new relations to the newly modified earth, and to the human race.*" Neither revelation nor matter can stand against such liberty of supposition and conjecture!

The entire hypothesis of a lapse of ages between the supposed primeval creation, and the creation recorded by Moses, whether held in the form given to it by Doct. Buckland, or in that which makes the six days so many prolonged periods, rests on the assumption that the changes, which are shown, by the fossil remains of vegetables and animals, to have taken place since the creation, were effected by slow and gradual processes. The magnitude of these changes is such as seemingly to require incalculable periods of time for their accomplishment, if they were produced by the slow operation of ordinary causes. That they were produced in this manner, and not suddenly or within brief periods, is inferred from the quantities and condition of fossil remains, mostly of species now extinct; the order of succession in which they were deposited, and the thickness of the strata in which they are found. The circumstance that no remains of the human species have been discovered in the lower or oldest class of stratified rocks, is regarded as evidence that these rocks with their inclosed fossils, were deposited before the creation of man.

Now it is quite impossible for the geologist to show that



all the changes and inhumations which he discovers in the crust of the globe, might not have been effected by the operations of Divine power within a period so brief as not to transcend the Scriptural epoch of the creation. It is neither impossible nor improbable that these changes took place within 2000 years from that epoch, and apart from the statements in the 1st chapter of Genesis, we deem it far more credible that all the vegetables and animals of which geology discloses the remains, lived, multiplied, and were deposited in the earth within that period, than that the suppositions and implications assumed in the hypothesis of a preceding lapse of ages should be true.

We proceed, therefore, to present some considerations which we trust will appear sufficient to caution our readers against yielding their faith to that hypothesis.

1. There are monstrous inconsistencies and absurdities in the first lines of this hypothesis. We are told that the earth existed, and abounded with plants and animals during countless ages before the creation of man; that in the course of these ages, the stratified rocks with their inclosed organic remains were deposited; that after the completion of this process, the whole fabric was destroyed, ruined, plunged into a state of chaos; that a new creation then took place, viz., that recorded by Moses, when, from the wreck and ruins of the former world, 'the earth was fitted up and peopled in a manner fit for the reception of mankind;' we are told all this by geologists, who fetch their proofs from that very former world which they pretend was destroyed and blotted out; from these very strata which, according to them, after having been slowly deposited in a quiet and orderly manner, during myriads of ages, were so utterly destroyed as to require a reconstruction of the earth in order to fit it for the support of animal life! Surely these visionary men deserve to be led round the circle in which they reason. The thickness, regularity, and variety of the strata, and the quantities, condition, and species of the organic remains which they contain, prove, say they, that the process of deposit and arrangement was so slow and gradual as to require incalculable periods of time; therefore the earth existed, and was stocked with animals and vegetables during these required periods; but when the grand object of these deposits was accomplished, the whole was wrecked and thrown into chaos, and even into temporary darkness, in



order to give occasion for a new creation out of the ruins, and for calling forth light out of the darkness. In proof that we actually live on a crust of the globe which was constructed out of the wreck and ruins of a former one, they point us to the stratified rocks and deposits, which in due order and succession constitute the habitable part of this new crust; and which, if any of their facts or reasonings respecting these rocks are to be relied on, are situated exactly where they were, and as they were, before the pretended wreck, chaos, and a new creation! After a destruction so complete as to annihilate every vegetable, animal, fish, and fowl of the former world, and to render necessary a new creation of every plant, and every creature that hath the breath of life, behold the crust of the earth presents to us the most indelible and conclusive evidences of its being just as it is alleged to have been, before it was whelmed in darkness and ruin.

Nothing, surely, can be more utterly incredible than that any such change from chaos and ruin to order and habitability as the geologists inform us was made at the Mosaic creation, should not have totally deranged, obliterated, or removed beyond the reach of our researches, the stratifications and fossils of preceding ages. To suppose that no such obliteration took place, that all things remain as they were, that chaos and ruin mean order and repose, is to yield an indispensable prop of the hypothesis; for on that supposition, the earth needed no new fitting up, the pretended fitting up altered nothing, it was in a condition no more fit for the reception of man after the fancied change, than before. In a word, if this hypothesis is held, the Mosaic narrative, with all its details, must be given up. Every supposition essential to the hypothesis is irreconcilable with the narrative; and we may look in vain to geology for any evidence that the material universe is not eternal. If we have, within a few feet of the surface, proofs of changes which are to be dated back, no one knows how many millions of years, we may dig in vain for evidence that the globe itself ever began to exist.

2. The Scriptures teach us that the earth was made to be inhabited by man, and that the animal and vegetable tribes were designed for his service and benefit: and in their account of the creation, he is brought on the stage contemporaneously with the lower races, and invested with dominion



ion over them. In this procedure Divine wisdom and goodness are conspicuous. The whole scene is fraught with order, harmony, and beauty. The earth is represented to be in a proper condition to produce the most abundant and luxuriant vegetation, and to support the teeming families of organized beings. All this implies that the materials for the most part, which constitute the stratified formations of geology were then disposed in soils, minerals, and other forms adapted to the convenience and well being of the inhabitants, and not in Chrystalized rocks to be slowly decomposed by processes requiring myriads of years. Considering their author and their object, it may with propriety be inferred that these materials so conditioned, were fitted to sustain both animal and vegetable life to an extent scarcely conceivable in the present condition of the earth; and that they were at the same time highly susceptible of rapid and stupendous changes. The supposition that the strata now subject to geological inspection, were formed by the gradual decomposition of primitive rocks, implies nothing less than a miracle in regard to the separation and distribution of the different strata, and moreover implies that before the process commenced, no part of the surface was in a state to support either vegetable or animal life. In short, on this supposition, the wisdom and purpose, if not the agency of the Creator are left out of view; and we are called on to believe that the globe was originally a mass of molten matter, the surface of which in course of time cooled down and hardened into rock; which rock, in the lapse of further periods, crumbled down, and formed soil sufficient for the production of certain species of vegetables, the waters at the same time becoming cool enough to permit the existence of shell fish and reptiles. These plants and animals, however, in one respect resembled those of the present day. They were mortal. They died and were buried it should seem, in select portions of the decaying rocks. Ages rolled on in this manner. The earth was the paradise of lizards "of various forms, and often of gigantic statue, fitted to endure the turbulence, and continual convulsions of the unquiet surface of our infant world."—"We shall view them with less contempt, when we learn from the records of geological history, that there was a time when reptiles not only constituted the chief tenants and most powerful possessors of the earth, but extended their dominion also over the waters of the seas;



and that the annals of their history may be traced back through thousands of years antecedent to that latest point in the progressive stages of animal creation, when the first parents of the human race were called into existence."—*Buckland*.

Being once afloat on the ocean of geological fancy, we are to believe that successive classes of animals each more perfect than its predecessor, were created, as the earth became fit for their reception, until the latest period in the progressive stages of animal creation arrived; when man, the most perfect specimen hitherto produced, was called into existence. How the annals of the history referred to in the above quotation are to be reconciled with that part of the new interpretation of Genesis, which, in order to make room for the six days' creation, tells us that all the progressive creations of past duration, with the earth itself were destroyed, may not be entirely obvious. And we are no ways concerned to clear up a difficulty of such minor consequence. But we take leave to ask what traces of wisdom, goodness, foresight, or design, are to be perceived in such a course of procedure? Unlimited periods of duration occupied in bringing the world into a habitable condition, and stocking it with plants and animals, for what? Why, that it might be destroyed and reconstructed, and similar animals and vegetables created anew! Such is the mighty result accomplished by the operations of millions of millions of years. For to contend that any thing was gained by the preceding changes which survived the pretended ruin, wreck, and chaos, and which is of any value or use to the present inhabitants of the earth, is to give the matter up, and admit that no such wreck and ruin or new creation took place. It would indeed be quite as rational to believe with respect to the organic remains, that they were created or that they existed eternally in the strata in which they are now found, as to believe that they maintained their quiet condition through such a process of ruin and reconstruction of the crust of the globe, as is described by the geologists.

3. This grand hypothesis can claim nothing on the score of utility. It does not add a whit to the practical value of any of the facts disclosed by geological research. Doctor Buckland, indeed, endeavours to infer from it some support to natural theology; and no doubt he thought it deserved that praise. But most of his readers will, we apprehend,



agree that it detracts from revelation ten times as much as it contributes to the support of natural religion. He endeavours to guard against the plain and almost unavoidable conclusion from this hypothesis, respecting the eternity of matter. But the whole force of what he advances on this head depends on the assumption that the oldest class of fossil deposits has already been discovered, and that eternity is not necessary to account for their inhumation or condition. Further discoveries, bringing to view deposits of extinct species from greater depths, may on the same method of computation, require a large addition to the antiquity of the globe, and considerably weaken the inference now made in support of natural theology.\*

The argument derived from the rare discovery of human bones, in aid of the hypothesis that the fossil remains of animals were deposited before the creation of man, can be entitled to but little consideration, till every region of earth and sea has been fully explored; certainly not till it is clearly ascertained that the fossil remains of the human species are not situate lower down in the earth than the geologists have yet had time to penetrate. Such a discovery might occasion a considerable revolution in the theoretical part of the subject, but not greater than has occurred several times heretofore. And while so much progress is really made and making in the practical department of geological research, we ought not to be impatient if the theoretical part should yet for a time remain in a defective state. It is assuredly quite too soon to conclude that the remains at least of the antediluvian race of men are not imbedded and fossilized some where in the crust of the earth. It being a fact that the race was suddenly cut off by means of a deluge, it cannot be deemed improbable that their remains were subjected to inhumation. They may be beneath the waters of the ocean, or in the regions of earth which have not been geologically examined, or for aught that the lights of geology can yet determine, they may lie below the levels which have hitherto been opened to inspection.

4. The hypothesis under consideration proceeds on the assumption that the changes from which the alleged antiquity of the earth is inferred, were operated by very slow de-

\* The same inference is attempted to be made in the following summary of the geological hypothesis of the creation, from a note to Brougham's Discourse on Natural Theology.



grees. It is quite evident, however, that some of the greatest and most manifest changes in the surface of the globe never could have been effected in a gradual manner; those for example, which are so conspicuous in some of the loftiest mountains, and by which marine deposits were elevated many times further above the level of the sea than the earth has any where been penetrated below its neighbouring surface. Can any partizan of the hypothesis tell us for certain whether these changes occurred before or since the alleged ruin of the former world; or whether, and how far, the convulsions which attended them, affected the rest of the earth? If they occurred before, were they exempted from the wreck and ruin of the chaotic state? If since, is it incredible that the rest of the phenomena of geology should also have been produced since that epoch?

Enough has perhaps been suggested to show that this hypothesis owes its pretensions to the overweening credulity and enthusiasm of visionary men; that the rejection of it does not involve the denial of any known facts; and that for the present at least, we have no occasion to swerve from the Scripture account of the epoch of creation. Returning, therefore, to the "sure word of prophecy," we take the opportunity to notice one topic to which we do not remember to have observed any reference in any treatise of geology, but which is, we apprehend, very nearly related to the physical changes which have been produced in the earth; we mean the introduction of sin by the apostacy of man; an event which, while it caused moral ruin, was of far greater importance in its bearing on the physical world than all the phenomena of geology put together; an event which philosophers and naturalists ought not to overlook.

"Nature sighed through all her works." The earth was cursed, rendered sterile and subjected to vicissitudes and convulsions on account of the guilt of man. In the progress of these changes, the period of human life was shortened, and the stature of men was reduced. That great convulsions occurred previous to the deluge, is in every view highly probable, and is perhaps implied in what is related after that event in the 21st verse of the 8th chapter of Genesis. "And the Lord said, I will not again curse the ground any more for man's sake—neither will I again smite any more every thing living as I have done. While the earth remaineth, seed time and harvest, and cold and heat, and sum-



mer and winter, day and night shall not cease." Is it presumptuous to suppose that great irregularities and vicissitudes in these respects had been caused by physical changes in the course of seventeen centuries? Finally, by the general deluge, "every living substance was destroyed which was upon the face of the ground, both man and cattle, and the creeping things, and the fowl of the heavens, and they were destroyed from the earth, and Noah only remained alive and they that were with him in the ark."

Have we not sufficient reason to conclude that the physical changes to which the surface of the earth has been subjected, instead of being, as Doct. Buckland represents, wholly unconnected with the history of man, were wholly owing to his history as a fallen, guilty, and ruined creature?

It is indeed argued by the geologists that these changes were designed to render the earth more fit and convenient for man than it was before. But in this, as in other instances of theory, they put us off with assumptions and conjectures, instead of evidence. Do they know, or can they present a single consideration having the slightest plausibility, to evince, that the earth was not originally, when first replenished with herbs and animals, and before the blight and curse which ensued upon the fall of man, a hundred or a thousand fold more prolific, and more advantageously disposed for the convenience and benefit of the human race, than it has been at any period since the deluge? The earth was created by a Being of infinite perfections; and surely there can be no impropriety in concluding that degrees of excellence as much superiour to these now discoverable, originally belonged to the other terrestrial products of his power and wisdom, as are known to have belonged to man, the last and noblest of his works. The sacred historian not only informs us that God created the earth and the several classes of organized beings, but on announcing the successive operations, he pauses to exclaim that the Creator regarding his finished work, pronounced it good.

The facts of geology are of great practical value; and those who explore and bring them to view, perform an important service to mankind. But when they promulgate theories which sap the faith and infringe the immortal interests of men, they cannot claim respect or confidence. Attempts to invalidate the chronology of Moses, by men pro-



fessedly opposed to revealed religion, proved more than ineffectual, they recoiled on their authors, and are no longer heard of. The geological hypothesis is more insidious, and far more dangerous. It offers to take in Moses on its way down the immeasurable stream of time, to lend him the lights which it brings along, and to extend to his imperfect and unscientific narrative, the aid of its discoveries!

The Mosaic narrative was given by inspiration of God, expressly to instruct mankind in regard to the creation and early history of the world, and of all things in it. If the natural and obvious import of this account be not the true one, if it is to be set aside on grounds so hypothetical and conjectural as those furnished by the construction put by short-sighted man on the phenomena of geology, it requires no skill or effort to infer that our confidence in the construction given to other parts of Scripture may be quite too sanguine. We reject the hypothesis as wholly at war with the Bible, and wholly unworthy of respect from those who profess that Book of books which, having stood the shock of numerous assaults from different quarters, remains alone to be relied on in respect to the origin and first ages of the earth and its inhabitants.

[The note from Brougham's Discourse on Natural Theology, referred to on page 535, is by mistake inserted in pages 526 and 527.]

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#### ART. IV. WRITINGS OF JOHN HOWE.

THAT a disposition has always existed in a greater or less degree to prefer other ages to our own, is a very common remark. As in passing over a given tract of country the traveller at once beholds the deformities, and feels the inconveniences of that portion which he now traverses, and relieves his dissatisfaction and weariness by looking either forward or behind to the magic region on which the blue horizon rests, calm and beautiful, it seems to him as blessed islands; so in passing our allotted course amidst the existing generation, we see and feel the evils which overspread it, aggravated perhaps by our own restless aspirations, and seek repose from the toilsome and tiresome way in anticipation of a better future, or, if our disgust with the present



produces despair of improvement, in reflections on a nobler past. It is a rough road now; but a few ages ago it was like the path to heaven. A dark, tempestuous night is over us; but it came in upon an Italian sunset. Examples of this tendency to prefer past ages, are not of modern date; they are as old as our literature. No poet ever found a Hercules, an Achilles, or even an Ajax in his own day; such names are always reflections of a far off generation, casting its lengthened shadows over the depressed surface of the nearer. As in war, so likewise in literature. Horace contended with some of his age who preferred Lucilius to the more polished poets of a later period. Cicero had a similar contest with his contemporaries concerning the earlier eloquence which they preferred. Cicero himself, after he became an ancient, was deemed the first who cultivated the higher eloquence, the first who was skilled in the selection of words, and the art of composition, but as sharing at the same time, at least in his earlier orations, in what the advocates of the modern oratory deemed the vices of antiquity, but its impugnors were no doubt inclined to regard as excellencies. Even the grave historian assigns as a motive and reward to his labour among the fallen memorials of Roman greatness, that oblivion of existing evils which it offered; the sight of present degradation driving back his mind to the glorious visions of those ancient deeds in which he discovered the clear and venerable characters of a primitive, august majesty. Evidences are not wanting that in our own literature the antique taste is now reviving. How many refer to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a golden era of English literature and theology, and our own as declined at the best, into the silver age, or bearing, forsooth, dark symptoms of the brazen! The day, we think, has past; ours is a deepening twilight. How often do we look lingering and sorrowful upon the brighter beams left above the horizon, as the sun went down, and mourn that but here and there a star peers forth of the outspread shadows!

These remarks have been made as suggesting cautions in our estimate of the comparative excellence of different periods, not as advising any diminution of our just reverence for the noble fellowship of patriarchal minds formed beneath the fresh morning influences of the Protestant Reformation. We would be the last to do away the veneration of anti-



quity; it is a great and essential principle of human progress; it is, we may add, a beautiful arrangement of Providence that, as objects are more distant, they should lose to our view much of what is unseemly and deformed, and present a fuller and æthereal manifestation of their excellencies; that thus, what we can never discover in real subsistence, to that we may make some nearer approach through the visions of the past, even an ideal perfection, a likeness of the celestial, endeared as well as hallowed by its relation to a time-honoured tomb. With such feelings of reverence and love, mingled with the caution which the memory of an undistinguishing praise sometimes lavished on the dead, should excite in our minds, we may proceed to the remembrance of those earlier writers in whom we certainly recognize the *primordia augustiora* of our theology and our ecclesiastical institutions; the men truly such, who, according to the admired ancient description, did not invest themselves with the seeming, but cherished in their inmost souls the being, of true excellence, whose minds, like the deeply ploughed and sown field, produced a ripe harvest of heavenly thoughts and noble purposes, or rather authorizing us, if we may recur to the fable of the golden age, to transfer to them the poetical description of the fertile soil which then blessed the earth in its free, spontaneous, and abundant productions:

καρπὸν δ' ἔφερε ξείνους ἄρουρα  
 ἀντομάτη πολλόν τε καὶ ἄφθονον.

Among these nobler spirits, and by no means undistinguished in his intellectual and religious position, it is our privilege to recognize and name JOHN HOWE. Surrounded by circumstances which a mind like his, must have felt as impulses to vigorous action, he formed and exhibited that personal character and those habits of theological composition, which suited equally the tendencies of his own genius, and the demands and exigencies of his age.

As regards what is of least, though not little, importance in his writings, the diction and all indeed which constitutes style, Doddridge, who yet applauds the grandeur and the tenderness as well as other peculiarities of his thought, censures it as "often obscure and generally harsh." It must be remembered, however, that the standard of taste in composition varies in different ages, according to the changes which



are constantly going on alike in language and in modes of thought and feeling. From the Reformation down to the period of the Restoration, there seems to have been a succession of writers, particularly theological, formed on a model the most unlike that which succeeded the accession of the second Charles. These latter were in many instances distinguished, both for clearness of thought, and for perspicuous expression. But it is most obvious that these qualities were often gained at the expense of others which many would seem higher and worthier. Who could fail to expect that such an age as that of Doddridge would deem Howe obscure? Nor more, indeed, from the higher elevation of his language, than from the loftier range of his thoughts. And yet the objection seems to have existed at an earlier period. Calamy, having referred to the judgement of "Wood, the Oxonian," in favour of his style, as "fine, smooth, and natural," informs us that this judgement was contrary to the more general verdict, "his style (as great a man as he was) being very commonly objected against, and thought the most liable to exception of any thing in his performances." This objection, he subjoins, is an obscurity to what are termed "vulgar understandings." Baxter, also apprehended that "plain unlearned readers" would find something to blame in what he terms "the accurateness of the style," but with a candour too seldom exercised in such cases, at once justifies it as necessary for persons equally with others needing religious instruction, "who cannot digest a looser style." If we might not yield to the decision of a writer, however excellent in devotional character, whose literary taste had been formed by the enervated productions of an age imbued with French notions and habits, diffusing themselves from the Court throughout the whole mass of the community, we may yet be required to admit the objection as suggested by his contemporaries, one especially so distinguished as Baxter for acute discrimination, and for a style uncontaminated and untouched by foreign diluting infusions. Still more weighty must we consider this suggestion, when we remember that, if deemed obscure by men of his own age, acquainted not only with our language in its fundamental character, but with all the idioms which marked that very period of its progress, we, to whom the language has descended in a different state, ought not but with great diffidence, to appeal from their judgement. It is,



however, to be remembered that Wood passes on his style an unqualified applause, and that whatever Baxter says of it is relative, not absolute; the obscurity is felt, not by the intelligent, but the unlearned: and this same obscurity furthermore, is ascribed not to the imperfection of the diction, but something which comes nearer an excellence, even its accuracy, the precision, the definite and logical use of language, by which it is distinguished. Thus we may perhaps, interpret Baxter. Calamy grounds the same objection on the encumbrance of parentheses; not wholly, perhaps, without occasion, though men of different tastes might on this, as on the other ground, pronounce various judgements.

Admitting after all, a measure of obscurity—the charge of *harshness* passed over as somewhat obscure in itself,—we may be pardoned in suggesting a doubt in regard to the correctness of these critics as to its origin. What is not unfrequently denounced as an obscure style, is in many instances, at least, a habit of thought, a reaching of the soul after truths and illustrations deeper than lie on the very surface of theology. A writer opens, it may be, some recondite mine of ethical or theological truth, and attempts to bring forth its long unsunned treasures to the light; and, instead of gratulations such as would resound from land to land, if new masses of ore were laid open in the mountains of Southern America, or in the heart even of African deserts, every voice is lifted against the adventurous spirit which dares to do more than gather and circulate the worn-out currency of commonplace illustration. It is forthwith denounced as mysticism, as metaphysics, that is, high sounding nonsense; at the best it may be full of sound lore, but it is too deep for common minds. Thus the unfortunate wight who has suffered himself, perchance, to think, is hunted out of the society of tolerable writers. And the whole difficulty very soon resolves itself into that indefinable accusation, an unintelligible style. Now Howe was a deeply thinking, profound, nay, metaphysical writer. It could be no strange thing that the depth of his philosophy seemed to some lower than they could fathom. The writers to whom we have referred had fathomed, they loved to fathom it. They felt no difficulty for themselves. But they saw how others floundered and sunk; it was most natural they should seek out the cause. It is not strange that what really was much at least of the cause, the depth of his



thought, they overlooked, and found another more obvious, as well as more favourable to the intellectual character of his readers, the obscurity of his language.

These remarks are suggested, not more to show the true ground of the common and almost the only objection made to Howe, than to set forth the position of a whole class of authors who would humbly walk, not as servile followers, but as lovers of spiritual wisdom, in the same path which he traversed with such majestic step, and over which he has thrown such broad beams of light. For himself, he does not appear to have indulged any anxiety about the mere matter of diction. He had a fulness of noble feeling, and of comprehensive thought; and he sought only to communicate both in those words which suggested themselves as their most fitting symbols. His own views of the subject he has himself given us in his observations concerning Dr. Bates, of whose style he says, "It was even inimitably polite and fine: but to him so natural, that it was more uneasy to have used a coarser style than to others so neat a one as his was. Nor is it to be thought strange that there should be in this a peculiarity; style being to any man as appropriate upon the matter as his visage or voice; and as immediately depending on the temper of the mind in conjunction with fancy, as that is more or less brisk, lively, and vigorous, as the other do on the complexion of the body or the disposition of the organs of speech.—That which is most peculiar to any in this respect is what one insensibly slides into, with no more design than one hath to walk after this or that manner." Thus style, when it is appropriate to the subject which it presents, is far less, than elegant and beautiful writers are charged with making it, a subject of chief or even distinct attention. Its principles are indeed studied; its rules are understood and consulted. But in the very act of powerful writing, those principles and rules are doubtless as little thought of as the laws of mechanics by the artist in the construction of a familiar instrument. The writer first thinks; he thinks more or less in words, even where he does not commit those words to paper; and his great object in writing them is to give his thoughts just as they are in his own mind; or rather we might say, his thoughts flow forth out of his mind, as the streams from the outgushing spring. The actual process is most accurately described by Milton,



setting forth the mode of his own poetical composition, in despite of his blindness :

“ Yet not the more  
Cease I to wander where the Muses haunt  
Clear spring, or shady grove, or sunny hill,  
Smit with the love of sacred song ! but chief  
Thee, Sion, and the flowing brooks beneath,  
That wash thy hallowed feet, and warbling flow,  
Nightly I visit—  
Then feed on thoughts that voluntary move  
Harmonious numbers.”

Here we hear the poet first conversing with the objects, and resorting to the sources, of his highest inspiration ; next incorporating, as it were, the peculiar thoughts thus produced into an element of his own being through the power of silent meditation ; then bringing forth his unbidden strains, or rather giving them liberty to flow out at their own sweet will, and uttering their natural, and of course melodious sounds. So with all excellent writing. May we not then pardon that beauty of composition, as well as refinement of thought, which the author cannot avoid ? which is in truth, no other than the self-cultured soul, bodying itself forth in outward symbols.

Hactenus hæc. Let us now proceed to consider what this soul was in Howe ; what the invisible power of which we have so many significant expressions. It might easily and truly be said, that he possessed a strong original mind highly improved by the massive learning of his age ; that he partook largely in those regenerating influences of the Holy Spirit, by which not only the being of holiness is produced in the heart, but that holiness advanced many degrees toward the destined perfection : and that, under the controul of this divine principle, he consecrated himself and his attainments to the service of God in our Lord Jesus Christ. All this is true. But it is no less true of Leighton, of Baxter, of Flavel, and of many others both in his own age and in other ages. How, we might rather ask, is he distinguished, we need not say above, but from, these and the like exalted spirits ? Perhaps his peculiar mental character might be summed up in one phrase, if that phrase may be pardoned, an introverted theological philosophy. It is a philosophy in the true sense of the word, a φιλοσοφία, a gen-



uine, hearty love of real wisdom ; a philosophy imbued with theology, and concentrating all its researches and results for the enforcement of great, essential truths concerning God in his character of Supreme Goodness, and his government over the universe, with our indissoluble relations both to his law and to his being ; a philosophy, not looking around on nature and external things, so much as turning its open eye within upon the soul itself, loving to converse with the spiritual and invisible, disembodying itself as it were, that it may dwell among unembodied existences and uncreated forms, of the beautiful and the glorious.

In these respects he is not wholly unlike Leighton, a spirit equally clear and discriminating, equally quick and vivid in its operations, neither less inclined to meditative thought, nor less stored with classical and scholastic lore. But here they differed : Leighton saw, as by intuition, the open face of truth ; Howe beheld it through the medium of discursive investigation. The former recognized her celestial beauty by the love enkindled in his soul ; the latter loved through the perfection of his discernment. The one reasoned by feeling, the other felt by reasoning. The moment truth entered the soul of Leighton, it seemed transformed from truth to love, and was no longer an idea, but an affection, if we may not rather say that truth itself came up out of his heart to go through his whole mind ; as the fragrance which floated about the regions of Eden had its source, not in the vernal airs which bore it on their wings, but in the inmost bosom of the tended flowers which could not so much as open their leaves in its deepest recesses, without giving out their native balm. Howe loved the truth like Leighton, but he searched after it as truth and as knowledge. It sanctified his heart, it exalted his whole soul ; but he made it the subject of reasoning, he questioned it and received its answers. He communed with it, and the idea dwelt in his soul ; but it was more intellectual, more a system of holiest doctrine flowing from the reason into the heart, as if we could reverse our former image, and suppose the surrounding air itself transformed into an element of fragrance, and, as it passed over the trees and flowers of Eden, infusing into them its own nectar. Through all the meditations of the one, a spiritual heart, converting every thing to its own form seems to diffuse itself like a gentle, if it be now and then a sombre light, a lambent flame harm-



less and even benignant in its touch, inextinguishable as it is holy, and raising our hearts with it as it goes up to the heaven from which it was kindled. Over the discussions and contemplations of the other, a spiritual reason, equally descended from heaven, casts forth its beams, and, like a star peering through the shades of night, out of the very point of the blue sky which the parting clouds leave open, marks out the heavenward path of truth and blessedness. We have even ventured to illustrate our impressions of Howe by reference to the magnificent night view of Homer, in which, over the broad face of heaven the stars appear most glorious around the serene moon, the air meanwhile unmoved by any breeze, spreading itself forth, calm, pure, transparent, and nature revealed its gladness amidst the ethereal lustre breaking over it from above.

Perhaps the image may be too strong. And many might deem the beautiful night, in its varied vestments, if not its grandeur, the fitter emblem of another mind by which that age was distinguished. We shall by no means claim for Howe gifts like those of Taylor. Unlike and even contrasted they are in many respects, both in their views of theological doctrine, and in their ecclesiastical attachments; nor less in their modes of presenting what they deemed the truth. It is by no means claimed for Howe that, like his oftener applauded contemporary, he clothed his thoughts with numberless and brilliant images, or as we might better say, thought in metaphor reflecting truth in all hues and shapes. But it may be truly affirmed that he possessed high powers of imagination and of moral description, and that as much as Taylor excelled him in fancy, rendering a subject splendid and brilliant, he excelled Taylor in a deep, everywhere pervading philosophy. Imbued with a genuine Platonism, not a mere mystic, unintelligible jargon of sounding words, but a distinct apprehension and a hearty reverence of the soul as soul, of its inward fitness for the reception of truth, and of that truth as it is in itself, independent of power, unchanged by circumstances, and enduring for ever, he perpetually strives to bring out the spiritual element as the most prominent object of contemplation, and to interpose no other medium than the pure ethereal lights of an imagination itself spiritual, between that element and the eye which is searching it out. Taylor, like most of his great contemporaries, was somewhat tinctured with this same Platonism;



but it was less prominent and universal, and he used withal to spread out so many bright images, so many dazzling colours, between the mind and the more distant object of its vision, as partially to dim and conceal that object itself. An ardent admirer might affirm that he darkened truth with excessive brightness. A less fervid reader might say, 'tis as when one looks from a hill-top over the dissolving mist, now lying still, now floating high, above some thick-set meadow, and sees the sun raising its golden light over it or streaming through its looser fringes, dimmed for a while, then brightened by contrast, all nature glittering in the meantime with countless refractions. Howe gives us no such fantastic imagery; his is one clear, unbroken manifestation of the light within rising and spreading like a cloudless autumnal morning.

Neither to Taylor nor to the majority of his prelatical associates, can we go without some caution for religious instruction. Their learned works can scarcely be read with any thing like thorough attention, without perceiving their repugnancy to certain peculiar doctrines involved in the great scheme of redemption by the sacrifice of Jesus Christ. The sinfulness and spiritual impotence of man, they sometimes, indeed, present in a most vivid and impressive manner; but the method of his restoration they certainly fail of revealing in its simplicity and entireness. Not only do they set forth no such doctrine as God's election of grace choosing out of the corrupt world sinners, involved in a common guilt and condemnation, to receive the image of his Son, and to share in a most freely bestowed salvation; but even the more generally received doctrine of justification by faith in Christ, as distinguished from the efficacy of all human works, they seem to have slightly apprehended, or at least, to have imperfectly set forth. This doctrine, it is well known, was esteemed by the earlier reformers, both in England and on the Continent, as the great test of the Church's stability. When it was rejected, they considered the Church as fallen; when received, they deemed it still erect. And if we reflect on it a moment, how can we fail to perceive the correctness of their judgement? It embraces these two positions, the first, that the ground of our justification is laid on the death of Christ alone, the second, that the act on our part by which this justification is appropriated, is faith in the Lord Jesus. Hence our justification is



not of works; no works of ours are either in whole or in part its ground; no works of ours are connected with its condition otherwise than as the results and evidences of that faith which recognizes Christ alone as our righteousness and sanctification, and redemption. This doctrine most obviously destroys all glorying in man, and prostrates the sinner beneath the cross of Christ, and keeps him there as the unworthy suppliant of a gratuity wholly such, altogether unbought and unrequited; a gratuity bestowed only through the power and mediation of Him in whom we have redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sins. Now, so early as the age of Howe, the greater body of the established Church seem to have in a measure overlooked this doctrine, held as it was by the venerated Hooker, his predecessors and compeers, as the ground-work of Christian theology. And here the Nonconformists evidently occupied a higher and more evangelical position. Leighton and some others may be excepted. But in general, while we would thankfully receive the treasures of ethical instruction, and the powerful enforcements of natural theology, accompanied by the Christian evidences, and many Christian motives and truths, with which Taylor, and Barrow, and Tillotson, have furnished us, we would yet go to the humbler names which their church cast out as evil and schismatic, to Bates, and Owen, and Howe, for answer to that most awful question, which can be proposed, *How shall man be just with God?* They reveal without any, the least concealment, our utter defilement; they assure us there is no justifying righteousness within us, or which we can work out; they refer us wholly to the cross of Christ; they recognize, alike in the necessities of the sinful, and the blessedness of the righteous, that redemption which supplies the demands of the former, and which makes the latter an object of hope and of joyful pursuit. Not that they continually dwell on this doctrine; on the contrary they bring forward all the revealed doctrines of Christ; they search out and unfold to their utmost, the mysteries of Godliness; they connect in due proportion and most beautiful harmony, the great principles of the Divine Oracles. But they never allow men to forget that they are sinners utterly lost in themselves, and saved, if saved at all, in virtue of the fact involved in that faithful saying so worthy of all acception, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners.



Closely connected with these views of the way through which salvation is obtained, is the doctrine of regeneration by the Holy Spirit of God. This is a subject to which Howe directs a more frequent and minute attention than the former. The cause of this may perhaps be found in his strong tendency to what has already been denominated an introverted philosophy, a love of turning his thoughts inward on the mind itself. Such a tendency naturally led him to the contemplation of religion in its subjective action rather than its objective character; in its internal working rather than its outward aspect; as it flows into the soul and moulds and shapes it, rather than as it stands out in remote and distinct abstraction. The nature of man as it is in itself; that nature depraved and debased by sin; that nature purified, exalted, unfolding its higher powers and original heavenly elements through the regeneration of the Holy Spirit, and by this regeneration made like God, and qualified for heaven; these seem to be the topics to which his mind most naturally recurs, on which it rests with highest delight, and by which its energies are called out into their most vigorous exercise.

Wherever, indeed, he finds the spiritual elements in distinction from the material; the universal in distinction from the local; the essential, the infinite, the everlasting, in distinction from the adventitious, the limited, the perishable; there he seems to have gained his native atmosphere, there he rises, and soars, and exults, not in his own power to ascend, but in the expanded glory so congenial both to the character of his intellect, and to the laws of the regenerated heart. This peculiar feature of his mind appears in his Blessedness of the Righteous. Baxter in his Saint's Everlasting Rest, has assayed the same most exalted subject, and has treated it, we need not say worthily, so far as man is able, of its nature. But in comparing the one with the other, we behold a delightful example of that wondrous variety with which God hath chosen to distribute his gifts for the edification of the Church and his own glory. Which of them was the more thoroughly imbued with the spirit of that life which they so loved to contemplate, and of which both have left such prophetic disclosures, it were perfectly useless to inquire. Whose work would do more on the whole to bring heaven down to earth, and to promote the preparation of saints for their future rest, of the righteous for their



congenial blessedness, we cannot determine. The one would have more effect on common minds; the other, on minds of a peculiar structure. The active man might prefer Baxter; the contemplative would be likely to choose Howe. Both are evangelical in doctrine, acute in discrimination, versed in scholastic theology, powerful in argument, and full of fervent, holy love to God and the souls of men. Baxter approaches more nearly, however, to what is denominated practical; he is more business-like; he comes and utters, with the energy of a mind roused to intense emotion, all by which he thinks it possible to affect others like himself. Howe carries through his whole work a serene philosophy; he goes forth to sweet and holy meditation; he bears one calm, unruffled aspect, not the result of insensibility, but as it were of the heavenly spirit reflecting itself in his tranquil thoughts. Baxter is always speaking as to men whom he would move by every rational inducement to secure everlasting rest; Howe seems scarcely to behold the presence of men, absorbed in the celestial visions which break on every side upon his illumined eye. The former is continually kneading and pressing his own thoughts into the consciences of others; the latter is apparently receiving a perpetual influx of heavenly light to flow forth again for others to dwell and rejoice in at their will. Both rise to a lofty atmosphere; but the one is, if we may repeat it with reverence, in the secret place of the thunder by which he would arouse a sleeping world, the other reposes away from earthly things in a milder region of calm and serene air, where for the time he comparatively loses sight of mortals in the outspread light of a holy blessedness.

Nor yet was Howe careless at all of human things. His communion with unchangeable and godlike forms enabled him always to distinguish what is essential from what is accidental, and by this very means fitted him to embrace and hold fast, not only the necessary doctrines of religion, but such views of outward rites and ecclesiastical regimen, as would tend most effectually to secure those necessary doctrines to the exclusion of whatever addition would either set them aside or mix them undistinguished with human devices. As it is philosophy which adopts, not the opinions of this or that sect, but whatever truth exists in any, so, he deemed it, Christianity is not the opinions and rites of any schism or party, but the whole truth as it is in Jesus; and



as it is humanity which embraces, not the peculiarities of any man or body of men, but the common properties of the species, so the Church is not this or the other denomination, but the assemblage of all in whom Christ's truth dwells as a sanctifying principle, manifesting itself in conformity to his permanent laws and institutions. Hence it is not strange that the Christian moderation which restrained him from violent opposition to the English Establishment, appeared after the act of ejection in a manner which excited surprise, even in his subsequent refusal of conformity. It was one principle all along. He loved the Church as Christian, not as Episcopal, or Presbyterian, or Congregational. Hence he could not yield to any act of power which went to merge Christianity in Episcopacy. He would have stood, it is believed, with equal decision as the antagonist of any measure which in his view had proposed the establishment of any church to a tyrannous controul over others. He avowed his indifference as to what party should prevail, so long as the Church retained its disorganized and divided state.

We may pause here for a moment, and reflect on this great and obvious principle. That all the churches in the world should adopt the same modes of government and worship, is by no means the principle, nor does it seem possible that the exaction of such an identity in the outward shaping can ever occur, even if it be desirable. Whether all Christians shall stand or kneel in prayer; whether prayer shall be offered in the minister's own words, or in a precomposed form, accompanied by responses from the congregation; whether sermons shall be written or unwritten; whether the Lord's Supper shall be received kneeling or sitting; whether the minister shall wear any decent attire or be clothed in a sacerdotal garment; whether a single church shall transact its own internal concerns, or depend on a Presbytery, or Convention, or Conference; whether these or numberless the like questions shall be decided in one way or another, we believe the decision may be wrong where the heart nevertheless is right, and that evangelical denominations are many only in circumstantialia, that they are but one in essentials. Even the graver questions of an Apostolic Episcopal succession, or of a dignified Presbytery, or of a plain, unadorned Congregationalism, debated as they have been, and are likely still to be, would come to a far more ready and happy adjustment through the un-



restrained exercise of the Christian spirit than through angry discussions and vigorous exertions of either ecclesiastical or political power. It may be asked, why are we not nearer in our republic to a religious harmony? Sure, it will be said, the spirit is here unshackled; and we might fairly expect that, having been bound so long and now set free, it would cast away the cords which have so long confined it. But there is sad reason, we may reply, to fear that the freedom thus predicated of Christianity, is as little felt in this land of republicanism as in our mother island. The political restraint, in name at least, is taken off. But sectarianism is a stronger check upon free spiritual religion than any the most formidable outward despotism. And where, alas! does it exert a mightier power than in our own boasted democracy? The counterfeit and mockery of religion, sectarianism usurps its name, and receives the homage of its votaries. Its position and character forcibly remind us of one among the multi-form idolatries of heathenism. Herodotus tells us that in Ethiopia, when a friend died, they used to dry his body, and after this was well done, to cover it all over with a plaster adorned with paint, making the form as near as possible to the likeness of the dead; then they enclosed it in a hollow crystalline pillar, through which the body would appear, and for a year kept the image in the house, presenting to it their first fruits, and offering sacrifices before it. 'Tis the type at once of what Christianity becomes, and how it is honoured by the sectarian spirit. The life is fled, the body itself is covered over with a cement not its own; the whole is cased up, then set away for a god; there is a worship, there is a sacrifice, but all to the lifeless and particoloured image, not to that which lives away from it and moves in another sphere, and is unchangeable spirit. What more decisive proof of this sectarian idolatry than we meet in numberless towns and villages? They have their houses of worship, their churches, their every thing of religion, but religion itself and its institutions. They might have a ministry; but their painted idol is too dear: they are all so tenacious forsooth of a pure Christianity, that is, of their own schisms, that they must remain year after year without the preaching of the word, without baptisms, without the Lord's Supper, waiting for the "man of their own order," the man who shall be faithful, not to the simple



gospel of Jesus Christ, but to a rigid Congregationalism, or an exclusive Immersion, or a versatile Methodism. Or, on the contrary, while millions are perishing in ignorance of the Way, the Truth, and the Life, some little village which might happily unite in one undivided worship and communion, must present on each successive Sabbath, not the full assembly uniting their hearts together before the throne, but smaller divisions passing in contrary directions to congregations jealous of each other, bitter in prejudice, harsh in mutual censures, and sometimes taught by their pastors to revile either the learned as hirelings, or the unlearned as fanatics, the Calvinist as a bigot, or the Wesleyan as a deceiver, the Baptist as a schismatic, or the Pædobaptist as a formalist, and so through the whole catalogue of sects. This is fact, and cannot be denied. The *primordia*, the essential elements, the vital powers of Christianity are fast bound in the fetters of sectarianism. Nay, religion is itself expiring beneath the pressure of its pretended forms. Decked it may be with pomp and splendour; but, like Alcestis, the morning of her doom, for death not life, or like Evadne, gorgeously dressed for her husband's funeral pile. Even now religion is writhing in horrible convulsions, compressed and broken by the dragon shapes which have come over the waves of its own discords to exult in its death, then to retire and lie down beneath the feet and the shield of the fiercer than Tritonian power from which they issued:

Ille simul manibus tendit divellere nodas  
Perfusus sanie vitas atque veneno.

Unlike the struggling Trojan priest, we believe Christianity will yet accomplish a perfect disenthralment. It has an indestructible power, a flame-like vigour inwrought into its whole frame, and produced by its celestial origin; so that it will mount upward, and break off its bonds and weights, and consume in its holy fires the enemies who grasp to destroy, but shall yet find in it their own destruction. It shall live, and not even die; it shall wrestle with the Power of Evil in its own precincts, and shall resume its native form neither veiled nor voiceless. What, then, is to be done? How is the Church to become one, if its oneness is to grow out of the prevalence of its essential spirit, and if that spirit is held so fast in sectarian bonds, its "nerves all chained up



in alabaster?" Simply, it is conceived, by each individual, inviting to his own rescue the mightier counteracting power, thus breaking the hold which the spell has over himself, and disenchanting his own soul, thus unlocking the clasp of charm and escaping from the sorcerer's accursed place to holier, heavenly ground. Each individual Christian must, in other words, divest himself of his narrow bigotry and become a Christian wholly, not the votary of a denomination. The glorious reformation must be begun, not in establishing or weakening this or that ecclesiastical form, but in filling the whole heart of every disciple, and thus of the entire Church with one simple principle, the love of Christ. Our souls, now shut up in a dark dungeon, must be drawn out and set free; they must breathe a new air, and cherish a nobler discipline, and exercise themselves in higher things, if we would have the Church come out into a broader Paradise. Purging themselves from vile sectarian adherencies, they must retain but the pure ethereal principle, drawing them first to Jesus Christ, and next in Christ to each other. This is humbly conceived to be the true secret of restoring the Church to its native unity; this, we may add, is in fact, the least difficult process for accomplishing the end. Abstract reasoning and Scriptural argument will in any other case be fruitless. The remark of Bishop Taylor is well known; "when the wolf in the fable went to school to learn to spell, whatever letters were told him, he could never make any thing of them but *agnus*." He could not, so long as he remained a wolf; but then if the wolfish nature might have been put off, and the human substituted in its place, he would have gone forward from *agnus* to *animus*, and in his new intellectual and moral appetites, would have found something more than hunger to appease, and other powers than bodily to employ. So, if you can turn the sectarian into the Christian, and inform the Christian with the free and holy principles of his faith, he will be no longer the wolf, but the man, no longer earthly, but heavenly, sharing even with angels in the oneness and power of their godlike spirit. And all these mighty transitions are possible through the power of Jesus Christ, and of the Spirit which he is exalted to bestow. Meantime it were well for us to remember the solemn declaration of our author: never can there be union or peace in the Christian world, till we take down our arbitrary enclosures, and content ourselves with those which our com-



mon Lord hath set. If he falls under a curse, that alters a man's landmark, to alter God's is not likely to infer a blessing."

Views like those of Howe concerning the union of the Church, held not as a bare theory, but as a living principle, grew not only out of his natural tendency to dwell upon the permanent and essential, as opposed to the accidental and temporary, but equally out of the prevalence and maturity developed, as respects the former, in his religious experience. The details of this experience we know far less, indeed, than we would. But his writings, the most real image of his mind, evince the immense influence of truth which is always the same, in forming his character to its beautiful harmony, proportion, and steadfastness. One precious record escaped the flames to which he devoted all his other private papers; the more precious as containing, not the memorial of earlier and youthful emotions, but the testimony to that inward fruit, corresponding so perfectly with the outward and visible, which he continued to bring forth in old age. They will be presented in the translation by his friend Mr. Spademan, from the original Latin, in which they were written in his Study Bible:—

"Dec. 26, '89 (1689.) After that I had long, seriously, and repeatedly thought with myself, that besides a full and undoubted assent to the objects of faith, a vivifying, savoury taste, and relish of them was also necessary, that with stronger force and more powerful energy they might penetrate into the most inward centre of my heart, and there, being most deeply fixed and rooted, govern my life; and that there could be no other sure ground whereon to conclude and pass a sound judgement on my good estate, Godward; and after I had in my course of preaching, been largely insisting on 2 Cor. 1: 12. 'This is my rejoicing, the testimony of a good conscience;' this very morning I awoke out of a most ravishing and delightful dream, that a wonderful and copious stream of celestial rays from the lofty throne of the Divine Majesty, did seem to dart into my open and expanded heart. I have often since, with great complacency, reflected on that very signal pledge of special divine favour vouchsafed to me on that noted memorable day, and have with repeated pleasure tasted the delights thereof. But what of the same kind I sensibly felt through the admirable bounty of my God, and the most pleasant comforting influence of the Holy Spirit, on Oct. 22, 1704, far surpassed the most expressive words my thoughts can suggest. I then experienced an inexpressibly pleasant melting of heart,—*perquam jucundam cordis emollitionem*,—tears gushing out of mine eyes, for joy that God should shed abroad his love abundantly through the hearts of men, and that for this very purpose, *mine oen* should be so signally possessed of and by his blessed Spirit,—*mihi que speciatim donato, in hunc finem, Spiritu suo*.—Rom. 5: 5."

*Life of Howe, by Dr. Calamy.*



Such are a few thoughts and impressions gathered out of the many which arise from contemplating the character, the views, and the writings of John Howe. The question will naturally occur in reference both to himself and to others of kindred mind, in the same age of the Church, whence arose their peculiar and distinguished excellence? To this question, virtually answered already, it may be neither incongruous nor useless to suggest a more explicit, though by no means a complete, reply.

The first cause of their excellence must be sought in their vigorous original powers. Both in action and in study they furnished evidence of this fact too manifest for doubt or evasion. God who, amidst the unity which pervades and binds together all his works, still chooses to show forth the endless extent of his own wisdom so expressively denominated by the Apostle in reference to his highest work *πολυποίκιλος σοφία*, by forming numberless correspondencies and harmonies with its manifold forms and operations, produced just the order of minds suited, not only to receive, but distinctly to reflect and transmit those aspects of truth, in which certain glorious varieties of his wisdom would appear in adaptation to the character of the age, and to the advantages of succeeding generations. Nor need we wonder at the native diversity of intellectual gifts. It concurs with universal analogy as it is testified by all observation. There is a romantic phrase in the Prometheus of Æschylus, not wholly unlike what has just been quoted from the Apostle, *ἡ ποικίλειμων νύξ*. Now within the broad, shadowy compass of the intellectual horizon, mind invests itself, or rather is invested by its Divine Parent, with robes of as many fashions and hues, as the skies and stars, the mountains, forests, fields, valleys, streams and oceans, outspread amidst the haze of evening. The drapery of night is not more varied. And if the creative power has here fixed the lovely moon and its brighter path, and there in a deep valley, some sweet violet or even ungainly brier; nay, if it has made one rose more full than another, and one star more glorious; why question the universal extension of a law thus corresponding with whatever we see and know? Why doubt that for an era so great and solemn, God himself formed the very minds which it demanded? And for such luminaries planted by his hand in the upper firmament, let us bless him and rejoice in their unceasing light.



To which cause found in their original powers of mind, we may, secondly, subjoin the thorough work of the Holy Spirit, wrought in their hearts. Without this, they might have been great as civilians, as philosophers, as orators, as leaders of the people; they might have risen amidst the political agitations of their age, to the most exalted worldly stations, employing their powers for the good or the ill of their country and the world. But that a destiny less suited to the pride of man was the object of their election; that they chose to be the lowly heralds of a despised truth rather than either the loyal dignitaries of a powerful monarchy, or the republican champions of a rising commonwealth; that amidst the collisions of these hostile interests, amidst the revolutions of an age pre-eminently distinguished for the warring of elementary political principles, associated on the one side with a venerable hierarchy, and on the other with a burning zeal for reformation, they consecrated all their powers and attainments, all their gifts and their own persons, neither to the excitements of their age, nor to the acquisition of human applause, but to Jesus Christ and his scattered people; that for Christ they lived, for Christ they toiled, for Christ they suffered, for Christ they were ready to die; this grew from another principle than worldly. For full well do we know that neither organic strength of intellect, nor the perfection of its culture can produce such a result. A result it is differing in kind, not barely in degree, from any thing merely intellectual, however exalted and improved. It differs in kind, we may add, from any thing inherent in man's fallen, depraved character. It has another cause than nature; it flows from a holier source than earthly. It is the manifestation of no less power than the Holy Spirit, the unfolding of no feeblere principle than Christ formed in the heart the hope of glory. To this origin they rejoiced to ascribe all human virtue. They felt more deeply that, by the grace of God, they were what they were. "There is nothing to be found in all this world"—such the emphatic language of Howe—nothing "worthy the name of spirit, but that which is born immediately of the Spirit, and is its offspring. Let a man be of never so refined intellects or great accomplishments; let him be never so much a man, and humanity cultivated to the highest pitch and degree; without this same additional superadded spirit, he is nothing but a lump of flesh." Under the influence of this



Spirit working the new creation, dwelling within the soul, and changing its nature, diffused in its high excellence throughout the man and restoring him to his primitive character, divine in effect as in origin, exciting aspirations toward God on whom it is dependent, producing actions suited to itself, and infusing into its subject immortal vigour; under this influence of God, they felt that man ceases to be the mass of corruption, the creature of earth, and that, rising to communion with God he becomes like him in the noblest element of the Godhead. Thus transformed in themselves, they manifested the reality of the work wrought within them; and instead of turning the grace of God into licentiousness, they felt it to be a most powerful practical agency, and sought in earnest prayer and diligent self discipline, the accomplishment of its whole work, and their growth through the strength of the vital principle to the fulness of the stature of perfect men in Christ Jesus. God forsook not the work of his own hand. Having united these branches to the true vine, he secured their fruitfulness; the branches continuing to bear fruit, he purged that they might bring forth more fruit. The celestial principle engrafted into the earthly heart, grew by the power which appointed its position; all its progress and developements the result of divine culture, Jesus Christ the true vine, God the Father, guarding, watching over, and dressing it for himself.

With such gifts of nature and of the Spirit, their education concurred to produce and manifest their peculiar character. We need not condemn the prevalence in these later ages, of what are termed the physical sciences. There is a great value, no doubt, in them all; provided especially they be kept in their proper relative position by means of a constant subordination, not only to mathematical pursuits, but to psychological investigations combined with a thorough theology and sound ethics. These latter are indeed undervalued as less practical; men deem morality and theology, that is, as merely speculative, vain reasonings all, and if not false, yet at the best, foolish and worthless philosophy. Different views from these have existed. Above a merely intellectual and scientific education, as well as an education which develops only the physical energies, there has been that which sought as its great end the evolving and ennobling of man as a moral and religious being. And this education of the moral and spiritual nature, has been in some



periods distinguished from education in the science of outward things, as specifically and eminently practical. Socrates is often referred to in contrast with theorizers and abstruse philosophers; they lost in wild vagaries and dreams, he devoted to solid and useful pursuits. And what were those pursuits! Xenophon expressly tells us that they had nothing to do, like those of most others, with the nature of the universe; that, while the sophists dwelt on the constitution and necessary laws of the external world, he deemed these sapient discussions fooleries, and made man and man's relations and duties the great subjects of his conversation. His plainer and more practical discussions proposed the discovery of what is godly, what ungodly; what noble, what base; what righteous, what unrighteous; what soundness of mind; what the contrary; what manliness, what a cowardly mind; what a commonwealth, what a politician; what a government, what a governor; and other things of which he believed that those who know them are noble and virtuous, and those who are ignorant may justly be called slaves. A formidable array, most surely, of odious metaphysics! The celebrated inscription on the Delphic Temple he seems also to have understood as recognizing this more inward and intimate knowledge, the knowledge of human powers and wants, of what is befitting our nature, and what the reverse, of what is either good in itself, or salutary in its effects. We know full well that physical science is far from being now what it was in ancient Greece, the result of severe induction not of fanciful theory, and that it proposes valuable ends as regards both the culture of mind, and the improvement of human art. And we fear also that ethics and kindred sciences have lost in a measure their vital and practical character. But after these deductions, it must be conceded that researches like those of Socrates, furnish the appropriate pursuit of man, that they are the most practical, the least visionary, and that they tend in the highest degree to improve the mind through the exercise of its noblest powers. So Howe felt, and his nobler contemporaries. With the ethical spirit of the Grecian philosopher, they conjoined, moreover, the exalting influences of that gospel in which the light he sought amidst shadows and obscurity, arose in the glorious day-spring. How thoroughly Howe was trained to an inward communion with the spiritual and the unchangeable with the *καθ'αυτὴν* of the Socratic phi-



losophy, the ethnic type of that higher goodness, that perfection of beauty, to which the gospel elevates whatever it inspires by its own influences, both his writings and his life most clearly evince. What was doubtless an impulse of nature, received strength from the Socratic books with which he was familiar, and from the education scarcely less important, which attended his earlier classical studies, resulting from association with such minds as those of Dr. Henry More and Dr. Cudworth, "of both whom," says Calamy, "he was a great admirer," and from his intimacy with whom, he remarks, "it is not to be wondered at that in his early days, he received that Platonic tincture which so remarkably runs through the writings which he drew up and published in his advanced years." A similar vein of Platonism pervades also the writings of Leighton, and exists, indeed, to a greater or less degree in nearly all the holiest and most fervent of those preachers and writers by whom the seventeenth century was distinguished. Perhaps it might serve to abate somewhat of the hostility now arrayed against classical literature, and particularly to soften the contempt with which the very name of Plato is associated with every thing fantastic and visionary, were the reflection thoroughly admitted that the noblest specimens of our theological literature, divested of what the Grecian philosophy did in forming their character, would be shorn, not to be sure of all, nor even half of their beams,—for Christianity is worth more than all,—but certainly of a lustre which now, like threads of golden light, flows through their deepest thoughts. Nay, we could not readily consent to dispense with what is despised even more than "heathen Greek," the scholastic lore which presents itself every now and then in their *species*, and *essential forms*, and *substances*, and *accidents*, and other the like distinctions. Their early familiarity with these nice and refined, even though remote, modes of thought, produced a clearness, a precision, and a logical arrangement of thought which perhaps no other discipline could impart. Beyond every other means of instruction, we need scarcely to add their deep and constant searching of the Holy Scriptures. They went to them, not indeed as critically and exegetically as scholars at the present day, but with a spirituality, with an opening of heart to receive their real and heavenly doctrines, with a preparation to have the mould of the gospel, the seal of the Spirit, impressed upon them, of



which no age has probably furnished more perfect examples. Such the influence of what, giving the phrase its widest import, we may term their literary education. It was, in fact, an ethical and religious education throughout.

Nor can we exclude from the process of their intellectual, and still more, their moral and religious education, that constant influence, beginning with their earlier years, and extending through their whole course of action, which reached them from the state of society in which it was their destiny to live. It was an age of transition and of conflict, government passing from one form to another under the mutual resistance of opposing principles, and religion, sharing in the revolutionary character, alternately toiling and striving, now for its reformation, now for the re-establishment of its older institution. Neither party was wholly right nor wholly wrong. On both sides great principles were evolved and brought into action; the love of freedom and the rights of humanity stood out on the one in all the prominence and power to which a most intense enthusiasm could raise them, and on the other, the reverence due to government, and the duties of subjects were enforced with whatever of solemnity and influence the authority of a potent monarchy, and the hearty zeal of a thorough loyalty could impart. Thus it was not, as in the French Revolution, a conflict of irreligion with religion, or of unbounded licentiousness with moderate government; it was the conflict, if we may borrow from a late writer so nice a distinction, not of contraries but of opposites. Both in Church and State, the leading spirits were attached alike to religion and government, to freedom and duty. The advocate of reformation sought not the pulling down of the sun from the firmament, or the destruction of that very firmament itself; he sought not to destroy but to reform, not to waste, but to repair, not to consume, but to purify, not to spread darkness, but to diffuse clearer and holier light. The loyalist, again, sought, not the subversion of freedom, but its protection through the strength of royal power, not the substitution of forms for the spirit of religion, but the prevalence and dominion of the spirit through the influence of venerable and time-hallowed forms. The Commonwealth was against the monarchy, gathered churches against the national church; but with both, government, law, religion, were sacred and precious names. It was, in fact, the collision of right on this side, with right on that, of one truth with an-



other truth, of virtue with virtue and religion with religion. Much as we may lament that these parties should have become antagonists, and still more that they should have prosecuted their warfare with bitterness and wrath, we have yet the advantage which the fact gives us of finding in both Episcopal and Dissenting writers the clearest elucidations and the strongest enforcements of differing principles, both of our nature and of religion. We have, moreover, the noble examples—and what do we of this age more need?—of serene and holy minds coming out of the deep amidst its tempestuous agitations to smoothe the swollen waves, to scatter the gathered clouds and bring back the sun. Not only may we believe that these agitations furnished the opportunities for displaying, we may presume they likewise aided in producing and confirming, as every one would perceive, the energies of a mind intense like Baxter's, and, what we less readily perceive, the meekness of a temper sweet and heavenly as Leighton's, and the calm grandeur of a spirit lofty and comprehensive as Howe's. Bringing with them into the midst of commotion, mind great in its native strength, ennobled by the regenerating influence of the Holy Spirit, and exalted in all its powers by the thorough education of the moral principle, they could stand unmoved amidst raging elements, and grow more heavenly and calm from the very shock. Thus the habit is formed, which cannot be broken. The abhorrence of evil becomes an unconquerable passion. The reverence of good becomes an element of the being. The exercise of whatever is excellent becomes as it were a natural movement. By the very violence and wrath which surround it, the spirit is raised to a higher and holier serenity.

Perhaps we may be pardoned in suggesting that circumstances not wholly unlike those of the seventeenth century may demand of us in the present age a culture, intellectual, moral, religious, by which we may be prepared for similar exertions. We have as yet, indeed, no great political revolutions. We have no established church to uphold or pull down. We have no new regimen in Church or State to adopt or resist. But in the moral warfare of human freedom, of pure religion, and of all virtue with antagonists most powerful and energetic, we have a mighty work to achieve. To save freedom from anarchy, and government from despotism, and religion from unbelief and contempt;



to adjust the conflicting claims of the reforming spirit, which will always have enough to do while human depravity continues, and of the conservative principle which is equally necessary to protect what is valuable and exalting, against a ruthless vandalism of moral efficiencies; to guard the temple of God from either pollution or ruin, while we suffer and even invite every repair which it may need through the violence with which men have assailed it; here is surely demanded, most urgently demanded, the concentration of wisdom, of learning, of energy mingled with gentleness, and, more than all, of a deeply rooted and mature religion. Our own country presents at this moment an immense mass of mind intensely excited, we had almost said volcanic. Our age manifestly has aroused itself to the thought, however misshapen, of a higher excellence than it has reached, to the aspiration, however misguided, after a nobler idea than it has realized. It is sleeplessly striving and reaching after what it depicts to itself as good. It is, as it were, another Orpheus, going even into the shades in search of a lost Euridice. An inward impulse has been excited urging our nature forth after its long wandering Psyche. There is a weeping over its desolations, a voice of supplication for some mightier than Herculean strength to meet the power of death at its very portals, to join in fiercest fight with the Prince of Demons, and compel him to give back its mourned and buried Alcestis. That cry will yet be answered. That voice will yet receive a full response. Man shall yet look again on the departed form of holiness, and clasp it to his bosom; celestial love and the parted soul rejoined and exulting in eternal youth. God has cast our lot in that interesting age wherein we must be false both to him and to our own nature, if we refuse to deplore the evil, and to toil for the good, to mingle in the prayer, to breathe after the blessing, to throw forward all our energies for the entire disenthralment and exaltation of man. God grant that we may so fulfil the obligations which we cannot escape as, not only to embalm our names in the memories of saints on earth, but to unite them with those which we now associate with spirits whose good fight is fought, whose course is finished, whose crown is won!



ART. V. REVIEW OF STUART'S *ŒDIPUS TYRANNUS*.

BY REV. ALFRED ADDIS, Edenton, N. C.

*The Œdipus Tyrannus of Sophocles, with Notes and a Critique on the subject of the Play. By J. W. Stuart, Professor of Greek and Roman Literature in the College of South Carolina. 1837.*

WE always hail with pleasure any elementary production, that promises to advance the cause of exegetical literature in the interesting department of the Greek Theatre. We do not pretend to be *enthusiastic* admirers of the Athenian stage. We certainly prefer the picturesque spirit of the romantic drama of the moderns to the cold, rigid, plastic conformations of the antique school. The subject of the plots of the ancients is not in unison with the spirit, taste, genius, manners, sentiments, religion, of the present age. Though well trained in the study of the Greek dramatists nearly from our infant years, we still find ourselves more at home with the fays, fairies, and elves of Shakspeare, or the demonology of the German dramatists, than with the cunningly devised fables of the heroes and demigods of antiquity. A great deal of the enthusiasm which the ancient Greeks felt for their tragic drama, was owing to that sombre cast of mystery with which their religious sentiments veiled the inscrutable ordinations of Divine Providence. The Athenian breathed the atmosphere of inexplicable mystery when he sought to unravel the perplexities of the moral world, to which the broader light of revelation has given *us* the clue; and he resigned himself wholly to the thrilling awe which the master spirits of fiction infused into his breast when they dragged him, like an ox for the slaughter, through the interminable train of disasters which prostrated one wretched family after another to the unintelligible wrath of an inflexible Necessity. The Athenian exhibitions were religious spectacles; and the stage was the altar where their poets offered up the destinies of the human race as a sacrifice to the unerring shafts of an implacable fatality. Unless we could feel all the religious associations with which the Greek representations stood connected, we might in vain conjure up all the accessory enchantments of music and



scenery by which the attention of the Athenian was riveted in awful suspense to the terrific splendour of the moral action developed before him, and which continually accumulated in wo till it terminated in an overwhelming catastrophe. The Schlegels have done much to set the ancient drama in its right light, without attempting to intrench upon the just claims of the moderns. Like the Grecian and Gothic styles of architecture, the ancient and modern drama have very little in common, and do not admit of fair comparison. Each must be weighed in its own balance. Wherever the Grecian hero has left his tragic stilts to be tricked out in a Parisian costume, he has always betrayed his unnatural position, and ceased to attract the ordinary respect paid to the inflexible dignity of the antique.

We are altogether averse to the insane ravings of critics who have held up the Greek drama as a perfect model for imitation to all after aspirants to dramatic reputation. The great Shakspeare, the child of nature, has broken through all the unities of time and place; and while the Greeks have gone the round of their trilogies and tetralogies in the narrow compass of their theatrical kaleidoscope, the moderns have traversed the varied regions of the picturesque and romantic, and have created a unity of interest, where they could not cripple the wayward offspring of their imagination in the excruciating mould of the Greek critics.

Stripped of its primitive associations, the ancient tragedy descends to us in its naked simplicity, yet still to be admired for its graceful symmetry, though deprived of its original interest. The sublimity of Æschylus, the pathos of Sophocles, the sentimentalism of Euripides, may still call forth congenial emotions in the breasts of the moderns. Yet as dramas they are merely food for the closet of the critic, serve as an historical illustration of the genius and character of the people by whom they were invented, and add to the mass of exegetical apparatus by which the sense is determined of other productions which are more deserving our attention. The Greek tragic writers, especially Sophocles, may be made a good whetstone upon which to sharpen the critical acumen of the student in order to prepare him to exercise it on more serious and useful occasions. A stock of erudition derived from Attic sources may be frequently turned to account for the advantageous elucidation of many controverted passages of Holy Writ. The incidental diffi-



culties of the Greek tragedians give opportunity to the student to pause and weigh the various bearings of mood and tense, of particles and participles, of prepositions in composition and out of composition, in order that he may bring into some intelligible connection the sense of the often short, elliptical and sententious dialogue of the speakers. Homer's Iliad and other books of simpler and more ready interpretation, are not of sufficient difficulty to arrest the student's attention to the structure and peculiarities of the Greek language. A translation of the tragedies of Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, demands precision of expression in order to fix with any definiteness the genuine meaning of the author. Much remains to be done by the Donnégans of the day to bring Anglo-Greek lexicography to complete accuracy. Greek dictionaries have not yet wholly cast off the sackcloth of their Latin obscurity.

Professor Stuart, of the College of South Carolina, has presented us with a handsome edition of the *Œdipus Tyrannus* of Sophocles, illustrated with copious notes derived from a careful and judicious collation of European criticisms. We have examined diligently his notes, and can pronounce them to be, in general, perfectly orthodox. He, however, offers us nothing very new. He has not deviated much, if at all, from the track of his able guides; and his wisdom and modesty may be thus safely commended. In his stock of criticisms we recognise all the *materiel* with which we were regularly *crammed* some fifteen years ago, nearly word for word, before we were sent down to our beloved *Alma Mater*.

As Mr. Stuart has entered upon a very close inspection of the Greek text, so as scarcely to have let a particle escape him without assigning it some meaning, we wish he had been more precise than he has been. We wish he had been more fixitior in his determination of those Protean atoms the Greek particles. Thus he says, v. 2, "*ἵνα* expresses *eagerness* or *impatience* in interrogation;" but he does not give us the corresponding word in English or even Latin by which it is to be construed. *ἵνα*, we well knew, in an interrogation answers to the Latin *tandem* when in the same predicament, and is equivalent to the English *pr'ythee*, or *I should like to know*, or corresponds to the force of *ever* in such a phrase as this, "What *ever* in the world do you mean?" 342, "*οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔτι*." The old meaning, *wherefore, for this very reason*, will do very well for this particle. The attention



of the student might have here been directed to the accentual difference between οὐκοῦν and οὐκοῦτε, 565, as guiding him to the difference of the sense. 289. Πάλαι, like *jamdudum*, in this instance as in many others, does not signify *long*, but *very much*. 345. Περ does not "augment the force of ξένους but belongs to the word "απὸς and has the sense of *cunque* in *quæcunque*, whatever. 769. Πῶς, *If I mistake not*, or *perhaps*. We are very glad to see Mr. Stuart pay so much attention to the signification of the Greek particles that are ambiguous; καί does not escape his notice. Much remains to be done in this department of Greek criticism, now that the language is emancipated from the old method of interpreting it by the Latin. The English language affords abundance of particles sufficient to give to every Greek particle its precise meaning. Mr. Stuart's book would have been better, if he had adduced from his reading more passages in confirmation of his meanings, and thence have deduced some general expressions by which we could always grasp the sense of these so long fugitive *expletives* as they have been miscalled. Notes on the Plays in order to be useful ought to have a general bearing on the whole range of Greek criticism. They ought to take in the whole circle of Greek literature; and weapons be forged from them by which the student might be able to go forth, attack and dissipate every difficulty of construction elsewhere found. The Plays may be made famous text books on which to establish an inexhaustible repertory of philological knowledge.

We dislike to see critics calling in the aid of pleonasm and cases absolute and anaceleuthias to solve a grammatical difficulty, when the knot may be untied without having recourse to any such subterfuges. Thus Mr. Stuart says, 58, on γινῶσθαι καὶ ἀγινῶσθαι ποτὶ, "The same sense is here repeated by adjectives, one of which negatively expresses the sense of the other—a common pleonasm, as often in the Iliad; e. g., κατ' αἰῶνα οὐδ' ὑπὸ καίῳ, and elsewhere." Now the double negation in the first passage very elegantly strengthens the preceding affirmation; and the sense is, "known to me, and *very well known* to me." In the passage of the Iliad, the sense is, "according to justice and nothing more than justice." In 101 we are told that we have an accusative absolute, when we have nothing more than an ellipse of ἐστὶ or ὑπάρχει:

ὅς τοι αἶψα (ἐστὶ) χερσίν ποδίν,



where the verb understood governs the participle expressed, according to a well known grammatical construction.

Mr. Stuart does not seem to us to enter fully into the spirit of that sublime choral ode (863), where Sophocles, standing forth as the poet of the Republic, vindicates the supremacy of the laws against the arrogance of monarchs. The chorus, officiating as the representative of the public sentiment, by a happy transition from the subject of the plot to some well-known passages of Athenian history, catches up the over-wrought feelings of the whole mass of his congregated fellow-citizens, and wafts them in one bold invective against monarchical government. After asserting the divine origin, purity and eternity of the laws, as of themselves a sufficient guard for the public liberties, he launches out the thunder of his strong anti-Homeric apophthegm :

Υβρις φύτευε τυραννιν  
Presumption sets up a monarch,

i. e. it is an act of overweening insolence by which one man arrogates to himself supreme dominion in the state. The poet never speaks the language of Homer about *Jove-nourished kings*, nor displays *his* political sentiments in such a sentence as this :

οὐκ αγαθὸν πολυκυβερνέειν.

No—at those grand *political* as well as *religious* festivals of the republic, the *Dionisia*, whole dynasties of the ancient kings of Greece are offered up by the tragedians as an acceptable sacrifice to the spirit of the democracy, and to Jove its king. *Musgrave* thinks the poet glances at the ambition of some men existing in his own time, as Alcibiades. But the poet goes farther back. He calls to remembrance the time when the Athenians, abrogating the old monarchical sovereignty, put themselves under the protection of Jove alone as their king, to whom the chorus appeals *indirectly* as the *προστάτης* (832) the defender of the Athenian commonwealth. The imagination of the democrats then naturally flowed to the *καλῶς εἶχον πάλευμα* their successful struggle with the Pisistratidae, when through their licentiousness, ἃ μὴ σικαίρα μὴ ὅα συμφέροντα, after having arrived to the summit of the rugged precipice of power, they were hurled



down by Harmodius and Aristogiton, into irretrievable destruction.

εις αναγκαν  
ενθ' ου ποδὶ χρησιμὸς χροταί

The chorus then prays in an equivocal style which suits both the struggles of the Thebans with the pest sent upon them, the Ἀρεὰ τοῦ μαλ' ἔργον ὅς νυν ἀχάλευς ἀσπίδων (190) as well as the struggles of the Athenians, with the invaders of their constitutional liberties—that Jove will not render abortive the happy issue of the contest to the state, for the chorus will never cease upholding Jove as their supreme ruler. Here, indeed, may have been a hit at the ambition of Alcibiades, which the quick-witted Athenian well knew how to take. But this is not the only occasion in which the poet asserts the supreme authority of Jove and the laws over the wilfulness of kings. He puts the same sentiments in the mouth of Antigone, when protesting against the sanguinary decrees of King Creon in the tragedy of that name. Antig. 453. It is from want of understanding all the allusions of the poets to the circumstances of the day, that their tragedies come down to us under a great disadvantage; and it is necessary for a modern to throw himself back into all the views, feelings, and condition of the ancients, in order to appreciate fully the sublimity of their conceptions. We think Mr. Stuart, therefore, has departed from his usual discrimination in not adhering to the approved signification of τυράννον simply as *king* in the present instance. He is mistaken when he supposes that the chorus wishes to represent Œdipus individually as a *tyrant*. Far from it. Œdipus comes forth in the outset in all the amiability of the patriarchal character. He comes *himself*, not by *messengers*, to ascertain the causes of the public calamity, and he assures his people that none feels more for the common suffering than he himself does. His indignation at Teiresias and Creon is the very natural result of the unconsciousness though erroneous, of his own guilt; and when some suspicion begins to attach to him in the development of the plot, the chorus immediately prior to the very *recitative* in which the word τυράννης is used still hold out hopes of encouragement to their sovereign, that he may not be found implicated in the charges of Teiresias, v. 835. And again in a subse-



quent ode, when the certainty of the guilt of Œdipus is not yet evinced, the chorus is found revelling in the hope that the investigation will produce some gratifying discovery to their sovereign, 1095.

στίνῃ θεῶντα τοῖς ἐποῖς  
τεταυρῶς

that he will turn out to be the descendent of some god, and thus throw additional lustre on his already wide-spread renown. Hence, in the disputed passage, the chorus takes occasion from the as yet unauthenticated aspersions on the character of Œdipus, merely to enlist the popular prejudice against the licentiousness of kings *in general*, averring that kings are the natural growth of an insolence and presumption which desecrates all laws, human and divine, and that as they are engendered from such a corrupt seed, nothing but insolence and licentiousness can be expected from them. Arrogance gives them birth; and arrogance characterizes them in all their actions. This being designed for the Athenian ear, the *chorus* does not so much speak out as the *poet*. If Mr. Stuart understands rightly the moral of the Greek dramas *in general*, he will see that it is far from the intention of the poet to punish Œdipus for his tyranny. No—the poet excites the terror and pity of his audience by dragging his heroes through a series of crimes over which they have no controul, and then, by inflicting the vengeance of the gods upon them for their utter helplessness. An uncontrollable destiny impels them into guilt; and the implacable Furies punish them for it with their arbitrary judgements. Pity arises from the former cause; terror from the latter. The audience depart awfully impressed with the mysteries of the divine dispensations and of their own inscrutable destinies. This constitutes the great *momentum* of the ancient tragic drama. The poets dived deep into the enigma of human life, and brought up from the unfathomable abyss their frightful monsters. They saw men existing upon the earth, the mere creatures of *circumstance*, which they called *destiny*; and could not reconcile the justice of the gods with their judgements, the fatality of human actions with man's responsibility. And thus the *chorus*, the great soul of the moral of the plot, winds up the whole mystery of the fable by introducing a still greater mystery. *Oh, ye*



sojourners of Thebes, see! Here is Œdipus who found out those famous enigmas about human life; and became the greatest man of his age, but who, from no hatred of the citizens, and in the act of administering to their misfortunes, has been plunged into how great a gulf of overwhelming calamity! Man has no controul over his destiny, whether he be good or whether he be bad. (See the sentiment of Jocasta 977.) We cannot calculate what may happen; so let no one deem happy any mortal, who yet waits to see the very last day of his existence, till he has past clear the boundary of life without meeting with any affliction.

In line 1526, scholiasts and critics have wofully missed the meaning of the poet; and Mr. Stuart has not presumed to set them right. There ought to be a comma after πολισων; ζηλω is not governed by επι βλεπων but connected with it by και, the former being the causative dative, and the latter in the sense of a gerund in *do*; the ου is an adverb for an adjective, and agrees with ζηλω. Thus,

οστις, ου ζηλω πολιτων, και τυχαις επι βλεπων,

*who, not by hatred of the citizens, by exercising any tyranny over them, and or but by looking after or administering to their misfortunes or interests, as Œdipus is represented as doing at the commencement of the piece, when he comes to investigate the cause of the Theban Pest.*

Though it might swell the body of the notes, yet we like to see a display of authorities. In 169 we have στωλος *any assembled multitude*, hence generally *a people, a nation*, the meaning here given. Now στωλος means primitively *an army*; and for its acquired sense of *a people, or nation or assembled multitude*, we would have quoted parallel passages, where στρατος, ταγμα, ταξις are used in the same way. Thus, ταξις. Æsch. Prom. v. 128. στρατος Elect. 749, and Trach. 797, and *exercitus*. Æn. vii. 38. This shows the scholar and makes the scholar. Again, we have no note upon προς χαριν, 1152, whose various uses might have been illustrated from Antig. 30,899. Trach. 179, Philoct. 1156, Medea, 541, Meleag Epig. 39, etc., etc. We see many definitions of particles, as 1114, 1116, 290, 37, 53, without authorities, though in other places the author is diffuse. We like to see English illustrations of Greek phraseology, and we would have added to the specimens of the *Oxymoron* 1214. *Shak's Comedy of Errours, Act. 5, Sc. 1.*



They brought me one Pinch, a hungry, lean-faced villain,  
 A mere anatomy, a mountebank,  
 A thread-bare juggler, and a fortune-teller,  
 A needy, hollow-eyed, sharp-looking wretch,  
 A living dead man.

a passage which we copied down once to illustrate Antig.  
 ἐμὲ λυχνὸν νεκρὸν.

In the perusal of Mr. Stuart's *critique on the subject of the Œdipus*, we must revert to the remarks we have thrown out at the commencement of this review. Schlegel in his *Dramatic Literature* has done all in his power to cast a halo of enthusiastic enchantment around the cold forms of the dramatic pantheon of the Greeks. The moderns might have well let them stand in their simple and naked glory. We have seen in a modern theatre, where *Robert le Diable* was acted, a row of female actresses dressed in the antique, stand as motionless statues for a time on pedestals in the several niches of what was designed to be a temple, and then at a given signal move from their places, assume the habits of nuns, and dance over the stage to a step something resembling the quadrille. But in the temple they looked much better motionless as statues, than moving as nuns or dancers. In the same way we look upon the Greek Tragedies as admirable specimens of ancient art, but when they leave their place, assume a new dress, and become furnished with modern accomplishments, their motley appearance strikes us with disgust instead of pleasure. We cannot fully subscribe to the sentiments of Mr. Stuart as altogether a useless critique. Every nation, every age, has its peculiar drama. The savage and the civilized equally delight in the mimetic art. That tragedy affects the most whose subject is most interwoven with the manners, sentiments and history of the people before whom it is exhibited. The subjects of the Greek drama are unfitted for a modern audience, however they may be remodeled by the genius of a Corneille or Voltaire. When Mr. Stuart says "it is only when treated in a Grecian manner that a subject like Œdipus can possibly affect," he ought also to have inserted, *and only when exhibited before a Grecian audience*. The modern imitators of the Greek drama have committed one great blunder; they have always calculated without their host, the sentiments of the age for which they wrote. The drama is the mirror held up to nature, which reflects those objects *with the greatest effect* which come more immediately before



it. The rules of its formation must change with the spirit of the age. If the subject is too antiquated or remote, it has no hold upon the passions, and can excite them neither one way nor the other, because it finds no congenial elements to work upon. Who but a Grecian could enter fully into the sorrows of an Electra, wailing for the misery and indignity her supposed dead brother endures by not having the usual funeral rites performed for him by his relatives? If Mr. Stuart, instead of comparing the modern versions of the plot of Œdipus with the ancient Greek, had endeavoured to infuse the *spirit* of the Greeks into the students of their drama, by being more exegetical in the manners, customs, and sentiments of the Athenians as bearing upon the plot, he would have been more in keeping with the design of his performance. Yet we shall not do justice to the author without quoting the following admirable remarks, p. 214.

"Tragedy must be founded either on circumstances which are universal, or on those which belong to particular countries. In the first case it moves on the spring of feelings, associations and conceptions which are common, necessary, and natural to all, and is therefore interesting to all. In the second case it is national—it is Greek, or Roman, or French, or English, according as its spirit and materials are the peculiar property of a people. But the Œdipus of Corneille is founded on circumstances which are neither entirely universal nor particular. It is an incongruous mixture of materials and manners drawn from two remote and widely differing nations. Its fable is one of Grecian mythology, but Corneille has stripped it of its Grecian costume, torn its characters away from all the spirit and customs of their age, and given them French manners, and the calculating policy of a French court. He has united the simple, stern subject of Sophocles with a low intrigue, and, as might be expected from this unnatural union, the former is divested of all its terror and pity, and the latter, so far from exciting in our minds any sympathy, creates nothing but disgust." All this is admirable—sound criticism, and well expressed. Here then the Professor fixes a good limit to the claims which the Greek tragedians have upon our admiration. What is *universal*, the sublimity, pathos, and soul-delineations of the tragedians, these we admire. What is *national*, their manners, superstition, and mythological material of the Greek plot, with these we have no affinity. The former give them a



*readable* interest; but the latter eternally restrict them to the closet, and rob them of their character as *acting dramas*. All comparison then between the ancients and moderns is useless. It is an affair of national taste; and none but a Frenchman could think of perverting that.

Upon the whole, we can safely recommend to the scholar Mr. Stuart's handsome edition of the *Œdipus Tyrannus* as being the earnest of a series of commentaries on the Greek Tragedians, in which every thing that is useful to the student will be furnished to guide him through the difficulties of the Greek language, according to the most approved criticisms of the Europeans, and at the same time imbue him with some tincture of the spirit of the ancient drama. Some view, however, of the metres and the structure of the choral odes, of the scenical apparatus, dramatic contests, etc., might form the subject of useful critiques appended to the next Plays. The *verbal* criticisms might partake more of the form of grammatical rule, after the manner of Porson, Bloomfield, etc. We subscribe cordially to Mr. Stuart's wish—"May this my first attempt in the sphere of Greek literature, undertaken principally with the view of being useful to my pupils, be favourably received."

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#### ART. VI. THE PASTORAL OFFICE AND CHARITIES.

By Rev. H. READ, late missionary at Ahmednuggur.

THE conversion of the world is professedly, and we hope, really the leading object in the wishes and efforts of the Church of Christ. It should doubtless be a grand desideratum with every Christian to know how this object can be the most readily accomplished. Nothing can be more proper than free discussion of the ways and means. We are not among those that apprehend any thing but good from such a discussion. It may develope principles which shall lead to the abrogation of long existing systems. And these systems may have been regarded as essential to the prosperity of the missionary work, while indeed they may now be but hindrances.

It behooves us at least to examine our present mode of



operations, and seriously to inquire if there be not a better. And it behooves us to give a weighty consideration to other systems that have been proposed.

The design of the present article is to contemplate the work of Benevolence in a single aspect—its relation to the pastoral office.

The pastoral office is one of sacred dignity and vast responsibility. It is a divinely-appointed institution for the complete supervision of the Christian Church. It has a twofold object: the edification of the Church, and her extension. Whatever be the actual efficiency of the gospel ministry, its design doubtless is to accomplish both these purposes. All reforms belong either to the body politic, or the body ecclesiastic. The regularly appointed leaders in these respective bodies stand charged with the responsibility of suppressing vice. The state possesses the proper authority and power, and may, and ought to employ the proper means of suppressing all those vices that fall within the reach of the secular arm. And the Church possesses all the necessary authority, and all the needed means for the curbing or exterminating all those vices which more properly fall within the precincts of her dominion. The suppression of vice is, in fact, in the divine economy, a consequence of the faithful discharge of the twofold duty of edifying and extending the Church. Both objects are accomplished by the presentation of the truth—the exhibition of light, before which darkness will flee away.

When an extraneous power must be employed to secure the ends of government, we justly reproach the government as corrupt and imbecile. In like manner we concede the weakness of the Church, and the inefficiency of the divine organization of gospel institutions when we recognize the necessity of human institutions to supply that which is wanting in the divine organization. Such a concession is derogatory to the Church, and dishonourable to the great Head of the Church. We believe that the Church needs no such extraneous aid. We believe that Christ, in organizing the gospel ministry and appointing overseers over the different portions of the catholic church, adopted a system adequate to all the exigencies of this body, and one which, if carried out by its ministers, will prove to be all that Christ designed it should be. He gave in charge to his ministers not only the protection, the instruction, and the building up of his Church



in countries where it is already established, but he particularly charged them that they see to it that the gospel be made known to all that dwell on the face of the earth. Every minister of Christ, therefore, wherever he may be situated—every man who bears a commission from the great Head of the Church, is bound in virtue of his commission as ambassador of Christ, to *act his own part*, and to bear *his own* responsibility in the *whole* work of the gospel ministry. He is set in the Church as a leader in all that appertains to the business of the Church, whether it be for her edification, or for her extension.

Paul was neither a fund-gatherer, nor a revivalist, nor a temperance leader, nor a missionary, nor an abolitionist, nor a peace agent. He was more. He was a minister of Christ—preaching the gospel of peace, and temperance, and liberty to the captives, and good tidings of great joy to all people. His office was circumscribed by none of these modern boundaries. The reviving of the Church; the alarm and conversion of sinners; the promotion of temperance; the collecting of funds for the poor; the fitting out, sending abroad, and the support of preachers among the heathen, were but the every day functions of his high and holy calling. Strip the sacred office of these cardinal duties, and it is shorn of more than half its glory. Paul would as soon have adopted the plan of setting apart a particular order of ministers for the administration of the Lord's Supper; and another order for the administering of baptism; and another for the office of marriage, or for visiting the sick, or officiating at funerals, as to have adopted our *new* plan of designating large classes of ministers to the performance of single duties in the work of the ministry.

Portions of the American Church now present to the world a singular anomaly. To a choice few of her sons is conceded the power—or something very much like the power of “producing” and “conducting revivals.” The Spirit “follows,” accompanies, or “goes before them,” and they alone understand the matter of revivals. Pastors of churches, and all ordinary ministers must stand back, and see their zeal for the Lord. This one erroneous opinion, with its consequent practice, is no doubt on the wane. The more judicious, sober portion of the Christian community are beginning to see the evil of detaching so important a part of the minister's work from the pastoral office. They are



now by painful experience convinced that so important a part of the sacred office as the work of revivals, must be allowed to remain an integral and indispensable duty of every minister of Jesus Christ.

Yet the principle has not been abandoned. It is still acted upon in reference to some of the most important functions of the holy office. The agents of our different benevolent and moral societies, are still a living—*travelling* reproach on a regular ministry. They are professedly, and really, necessary only to fill up the pastor's deficiencies. Let the pastor do what is his plain, his acknowledged duty, and there would be no occasion for agents of any kind. Our present system of agencies is founded on the assumption that the regular ministers of the Church are either unqualified or unwilling to do their duty. If unqualified, they ought to suspend the exercise of their office, and prepare themselves in the shortest possible time for the discharge of, at least, these more prominent duties of their calling. And they can never hope for a better time for such preparation than during the present regency of agencies. But if it be a disability in the will, more than in the head, their whole duty should first be thrown upon them, and let the event tell whether they will shrink from the discharge of those important pastoral duties which are now done by *hired* men, and "strangers." Where the experiment has been tried, it has succeeded well. Pastors have not shrunk from their duty. And why should we suppose there will be any disastrous dereliction?

The two following considerations, if sustained, are sufficient to substantiate the foregoing positions.

*FIRST, Agencies are now unnecessary.* The necessity never did exist except in the delinquency of pastors. In the incipient stages of foreign missions, for an example, such extraneous aid, doubtless, was necessary to help on our predecessors in the ministry, in the discharge of their duty to the heathen. They were then a necessary evil which, in a darker dispensation, might be tolerated. Twenty years ago and little was known, and little could be known of missionary operations. And it seemed necessary to employ the few who were then in advance of their brethren in knowledge or feeling on this subject, to visit both ministers and people, and enlighten and electrify them on their momentous duty to a perishing world. Many then doubted as to the



duty of the American Church engaging in the work of missions beyond the seas ; and more doubted as to the practicability of such an undertaking. All was new ; all was experiment. And there were not facts then, by which to produce conviction in the public mind. But the case is far different now. The means of information are abundant. They are widely diffused, and in so cheap a form as to be within the reach of the humblest member of the church.

If the time has not now come when every minister may, in point of information, qualify himself to discharge that part of his duty to the heathen world which lies within the precincts of his own church and congregation, it is hard to conjecture when it will come. He has, at least, every means he can wish of gaining information for himself, and of diffusing it among his people. But it is not to be expected that he will employ these facilities while the work is taken from his hands, and given to an order of men who, by common consent, are set apart and paid to do his duty for him. While agents are employed and paid for a specified service, it is not to be expected that others will do their work for them. And while things are suffered to remain in their present posture, there is no doubt the agent is able to collect a greater amount of funds in a given church than the pastor ordinarily can. The *reason* of this again illustrates the evil of the system of agencies. The pastor, in the habit of being admonished of his duty by the visit of an agent, is unprepared to present the subject of benevolence himself ; and he is never likely to be prepared while he can lean on foreign aid.

There is also a corresponding unpreparedness on the part of the people. They expect the periodical return of the agent to supply their lack of knowledge on the great subjects in question. They expect, too—which is far worse—that their benevolent feelings will be drawn out by the agent, and not by their pastor.

This is but another branch of the system of employing a particular order of men, called “evangelists,” for the promotion of revivals of religion. We know of churches not a few, who are so thoroughly initiated into this modern arrangement for accomplishing the great objects of the Church that they do not seem to expect much from the regular and stated administration of the gospel among them. They have a spasmodic existence. The pastor, during the inter-



vals of torpor, acts as a kind of conservative power to protect the body till the return of animation. The impulse is to be given—the breathing in of the breath of life is expected from some external source. Not till a man skilled in the work of revivals is called in, do they expect to awake from their lethargy, and do their “first works.” The pastor now becomes of little account. He yields to his more skilful brother the conduct of the revival department of his official duties. And when he has yielded to other hands the discharge of the duties that devolve on himself in reference to the three great departments of ministerial labour, viz., revivals, the general cause of benevolence, and of reform, what has he left? He has yielded the power and dignity of his office. This will appear more clearly from our next consideration, which will be presented in its proper place.

Many seriously oppose the order of things called “New Measures,” yet heartily adopt an essential part of that system—the present system of agencies. This is inconsistent. Why have an order of men especially to do a pastor’s duty in reference to the work of benevolence—whose object is the extension of the church abroad, doubtless the principal object of the church—and not have a corresponding order, namely, Evangelists, to assist, or rather we should say, to *lead and direct* both pastor and people in the work of revivals, the work of converting sinners, or enlarging the church at home. If the system here alluded to is unnecessary and injurious to the best interests of the church, its corresponding branch is doubtless scarcely less so. They ought to stand or fall together.

That the present agency system is unnecessary further appears from the fact, that where the experiment has been tried—where the duty of inculcating the spirit of benevolence and of gathering funds for the execution of the work has been resigned into the appropriate hands—pastors have not been found delinquent in their duty. No agents are employed in a large portion of the New England churches to raise funds for foreign missions, and to but a limited extent for other purposes. And never did the cause of benevolence go forward so vigorously as under this new state of things. And why should it not? The responsibility is now thrown just where it belongs. It is made a business of the pastor and his people, and not of agents and societies. If the work



now falter, the pastor and church are made to feel the delinquency and adopt means accordingly.

The Reformed Dutch Church have no paid agents to do what they have once paid their pastor to do. It is now but a few years since the missionary spirit was at so low an ebb in that church, that it was thought by some of their wisest and best men preposterous to attempt to send out a single man to the heathen: and now they are able to raise, in proportion to their numbers and resources, a greater sum for foreign missions than any other church in America. How is this? In less than half the time that even the New England churches have been gaining their present high level in the good work in question, the Dutch Church has been transformed from a church that did the least in this cause to one that does the most. And this happy transition without the electrifying influences of an established system of agencies.

In the District of Columbia, and in other portions of the Presbyterian Church contributing to the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, agents are no longer employed. The Presbyterian Foreign Missionary Society resolve to employ no agents for the special purpose of raising funds.

Our *second* remark is, *that agencies are attended with many serious evils which would be avoided in the proposed change.* Here we must specify; the following are a few of them:

1. *Agencies are expensive:* a very serious evil if they be unnecessary. Here we shall enter into no details; and hope, for the honour of our Zion, the evil complained of will be removed without a resort to facts. It is exceedingly desirable that no such development should be made. Far be it from us here to cast any reflection on those who perform the arduous and oftentimes extremely perplexing duty of agents. If employed they ought to be paid, and well paid. But the church, we contend, has no right to employ them. She has no authority for separating so many of her best and wisest sons from the pastoral office, and employing them as *helpers* to her pastors to do what they ought to do, and what they can do better than those employed. She has no right to pay over thousands annually, of her charity funds, for the performance of duties for which she has once paid. She defrauds herself by foregoing the extra influence which her pastors



would gain by urging the cause of benevolence themselves. She defrauds those destitute of the bread of life at home and abroad; she diminishes the supply of Bibles that she might otherwise furnish; she withholds a sixth, a tenth, or fifteenth of what she might otherwise pay directly to the education of indigent young men for the ministry. And the actual efficiency and strength of our missions abroad suffer nearly in the same proportion. It is time that this subject undergo a thorough and prayerful revision. It is time that the church in her *church capacity* recognise her duty to *extend* the blessings of the gospel in the same way, and by the same men, by whom she edifies her own body. Such a recognition would identify her twofold duty, and give to the former an efficiency and holy dignity which it has never yet had.

We have abstained from expressing views like these sooner, (and have no doubt others have done the same,) from an apprehension that pastors and churches were not prepared for so important a change. Our fears now are that they never will be prepared till the change shall be made. Therefore we hazard this feeble attempt on a subject yet unpopular.

2. *The present agency system, more perhaps than any one thing besides, degrades the work of benevolence.* It violently puts asunder what God so happily joined together. It tends to cherish the idea, already too prevalent, that our "charities" the whole work of extending the church, is a mere *gratuity*, and not a component and substantial part of church work. It fosters the *romance* of missions, which, after a quarter of a century has elapsed for sober reflection, obtains to a very destructive degree. It gives to the missionary a fictitious character as a devotee or a mendicant altogether too high; while it gives to him a real character, as to his actual standing in the gospel ministry, altogether too low. This artificial state of things magnifies him and his office as seen at a distance through the mists and fogs of a pious romance, but diminishes him to a humiliating insignificance when viewed without any of these adventitious circumstances. Experience, as to this last opinion, is more to be depended on than theory.

These remarks may need explanation. We know it will not readily be acknowledged that these things are so. No church, and perhaps few Christians, will express such sentiments; yet such is the latent influence of the present system



of things, that, with very few exceptions, all unconsciously act upon them. Allowing this, it will still be asked, What has our present agency system to do in the case? We answer, very much. This is the entering wedge that dissevers the two great departments of church work. It makes the work of benevolence an *extra* work. We care not whether its *nominal* position be above or below the other department of church labours. What with the church is *extra*, is pretty certain either to fall *below* her acknowledged duties, or *outside* of them. For in all spiritual things we recognise no authority to be higher than that of the church of Christ. We concede to no community so high a dignity as that which belongs to the Christian church. Every separation, therefore, of any given department of labour from the church, must be a proportional degradation of that department. The office once lowered, those that hold that office sink to the same level. Hence the degradation of the missionary character.

3. *Ministerial influence in the pastoral office is sadly abridged by the existing system of agencies.*

As already hinted, the pastor is divested of much of the power and dignity of his office. Important pastoral duties are thrown into the hands of strangers. A minister's estate lies in his ministerial influence. A treasure in the affections of his people is worth more to him than "his house full of silver and gold." But this is not the acquisition of a day. It is picked up, piecemeal, amidst a long and laborious discharge of his official duties. Every good feeling that he excites in the heart of a single hearer is an accession to his treasure. Every good sentiment he inculcates, every good object he urges, adds to his estate. What minister could afford to lose the influence to be gained by impressions made on sacramental occasions, at funerals, or about the death-bed? Let him keep silence or stand in the back-ground at such times, and he is poor indeed. He has lost influence enough to ruin him. He has yielded to a stranger a moral power which years cannot restore.

What then shall we say of the minister who allows the most catholic and ennobling, the most exalted and heart-thrilling subjects in the whole range of his official duties, to be presented by any one but himself? Why so readily yield to a stranger, who can scarcely be benefited by it, that which he can so illy spare?



But it has been said that an agent—generally a stranger—will make a deeper impression, and of course get more money than the pastor. This is doubtless a mistaken notion. Let a pastor do his duty—let him come before his people in the honour and might of his office, possessing their confidence as one that has no cunningly devised fable to unfold, and it is but reasonable to suppose he may produce, if not a *deeper*, a more lasting and profitable impression. His flock will follow him, for they know his voice. But a stranger will they not follow.

4. *The employment, in agencies, of so great a number of preachers, is another sore evil.* And these too generally the men—most of them torn from a pastoral charge—who would as pastors do most for the cause of benevolence. Not only then are their salaries as agents to be deducted from the general funds, but there is a still greater loss to the cause from their being without a pastoral charge. On this topic there is no need of enlargement. No one can but regard this as a grievous evil, and can only be reconciled to it from its supposed or real necessity.

If we have succeeded in convincing any one that agencies are unnecessary, he will feel the evil in question, and set himself about a reformation. Here every individual Christian may bear a part. He may promptly and cheerfully come forward, unsolicited by agent or pastor, and do his duty—give a portion to “seven,” and [if there be more than seven benevolent societies) to “eight also,” according as the Lord has prospered him; and we shall no longer have occasion to complain of any of these evils.

There are two classes of ministers who doubtless ought to be temporarily employed as *helpers* to pastors in the diffusion of a missionary spirit, and the collecting of funds. These are missionaries under appointment and waiting to be sent to the destined field of labour, and returned missionaries who are here recruiting their health, or for other reasons detained in this country with the expectation of resuming their labours abroad. They are not pastors, and cannot consistently become such. They possess peculiar advantages for *assisting* pastors in this important part of their sacred office, which cannot, in any other way, be employed so directly for the general good of the church of Christ.



## ART. VII. CELSUS.

(Concluded.)

By ENOCH POND, D. D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Bangor, Maine.

24. CELSUS objects to the Christians, that Jesus had borrowed much of his instructions from the Greeks, particularly from Plato.

"They have a precept not to repel him that injures, and if he should strike the one cheek, yet offer thou also the other. This is ancient, and very well said before. For Socrates is introduced by Plato, discoursing with Crito these things: 'Must, then, an injury in no wise be done? No, certainly. Nor must the injured repay the injury, as many think, seeing an injury must in no wise be done.'

"These things are better said by the Greeks, and without that commination and denunciation from God, or the Son of God." "Plato does not vaunt and lie, saying, that he has found some new thing, or that he is come from heaven, but confesses from whence these things are. But ye say, believe him whom I sent forth to you, that he is the Son of God; though he was bound most ignominiously, and punished most shamefully though *so recently*, before the eyes of all, he was treated most reproachfully, yea, believe the rather for this."\*

25. Celsus had evidently read the Apocalypse, and regarded it as among the sacred books of the Christians; for he ridicules many things contained in it, such as the voices, and the seals, and the figures of the cherubim, and the tree of life, and the coming period, "when the sin of the world shall die." We forbear to give a specimen of his language on this head.

26. Celsus objects to our sacred books, that they teach the doctrine of fallen spirits.†

"They are deceived most impiously, and by the greatest ignorance, making one contrary to God, naming him the devil, and in the Hebrew tongue, Satan. It is rash and unholy to say these things, that the great God, being willing to do good to men, hath one working against him, and is not able. The child of God, then, is put to the worse by the devil, and

\* Lib. vi. vii.

† Celsus had no doubt that our sacred books *do teach* this doctrine; nor did Origen reply to him, as some modern interpreters would have done, that he was mistaken in this matter.



being punished by him, teaches us also to despise punishments; foretelling, that Satan himself, in like manner appearing, shall show great works and wonders, usurping to himself the glory of God; to which, however, they must not give heed, but believe himself alone. These things belong manifestly to a man that is an impostor, setting himself to work, and beforehand guarding against them that maintain the contrary opinion."

57. Celsus objects to the account given by Moses of the creation of the world.

"The generation of the world and of men, described by Moses, is very foolish. Not knowing what is the nature of the world, and of man, he has composed a profoundly idle tale. Some of the days of the world's formation were passed before light and heaven were made, and the sun, and moon, and stars; and some passed after the making of these things. And certainly the maker of the world did not borrow light from above, even as they that kindle lamps among neighbours. If there was opposite to the great God, a certain execrated god who was doing these things against his mind, why should he lend him light?"

"It is extremely foolish to attribute certain days to the making of the world, before there were days: for how were there days, the heaven being not yet made, nor the earth established, nor the sun appointed to his place? Let us consider, whether the first and greatest God would not be absurd, commanding, *Let this be*, and another, *this or that*; and one day framing such a thing; the second day, so much more; and so on during the third, and fourth, and fifth, and sixth; and resting the seventh day, like some ill workman, being wearied out, and needing relaxation or rest. It is neither just that the first God should be weary, nor work with his hands, nor give orders; nor has he a mouth, nor a voice; nor has he any other of these things; nor did he make man in his image; for God is not such as man, nor is he like to any other similitude."\*

28. Celsus objects, that the laws of Moses and those of Christ are contradictory.

"If the prophets of the God of the Jews foretold that he (Jesus) would be his Son; how did he by Moses, give law to become rich, and to become powerful, and to replenish the earth, and to cut off enemies in war."

"But now his Son, the Nazarene, gives opposite law, insisting that there is no access to the Father for one possessing riches, or loving power, or striving for wisdom or glory; and there must be no more care had of provisions and the storehouse, than have the crows; and of raiment than the lilies; and it must be permitted to him that strikes once, to strike again. Whether does Moses or Jesus lie? Or did the Father, sending him, forget what things he discoursed by Moses? Or, disapproving his own laws, did he change his mind, and send the messenger to contrary purposes?"†

29. Celsus urges upon the Christians, that if they de-

\* Many philosophers in the days of Celsus, holding matter to be something evil, did not attribute the creation of the world to the Supreme God, but to some inferior, opposing divinity.

† Lib. vi. vii.

VOL. IV.



sired a new religion, they ought to have chosen some more respectable leader.

"How much better would it have been for you, since ye desired to make some innovation, to study concerning some other of them who have died nobly, and may well admit of a divine fable? If Hercules did not please, and Æsculapius, and those who were of old glorified; ye had Orpheus, a man that, without controversy, received the holy spirit. But perhaps he was pre-occupied by others. Then there was Anaxarchus, who, being cast into a mortar, and most unconscionably pounded, despised the punishment, saying, 'Bray the husk of Anaxarchus, for you bray not him;' the voice of some truly divine spirit! But some naturalists have followed him. Had ye not, then Epictetus, who, when his master was twisting his leg, smiling composedly said, 'You will break it;' and when he had broken it, said, 'Did I not say you would break it?' But what did your God utter like this when he was punished? Ye might also have set up as the Son of God the Sybil, whom some of you use. But now ye worship him as God, who passed the most infamous life, and underwent a most pitiful death. How much more appropriate for you than he, was Jonas under the gourd; or Daniel who escaped from the wild beasts, or they that are yet more marvellous than these!"\*

30. Celsus blames the Christians for not worshipping the idols, demons, or gods of the nations among whom they dwell.

"Why are not demons to be worshipped? Are not all things dispensed according to the mind of God, and every providence from himself? And whatsoever work be in the whole, either of God, or of angels, or of other demons, or of heroes, all these things have law from the greatest God; since whoever was worthy was set over each, receiving power. Does not the worshipper of God, therefore, justly serve him who hath obtained authority from God?"

"It is not possible, say they, that the same one should serve many lords. But this is the voice of the sedition of those that enclose themselves, and that break off from the rest of men. They that say this, as much as in them is, transfer their own passion to God. It is true amongst men, that he who serves one man should not serve another, as the other is hurt by the different service; nor should he that happens to be associated by oath with any one be so associated with another; but with respect to God, to whom neither hurt nor grief appertains, it is unreasonable to shun, as among men and heroes, serving many Gods."

"And he that serves many gods, serves one of those that belong to the great God, and in this does a friendly thing to him. It is unlawful to honour any to whom that is not given from him; but whoever honours and worships those that are his, grieves not God, whose they all are."

"If, indeed, these served no other but one God, they would perhaps have some strong reason against others; but now they worship excessively him that *late*ly appeared, and think that nothing is done wickedly in respect to God if his Son be served."

"Certainly God is common to all, and is good, he stands in need of nothing, and is without envy, what then hinders them who are especially

\* Lib. vii.



consecrated to him, from partaking of the public festivals? If these idols be nothing what is then grievous in partaking of the solemn feast? But if they are some demons, doubtless they also belong to God, and are to be believed in and sacrificed to according to the laws, and prayed to, that they may be benevolent. If, according to the custom of their country, they abstain from certain victims, they should also abstain from the eating of all animals, which is also the opinion of Pythagoras; but if they abstain that they may not eat with demons, are they not always eating with demons? and to what purpose is it to guard against this, only when they see the victim sacrificed? For whenever they eat bread and drink wine, and taste the fruits of trees, and draw in the water and the very air with their breath; do they not certainly receive with each of these some demons, to whom the care of them is in particular committed?"

"Either, therefore, there is no living any where or any way; or he that comes into life must give thanks to the demons that are set over the earth, and offer first fruits and prayers while he lives, that so he may have them lovers of men."

"The Christian says, 'Behold I, standing by the statue of Jupiter or Apollo, or any other god, reproach and strike, and he does not at all repel me.' Dost thou not see too, oh simpleton, that any one standing by thine own demon, not only reproaches, but also binding, leads thee away and crucifies thee, consecrated to him as a statue; and the demon, or (as thou sayest) the Son of God, doth not at all repel him?"

"Thou indeed railing, laughest at our statues, who, if thou hadst railed at Bacchus himself, or Hercules in person, thou wouldst not perhaps, have been dismissed rejoicing. But they who stretched out and punished thy God, in person, suffered nothing."

"What need we to allege how many things prophets and prophetesses, and others who were possessed, both men and women, have foretold from the oracles with a divinely inspired voice; yea, how many wonderful things have been heard from their innermost temples; yea, how many things have been manifested from the victims and sacrifices, to those consulting them; yea, how many things from other marvellous symbols? To some, evident apparitions have been exhibited. All life is full of these. How many cities have been set in order from oracles, and freed from diseases and famines; and how many that neglected or forgot these have perished miserably? How many have been banished, and following the orders, have become happy? How many, impatient through the want of children, have obtained their desires? How many have escaped the wrath of demons? How many have been healed of the mutilations of their bodies? On the other hand, how many that have violated the sacred things have been instantly seized? Some have been held there beside themselves, declaring the things that they had done; and some have been smitten with incurable diseases. Yea, I have known some destroyed by a grievous voice from the innermost temples." "What, therefore, forbids our honouring these by gifts, if one would be whole rather than sick; and be happy rather than unhappy; and be freed from places of torture, and places of punishment?"\*

31. Finally, Celsus blames the Christians for their disobedience to magistrates in certain things; particularly, in refusing to worship idols, to take an oath, and to bear arms in war.

\* Lib. vii.



"If any should command you to swear by a king among men, neither should this be grievous; for the things on earth are given to him, and whatsoever you may receive in life, you receive from him. If you do not this, the king will repel you; for if all should do the same with you, he would soon be left alone and desolate, and the things on earth would become the possession of lawless and rustic barbarians; and neither would the glory of thy religion, nor of the true wisdom be long left amongst men."

"Surely you will not say this, that if the Romans, believing you, and neglecting the things established by law, should call upon your Most High, he would come down and fight for them, and they have need of no other strength. For the same God, having before promised to them that cleaved to him both these things, and much greater than these, as you say; you see how much he hath profited both them and you. To them, instead of their being lords of the whole earth, there is nothing left; and if any of you wander from your hiding place, he is sought to the judgement of death."

"You ought therefore to assist the king with all your strength, and perform for him just things, and fight for him, and go with him to war. If he urge also, you ought to command in the army with him; and you should likewise exercise the magistrate's office in your country, if this need be done for the safety of the laws, and of piety."<sup>\*</sup>

To furnish an answer to the foregoing cavils and objections of Celsus constitutes no part of my present plan. Many of them are not deserving an answer; and the most of them were solidly answered by Origen, more than fifteen hundred years ago. My design has rather been to present a specimen of the manner of this ancient Pagan, and of the style of thinking, generally prevalent among the philosophical enemies of Christianity, at that day. I have been anxious, too, that so unexceptionable a witness to the authenticity of our sacred books, should not be lost sight of or forgotten.

We have seen that Celsus was well acquainted with the Pentateuch, and had no hesitation in ascribing it to Moses. Indeed, it is assumed in his argument that it *was* the work of Moses—the same who was educated in the court of Pharaoh, and became skilled in the magical arts of Egypt. He was well acquainted, too, with the other historical and prophetic books of the Old Testament, and speaks of them as the accredited sacred writings of the Jews and Christians. And when we come down to the historical books of the New Testament, it is evident that Celsus had not only seen them, but that he had studied them with a degree of attention. He refers expressly to each of the four gospels, and uniformly

\* Lib. viii. It is evident from the passages last quoted, that the Christians, in the time of Celsus, were not willing to take oaths; or bear arms in war; or exercise the magistracy under the heathen emperors, in situations where they would be expected to perform services inconsistent with the obligations of their religion.



speaks of them as having been written by the immediate disciples of Jesus. He also quotes from the gospels such a variety of particulars, that the enumeration of them might constitute a tolerable abridgment of the evangelical history. In particular, we learn from Celsus, that, according to the accounts given by the disciples of Christ, "he was born of a virgin, in a small village of Judea, who was supposed to have been descended from the Jewish kings; that she was married to a carpenter; that for some time her husband was doubtful about her chastity; that Chaldeans, or other wise men from the East, came to Jerusalem, soon after his nativity, to do him homage as king of the Jews, having been excited to that journey by the appearance of a star; that Herod, moved by jealousy, put to death many young children, hoping to kill Jesus with them; that, by direction of an angel, he was carried by his parents into Egypt, for the preservation of his life; where, as Celsus insinuates, Jesus learned the charms practised in that country. He calls Jesus the Nazarean man, or man of Nazareth, from the place where he was brought up, and chiefly resided, before his appearance in a public character. He takes notice of our Lord's baptism, and of the descent of the Holy Spirit in the shape of a dove, and of a voice from heaven, declaring Jesus to be the beloved Son of God. In another place he speaks again of a like voice from heaven, which seems to be what happened when our Lord was transfigured on the mount. He afterwards takes notice, that when Jesus appeared in a public character, as a teacher of religion, he went about attended by ten or eleven disciples, publicans, and sailors, or mariners, as he generally calls them. In the history of Jesus, written by his disciples, he is said to have healed the lame and the blind, and to have raised some dead persons to life: and though Celsus is unwilling to allow that these were miracles, done by the power of God, he dares not deny their truth, but is reduced to the necessity of allowing the power of magic. He has taken notice of our Lord's death on the cross, and of almost all the circumstances of his last sufferings: that he was betrayed by one of his disciples, and denied by another: that he was condemned by a judge, and prosecuted by the Jews. He mentions our Lord's deriders, and the reproaches he underwent, the crown of thorns, the purple robe, the reed in his hand. Nor has he omitted the wine mingled with gall, when our Lord was going to be crucified,



and the vinegar, when he was expiring on the cross. He also takes notice of the darkness during our Lord's crucifixion, and the earthquake at the same time, or soon after it. And though he will not admit that Jesus rose from the dead, he acknowledges the disciples to have related it, and that an angel descended, and removed the stone from the door of the sepulchre; and that he is said by them to have shown himself to one woman, and then to others, and to his disciples. He also observes, that the disciples have recorded that Jesus foreknew and foretold the things that happened to himself, and which were to happen to them, also, after he had left them. So that we have in Celsus, in a manner, the whole history of Jesus, as recorded in the gospels: of his birth, life, preaching, miracles, death, and resurrection; and all as taken by him from the writings of Christ's own disciples.\*

After the full attestation here given to the authentical existence of our sacred writings in the days of Celsus, it may seem superfluous to quote any more passages; and yet I can hardly deny myself the satisfaction of transcribing a few, which have not yet been noticed. In the following, Celsus refers to the introduction of John's gospel, where Christ is set forth as the eternal *Logos*, or *Word*. "Ye are sophisticated in saying, that the Son is the very *Logos*. If indeed the *Logos* is to you the Son of God, we applaud. But after promising the *Logos* to be the Son of God, ye show us not a pure and holy *Logos*, but a most ignominious man, scourged and crucified." Lib. ii. St. Paul says, Gal. 6: 14, "God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom *the world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world.*" And Celsus informs us, that this was the boast of Christians in his time. "You will hear all these, who differ so much, and confute one another, saying, 'The world is crucified to me, and I to the world.'" Lib. v.

Paul, too, had said, "The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God." 1 Cor. 3: 19. And this Celsus repeats, as a maxim with the Christians among whom he lived: "They say, 'The wisdom that is in man is foolishness with God.'" Lib. vi.

The apostle John, that he might set forth, in opposition to certain philosophical speculatists, the doctrine of Christ's *real* body, commences his first epistle thus: "That which

\* Lardner's Works, vol. vii. p. 268.



we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, and our hands have handled of the Word of life, that declare we unto you." Celsus refers to this passage, and charges it as an absurdity upon the Christians: "They tell of seeing God with the eyes of the body, and hearing his voice with their ears, and handling him with hands of sense," Lib. vii.

Our Saviour predicted his second coming, to be the Judge of quick and dead. So also did the apostles Peter, John, and Paul. At the time of Christ's second coming, the world that now is, is to be consumed, and the wicked are to be punished with everlasting destruction. These great events are all referred to by Celsus, as constituting a part of Christian doctrine at the period when he wrote. "It has come to them also, mistaking these things from Greek and Barbarian authors, that according to the revolutions of far distant times, and the recessions and conjunctions of the stars, conflagrations and deluges will happen; and after that last deluge in the time of Deucalion, the period, according to the retribution of the whole, requires a *conflagration*. These things have made them, by an erroneous opinion, to say, that God will descend, after the manner of a tormentor, bringing fire." Lib. iv.

In another passage he represents our Saviour as saying, "I will save, and ye shall see me again with heavenly power returning. Blessed is he who now worships me; for upon all others I will cast eternal fire, both upon cities and countries. And the men who knew not their own punishments, shall repent in vain and groan; but them that believe me, I will preserve eternal." Lib. vii.

Celsus not only represents the Christians as holding the doctrine of a future and endless retribution, but professes himself to agree with them in this matter. "They establish this rightly, that they who have lived well shall be happy; but the wicked shall be tormented with *eternal evils*: And may neither they, nor any other men, at any time go back from maintaining this opinion." Lib. viii.

I have considered the work of Celsus important, chiefly on account of its early and unquestionable attestation to the authenticity of the Christian Scriptures. But this is not its only importance. It is interesting to see in it the views which believers at that period entertained, relative to some disputed points of Christian doctrine. In particular, this remark may be illustrated in respect to the Divinity of Christ.



It is disputed now, and has been at different periods of the Church's history, whether the Apostles and primitive Christians regarded Christ as properly a Divine person. But certainly there was no such dispute in the days of Celsus, within little more than half a century of the Apostolic age, at least among the great body of Christians; for the burden of his reproach upon them then was, that they believed in and worshipped a *crucified God*.\* This every one must have seen, who has attended carefully to the foregoing extracts. Still, as this is a point of great importance, I must be permitted to condense the testimony of Celsus, and to present it in a single view.

"Jesus returned from Egypt, highly conceited of these (magical) powers, and on account of them, proclaimed himself *God*." Lib. i.

"The Chaldeans were said by Jesus to have been moved to come to his birth, *worshipping him yet a babe, as God*." Lib. i.

"What need was there to transport thee yet an infant, into Egypt, lest thou shouldst be killed? for it was not like *God* to be fearful about death." Lib. i.

"The body of *God* would not be such as thine." Lib. i.

"But how were we to esteem him *God*, who showed the performance of nothing that he had promised?" Lib. ii.

"Certainly it neither becomes one who is *God* to fly, nor to be led away bound; and still less to be deserted and betrayed by his friends." Lib. ii.

"How, if he foretold him that betrayed him, and him that denied him, did they not fear him *as God*, so that the one should not betray nor the other deny?" Lib. ii.

"*Being God*, he foretold these things; and what was foretold, it behooved by all means to come to pass. *God*, therefore, led about his own disciples and prophets, with whom he ate and drank for this end, that they should be ungodly and impious." Lib. ii.

"But he that ate with *God* became a conspirator! And what is yet more absurd, *God himself* conspired against his table companions, making them betrayers and impious!" Lib. ii.

"If these things seemed good to him, and he was punished in obedience to his Father, it is manifest that, to him, *being God*, and also willing, these usages according to his mind, were neither troublesome nor grievous." Lib. ii.

"What noble thing did Jesus *as God*, despising men, and ridiculing and mocking what befel him?" Lib. ii.

"Do ye thus accuse us, oh believers! for that we do not account him *God*, nor agree with you that he suffered these things for the help of man." Lib. ii.

"How is it not then foolish, from the same works, to reckon one *God*, and others impostors?" Lib. ii.

"If Jesus would really declare his Divine power, it behooved him to be seen by them that used him ill, and by him that condemned him, and in-

\* The writings of Celsus furnish an admirable illustration of the declaration of Paul, "We preach Christ *crucified*, unto the Jews a stumbling-block, and unto the *Greeks foolishness*." 1 Cor. 1: 23.



deed by all. For surely he no more feared any man, being dead, and, as ye say, *being God*." Lib. ii.

"He ought, for the manifestation of *his Godhead*, to have disappeared directly from the cross." Lib. ii.

"What *God*, coming to men, would be disbelieved, when he appeared to them who were waiting for these things?" Lib. ii.

"In these he openly confesses that he cannot persuade; which neither indeed, suits with *God*, nor yet with a prudent man." Lib. ii.

"They who *worship him* that was taken and put to death, do much the same with the Getae, worshipping *Zamolxis*." Lib. iii.

"H'm, being of a mortal body, *they esteem God*; and in this they think they do piously." Lib. iii.

"They laugh at the worshippers of Jupiter, because his sepulchre is shown in Crete; and yet *worship him* who is of the sepulchre." Lib. iii.

"They say that *God* is sent to sinners. What did *God* mean by such a descent? Was it that he might learn the affairs of men?" Lib. iii.

"If *God himself* shall descend to men, this will be the consequence that he must desert his own throne." Lib. iv.

"Either *God* is truly changed, as they say, into a mortal body: or else he is not changed, but makes beholders think so." Lib. iv.

"Not *God*, indeed, oh Jews and Christians, nor any child of *God*, either descended or would descend." Lib. iv.

"Seeing the *Divine Spirit* was in a body; it altogether behoved it somewhat to excel the rest in greatness, or beauty, or strength, or voice, or awfulness, or eloquence; for it is unaccountable, that what had something *Divine* more than others, should differ nothing from another; but as ye say, was little, hard-favoured, and ignoble." Lib. vi.

"How then are the things holy that were done unto him, as unto *God*? If these things were prophesied of the *God over all*,\* must then such things be believed of *God*, seeing they are foretold?" "They are manifestly convicted that they *worship* not *God*, neither demons, but *one that is dead*." Lib. vii.

"If these served no other but one *God*, they would perhaps have some strong reason against others; but now *they worship excessively* him that lately appeared, and withal think that nothing is done wickedly in respect to *God*, if his Son be served." Lib. viii.

"Under pretence of the *great God*,† they worship him alone whom they set up as the Son of man, whom they declare stronger and more powerful than the ruling *God*. Hence they have this commandment, Serve not two masters." Lib. viii.

In all these passages, Celsus assuredly represents the Christians of his time as believing and trusting in the Lord Jesus Christ, as properly a *Divine person*. He was *God*, the *great God*, the *God over all*. They *worshipped* him as they would worship no being but *God*. They did this, too, amidst reproach and contumely;—under the influence of strong temptations to do the contrary—temptations which,

\* We have evidence here, that the passage in Rom. 9: 5, was extant in the days of Celsus, and was then interpreted by Christians as it is by evangelical Christians of the present time.

† A manifest reference to Tit. 2: 13, and one showing how this passage was understood by the primitive Christians.



in a little time, so far prevailed with some professed Christians, as to lead them to fritter down the doctrine in question, and more nearly accommodate it to the philosophical speculations of unbelievers.

I have spoken of Celsus as an Epicurean philosopher; and so, in general, he is represented by those who have written of him. Still, so variously and obscurely does he speak, that it is not easy to determine whether he had any philosophical system; or if so, what his system was. He agreed with the Gnostics with respect to the inherent baseness of matter. This led him to undervalue the body, and to ridicule the doctrine of a general resurrection. He says many fine things respecting God; and yet it is doubtful whether he owned any God but nature; or in other words, whether he was not an atheist. "God," says he, "partakes not of figure, or colour, or motion, or substance. Neither is God comprehensible by reason; nor is he nameable: For there is nothing pertaining to him than can be apprehended by a name." Lib. vi.

The doctrine of Providence, as inculcated by Celsus, seems to be this, that events move round in a regular and necessary succession; that there is nothing new under the sun, and nothing on the whole, wrong or evil. "Evils in beings, whether before, or now, or afterwards, are neither less nor more: for the nature of all things is one and the same; and the generation of evils still the same. The world is unbegotten and incorruptible. Only the things on earth suffer deluges and conflagrations; and these things do not happen all at once. What may be the nature of evils is not easy to be known to one that does not philosophize. But it is enough to be said to the multitude, that evils are not from God, but cleave to matter, and govern them that are evil." "The whole is God's care; and Providence at no time forsakes it; nor does it become worse; nor does God through time, turn to it; nor is he angry at men, more than at apes or mice; each of whom in part, has received a portion of it."

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*"Out of the eater came forth meat, and out of the strong came forth sweetness."* In taking leave of Celsus, I think it justly matter of thanksgiving to God, that he was pleased to raise up just such a man, and suffer him to write just such a book as that which has here been the subject of remark.



For though Celsus 'did not mean so, neither did his heart think so, but it was in his heart to injure, and if possible, overthrow the religion of the hated "Nazarene man," still God has rewarded him, as he will sooner or later all the incorrigible enemies of Christ;—he has caused his "mischief to return upon his own head, and his violent dealings to come down upon his own pate." God has caused the wrath and wickedness of Celsus to contribute to his praise, and overruled his malicious designs for the furtherance of the gospel. No early disciple of Christ could have answered *the purpose* which, in the wise providence of God, Celsus has been made to answer. We have in him the testimony, not of a partial friend, but of an *embittered enemy*, that the books of the New Testament were extant near the middle of the second century—that they were the work of the immediate disciples of our Lord—and that they were regarded by Christians then as the sacred record of their faith. We learn, too, from him, and in the most unexceptionable manner, that the *faith* of these early Christians conformed, at least in some essential points, to that of evangelical Christians of the present day.

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#### ART. VIII. THE SPIRIT OF THE MINISTRY.

An Address delivered before the Alumni of the Theological Institution, Andover, Mass., Sept. 6, 1837; by EDWARD W. HOOKER, Pastor of the First Congregational Church at Bennington, Vt.

It is worthy of our notice how much instruction is contained in the New Testament, relative to the spirit becoming the ministry. Our Saviour repeatedly made it the subject of his counsels to his disciples. The apostles evidently made it much the subject of their thoughts, and of their solicitous watchfulness over themselves and each other. Our Saviour had reproved two of them, James and John, in a very emphatic manner, on one occasion, particularly: saying, "Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of." The reproof was not lost upon them, nor their brethren. Of



each of the two especially, as they appeared in their subsequent life, that might be said with truth, which was written of Daniel, "an excellent spirit was in him."

To us, as ministers of the gospel, and alumni of this sacred institution, the subject presented in our text is appropriate on this occasion.

Ministers at this day come together on occasions like the present, from amidst a Church and a world full of excitement, perplexity, collision, controversy, and revolution; and doubtless having to say, before God, and with deep humility, that they have borne their part in these things, somewhat by their sympathies, or their acts, or both. We are frequently in scenes and circumstances to forget ourselves; to lose sight of some of the great principles which should govern us, as ministers of Christ; are tempted to drink into the spirit of the times wherein it is wrong:—have perhaps fallen into misjudgements, committed mistakes and sins: have felt and acted, perhaps, under wrong influences. Thus we have probably suffered spiritual injury in our souls, and been unfitting our minds for our high and holy work. Our churches have thus suffered through us, doubtless. And in short, a watching world, and the church in which we bear office, have had occasion to feel, that "the ministry of reconciliation" is not all which it ought to be.

Let us not shrink, then, brethren, from looking at our state as it is; at our mistakes, sins, and dangers as they are; nor from confessing, to God and one another, the things for which we have reason to repent and humble ourselves. "It is not a vain thing, because it is for our life," and for the life of our churches, and the good of dying men. Have we "done what we could" for Christ and for this world which he visited and died to redeem from woe? Have we done it in "the spirit of Christ?" Have we never been chilled in our benevolence, and embarrassed or interrupted in our labours, by the evils of our own hearts? Have the interests of the truth we profess to love and preach never suffered, because we have preached or contended for it in a wrong manner? Putting to ourselves such inquiries, with fidelity and tenderness of conscience, how many of us in the sacred office at the present day, may find occasion to acknowledge, that though standing at the altar of God, under solemn vows, and professing peculiar holiness, we are still but very partially sanctified; and



have, each, occasion to cry before God with the prophet, "My leanness ! my leanness !"

Not by any means that we have never done any thing right. Not but that we have had our trials, perhaps peculiar temptations and provocations to wrong feelings and acts ; and therefore, have some claim for the charity of the churches to our weaknesses, mistakes, and sins. But have we as became us, "stirred up the gift of God which is in us ;" and under our trials and temptations, "borne and had patience, and for Christ's name's sake laboured and not fainted." For although ministers of the gospel are "compassed with infirmity," and exposed to trials and temptations ; still, while that promise of our divine Lord abides so firm, and shines so bright, "My grace is sufficient for thee ;" so long are we blameworthy, if we fail of the right fulfilment of our ministry, through neglect to throw ourselves upon this most free and precious promise.

We devote a few minutes then, this evening, to the inquiry,—*What, at the present day, ought to be the spirit of the ministry ?* This inquiry opens the door for a great variety of topics of remark. A few of them only can be considered at this time.

1. First of all—and doubtless with a response from the heart of each of us, it is proper to say, there should be manifest in the ministry of the present day, *a spirit of penitence*,—"Godly sorrow." The ancient priest, under the law, at the altar of sacrifice, was called to remember and offer "for his own sins," as well as for "the errours of the people." Holy men as were Ezra and Daniel, they took their place with the people, in the dust before God, and said, "*we have sinned and done wickedly.*" The injunction of God by the prophet Joel, in a day of darkness to the ancient Church was, "Let the priests, the ministers of the Lord, weep between the porch and the altar." Is there one thing more needful, at the altar of God at this day, than a *broken-hearted ministry* ? a ministry, whose members, having first bewailed before God their own sins, and come into a frame of self-loathing and abhorrence for them, have become prepared to offer, with greater efficacy, and with acceptance, through Jesus the great intercessor, that supplication, "Spare thy people, O Lord ! and give not up thine heritage to reproach !"

That minister can say a great deal, and should give all



the praise to preserving grace, who can say, in the presence of the Searcher of hearts, "I have only been about my Father's business; I have borne no share in the backslidings of the Church, nor in the strifes of tongues and pens, nor in the jealousies and heart-burnings which have agitated the Church." He who can say this has lived nearer to God, and kept his heart with greater diligence, and his lips with sterner conscientiousness, than many of us. Brethren, let us, as in the presence of Christ, review our conversation, our motives, our jealousies, envyings, and strifes; yea, our very preaching of the gospel; and with one heart and one voice say before God, "we have sinned:" "what shall we answer?" "we will lay our hands upon our mouths;" "have mercy upon us, O God, according to thy loving-kindness; according unto the multitude of thy tender mercies blot out our transgressions." Brethren, when we thus begin and do the work of repentance, and "bring forth fruits meet for repentance," then may we expect to see our churches also returning and weeping before God, and their "repentings kindled together," and their sins put away.

2. Next to a spirit of penitence, in the ministry, at the present day, may be placed the necessity of *the spirit of prayer*. Have not the sins and declensions of ministers come of this cause, among others, that we have gotten away from the throne of grace? Not that our closets are altogether neglected; but, brethren, have we not lost that peculiar nearness to God which is secured by *much prayer*? There is a volume of meaning in that proposal of the apostles to the first Christians, when they called them to the choice of deacons. "But we will give ourselves to *prayer* and to the ministry of the word." Prayer, they doubtless meant, in the high and holy meaning of the word, as being that communion with God becoming "ambassadors for Christ;" in which they sought to be girded with divine strength for their work, and with humble and teachable mind asked light upon their studies of the revelation of God, and wisdom "rightly to divide the word of truth to every man," and holy love to give fervency, fidelity, and power to their ministrations. The first ministers of the Master we serve, brethren, were eminently men of prayer; they lived at the footstool of "the throne of grace." The histories of all eminently holy and successful ministers since the days of the apostles show clearly this fact, that they were peculiarly



men of prayer. Oh! how much is there, as we read the lives of such men as Leighton, Baxter, Flavel, Doddridge, Newton, Brainerd, Edwards, Martyn, and Payson, to make many of us ashamed, and afraid of our religion and our ministry, because so far behind them in our spirit and habits of prayer. If the Lord, whose work we profess to do, has given us any success in our work; yet, how much greater had it been, had we been more prayerful! If we have made any attainments in holiness and grace: yet, how much greater might we have made, had we lived more constantly in the exercise of the spirit of prayer! Let the questions be brought home to his own heart, by each minister here, this evening, "What have been my own habits of prayer? What witnesses my closet, my study, my pulpit, on this subject? How much have my sermons been studied, written, preached—*baptized*—in the spirit of prayer?\*" And what will the revelations of secret things, "in the judgement," disclose concerning me, in this matter?"

This subject is mentioned, brethren, not only for our consideration as individuals, but in our collective capacity, and in our relation to ministerial, ecclesiastical, and other bodies. Do we give the proper place to prayer in our Associations, Conventions, Ecclesiastical Councils and Judicatories; in our meetings for mutual improvement in ministerial exercises; and in those meetings for benevolent purposes in which we are associated with others, and in boards of trust to which we may belong? Should it not be more deeply and steadily felt, that where ministers of Christ are assembled, for whatever purpose, there should be much fervent, importunate prayer? It surely is needful, that, by the power of united prayer, we may obtain in richer variety and measure the blessings of the Holy Spirit, for ourselves and our churches; that we may be more efficient instruments in the quickening of each other's gracious affections, and those of Christians around us; that our hearts may be more effectually "knit together in love," and in "the unity of the Spirit;" and that the world may see in us that union which is strength

\* Philip Henry thus wrote upon a studying day: "I forgot, when I began, explicitly and expressly to crave help from God; and the chariot wheels drove accordingly. Lord, forgive my omissions, and keep me in the way of duty." Indeed, as an old divine observes, "If God drop not down his assistance, we write with a pen that hath no ink. If any in the world must walk dependently upon God, more than others, the minister is he."



for the Lord's work; and that exemplariness in holiness which shall give weight to our ministrations. But,

3. The spirit of the ministry, at the present day, should be *the spirit of humility*. Who of us, brethren, with grace and an honest conscience in his breast, has not felt, with much solicitude, that there are many temptations to ministers to pride; and this, though the minister of Christ, above all men, should "be clothed with humility." If God has a peculiar abhorrence of pride, in any man, and any where, must not that abhorrence be peculiar to pride in the minister, at the altar?

Temptations of some kinds, to pride, are more powerful to the minister than to any other man living. And therefore it is the more needful that we maintain against it a sleepless vigilance, a severer jealousy, a conflict of grace, active, untiring, unceasing. Thus much in general; but

What are the manifestations of pride of which a minister should beware, at the present day; and what are the special necessities for the spirit of humility? These are some of them: pride of opinion; pride of party; pride of controversy; pride of knowledge; pride of office; pride of religious activity; and perhaps pride of talent. We are often in circumstances to feel that we have ground to hold; interests to keep good; positions which are controverted to maintain; prerogatives for which to contend. And we are in danger of acting, under these circumstances, in the spirit of politicians and disputants, rather than in the spirit of Him who is "meek and lowly of heart." How many the occasions, brethren, private, social, public, in which there has been reason for the minister debating; the minister studying a controverted point in theology; the minister in public conflict with some error in doctrine or order; yea, even the minister preaching in the pulpit, and administering in the sacred ordinances of our holy religion,—to pause, and look up upon the face of his Lord and Master, and see if there were not something in his eye which said, "*Be clothed with humility! Learn of me, for I am meek and lowly of heart.*"

The minister of the gospel, brethren, should regard it as a settled and solemn truth, that in our holy work nothing is gained by pride, nor lost by humility. Every where, whether in the church or the world, "God resisteth the proud, but giveth grace unto the humble." That, and that only, is true greatness, which lives in lowliness of spirit, at the foot



of the cross. This is alone the spirit in which, in these days of conflict, excitement, and revolution, any thing can be done by a minister, acceptable to the Master whom he serves. That minister alone is acting safely, on any of the great questions and interests in agitation at the present day, who is acting in "the spirit of Christ," as the spirit of humility.

Here it becomes us particularly to notice one important point of failure, in relation to this duty. Ministers, we must confess, brethren, have shared in the spirit of self-adulation which has had place in the church and the world, in our day and country. We have strongly suspected that this is a wiser age than former ones; and that the ministers of this age stood on higher ground than the fathers who have lived before us, as to our knowledge, benevolence, activity, and enterprise; have perhaps secretly wondered why the ministers and the churches of former days did not take higher ground as to benevolent enterprises, such as we have taken; have looked upon them, it may be, as cloistered Christians, finding their way to heaven alone, and leaving the world to sin and destruction, without their care. We have compared our learning with theirs, to our own supposed advantage; and almost ventured the belief, if not quite, that we are competent to revise and improve great first principles, which they have studied and evolved. Comparisons have been made of our theology, with theirs. Modern *striplings* in theology, whose "loins" would but very slenderly bear comparison with the "*little finger*" of Richard Baxter, or John Owen, or President Edwards, have been ready to pronounce such men behind the spirit and the attainments of this age of theological light and learning. We have compared our revivals with those of thirty and sixty years since, and with those of other countries; and with the silent and gradual increase of the churches in other times; and there have been those among us—and many to agree with them—who have ventured to talk of converting sinners, in our days, more easily and rapidly, and of multiplying converts more numerous than formerly; as though it were "by our own power or holiness," and as though that text had never been written, "*Not by might, nor by power, but by my Spirit, saith the Lord of hosts.*" The truth is, brethren, we belong to a boasting generation, and have but too plainly shown our belongings; feeding our foolish vanity, as other men do, and with imaginings that we are sons outstripping the fathers, or who



have set our feet on the altitudes of their shoulders, and are able to see farther than they saw, and to judge more wisely than they judged. And well is it if we have not, some of us, imagined them looking down, even from their "happy seats of everlasting day," in admiration of our better manner of doing our work. Yes; and God has looked down from heaven upon us, and been offended at our pride; and has "blown upon" our doings, and the fancied great fruits of our labours. We are under "the indignation of the Almighty" for our accursed pride. Our comparatively inefficacious ministry shows it. The languishing and distracted condition of our churches shows it. The embarrassments and paralyzation of our benevolent enterprises show it. Our confusion of theological tongues shows it. Our misunderstandings, our newly invented, or newly edited and republished heresies; which have consumed our time, and taken up our thoughts and conversation, and busied our pens and our presses, our councils and assemblies; these all testify "God is angry with" our pride; and that he has taken up his rod to scourge us, till he bring us down into our place in the dust before him. Degenerate sons we are of godly, learned, wise, humble, but—by us—dishonoured fathers; however reluctant may be our admission of the humiliating fact.

As such sons, under the rebuke and correction of the Lord of the churches, we must return, and that speedily, "to pray before Him, and to seek the Lord of hosts;" and to confess these our sins and put them away. He will not permit to pass unpunished, either our proud exaltings of ourselves, or our undervaluing of his "good and faithful servants," the fathers who have "fallen asleep." He will not cease from correcting us till we are willing to go back and take our seats at the feet of these beloved but disesteemed men, and learn of them; nor, above all, till he shall have brought us back to the humility of the New Testament, and to "sit at the feet of Jesus and hear his words;" and in "the simplicity that is in Christ," to study and drink into his spirit, and to "walk as he also walked," "*humbly* with our God."

Let it not be thought an unjust implication that it be said, for ministers of our day, that we must study our Bibles more, and have less to do with the proud and specious and adventurous philosophizing in religion of late brought into fashion: that we must travel back to the fathers of New England and Old, and of other countries and other ages, and study them



more; and read the swift-written volumes and pamphlets, and the various and many light and unsubstantial publications of our day, less; that we must study and imitate the habits and modes of living and labouring for Christ of other years, more; and talk less in praise of the activity, enterprise, and bustle, of these times in which we live. Let us be more bent upon searching what we may already have in our libraries, of the writings of the good and the great men of other times, than on increasing our libraries with the newest works among the new. It is well if some of us have not even now to confess that we have not studied through such books as Edwards on the Will, or on Original Sin, and Calvin's Institutes, and many other as common and as valuable books as those; and may have it to acknowledge, still more to our shame, that our acquaintance is by hearsay, or at second hand, with the writings of many others whose names are familiar to us, as great and good men. Let us be more desirous to get back into the society of the intellectual giants of old times, than to spend our time alone with even the interesting and elegant or brilliant, but less instructive, and less safe men of these our days.

Is this saying that there are no men of might and worth in modern times? Let me not be so understood. Honoured and great names there have been, later written among the "mighty dead." And others are living, who, it requires no spirit of prophecy to say will be written with them, when they shall cease from this life;—(may this last not be yet;—) men who are, and will be, worthy to be studied with those who have gone before. We are only arguing for a humbler estimate of ourselves and our contemporaries; and a return to more just estimates of the men of former ages, to whom we owe so much, and whom God has so highly honoured. Nor let it be supposed we are undervaluing the active benevolence of this day. We are only asking that it may be remembered there has been benevolence deep and active as ours, in men of ages before us; and claiming that their usefulness shall be estimated by some other means than self-complacent comparisons of them with ourselves. And as to our claims for the study of the Bible, no apology is offered for placing *the Book of God* before all the books of all the good and great of all ages; as the source of all our knowledge of divine truth; and the book which the minister of Christ should study more than all others. Never was there



a more foolish and dangerous sentiment—in its influence on the ministry—than that which is held and practised upon by some, at the present day;—that intellectual philosophy and metaphysicks must come before the study of the Bible, in the preparations of the theological student for his work as a minister. Nor is there any thing, short of absolute heresy, in a preacher, which will make a more barren, profitless, deadening ministry, than to practise upon this sentiment. Philosophy and metaphysicks are good in their place; but they are *out of their place* when they take *precedence of the study of the holy Word of God*.

4. The spirit of the ministry need, at this day, to be, — more than of late it has been, a *spirit of unity and love*. Who can deny what the world has seen, and the Church felt, that ministers have been divided; that some of the best ministers have had such sharp contentions between them that, like Paul and Barnabas, they have “parted asunder, one from another.” So far as separation between ministers, on account of real and dangerous errors in doctrine, order or practice has been necessary, there is nothing to be regretted but the causes. That there have been such errors and necessity for separation from those who hold them, no honest man with his eyes open, can question. To the bringing in of false doctrines, or things against gospel order and purity, we are to “give place by subjection, no, not for an hour; that the truth of the gospel may continue with us.” But that men who have “like precious faith” should fail of walking and working together, in “the unity of the Spirit,” is a grievous sin, against Christ and against each other. “Behold how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity.” And behold, how revolting to heaven and earth is it, when brethren “fall out by the way.”

One grand secret of the strength and success of the Christian ministry in the days of the Apostles, was, that “the multitude of them that believed were of one heart and one soul.” They lived by the thirteenth chapter of the first epistle to the Corinthians, beginning, “Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity (or love) I am nothing.” And the world at that day felt, and had occasion to feel, that men were in the field of ministerial service who broke not their ranks by divisions; nor weakened their strength by contentions: that union and



"love one to another," brought all their power to bear upon a single point of action; and that with irresistableness. And in such a union by the bonds of love, it was impossible there would not be strength.

These remarks are not made in the belief that there is no unity and love among ministers, but in view of the fact that divisions have place now which the fathers of our New England Churches particularly, did not know; in the apprehension that the bond which does link ministers together, is sometimes more one of party sympathy, than of genuine brotherly love; and also in the apprehension that the unity there is, needs more closeness; and our love, as brethren, more of that peculiar tenderness, belonging to ministerial character. What a strength and tenderness of brotherly affection, was that of Paul for Titus, indicated where he says, "when I came to Troas to preach Christ's gospel, and a door was opened unto me of the Lord, I found *no rest in my spirit because I found not Titus my brother.*" We need at the present day, to have more of such a *holy affection* for each other, as ministers of Christ, making us earnestly desire each other's society, for Christian communion; rendering it always refreshing to every minister's heart even to see a brother in the gospel; and that "as iron sharpeneth iron," so one minister's countenance shall enliven "that of his friend." We live in a wicked world, surrounded with the enemies of our king; and small is our number compared with them. Then how close and strong should be the bond of our hearts to each other; how tender the affection with which we should regard each other, as soldiers of Christ, as ministers of "the Prince of Peace." But

5. *Decision of character* should enter into the spirit of the ministry at this day. And there is nothing in this inconsistent with the traits just mentioned. Who was a more decided man in his ministerial character than Paul? And yet, whose heart more richly abounded and overflowed with love to his brethren and to all men? Is there any element ever introduced into the character of a man, which contributes more truly to decision, than "the love of God shed abroad in the heart by the Holy Ghost?"

Many things have of late tried, and will continue to try, decision of character in ministers. The fondness for new things, which has had such place in the churches, has sought to bring in novelties and experiments in matters of religion,



of doubtful or evidently dangerous tendency. And it has been the weakness and the sin of some of us in the ministerial office, that we have yielded to this spirit, when we should have "withstood it to the face." The conflicting opinions which have had place in regard to religious doctrines, or the modes of explaining them, have strongly and not without effect, tempted many to take, or *try* to take the attitude of neutrality; and that, even at the hazard of leaving some of the very truths of God's word undefended. Corrupting measures, professedly for the advancement of religion, have been invented and urged, and have taken strong hold on the confidence of multitudes in our churches. And many a minister, solicited to countenance them, has seen the time when it was very necessary for him, in the energy of an honest conscience, and of confidence in his own judgement to say "*No*;" and yet has been afraid to say it; perhaps has neglected to say it; and thus allowed the flood-gates of evil to be opened into the Church. In the corrupting of the Church, by such means, has been created the necessity for much faithful and fearless discipline; in order to the purity of the Church and the honour of Christ. For the modes of increasing the Church in recent times, have created occasion for this painful work, in most fearful amount. And the minister is often under strong temptation to let dishonours to the faith on the precepts of the gospel die out of the Church, or pass away as they may; when they ought to go out under the decisive and salutary administration of the laws of Christ's house. In the zeal for reforms of various kinds, desirable and important to be accomplished if it can be done in the right manner and spirit, plans have been proposed and modes of action introduced which true Christian wisdom and prudence, with half an eye, can foresee will embarrass and delay—if not utterly frustrate—the objects professedly sought; and these have been pushed with a spirit and tone in variance from the spirit of the gospel. And the minister of the gospel, oftener than any other man, is placed under circumstances in which he must revolve, with deep anxiety, the questions, "shall I go into this movement? Shall I lend my influence to this system? Shall I countenance this spirit?" And he meditates them under strong temptations to yield, and go with "the multitude," when he ought to plant his foot with the energy of an apostle, and say "*No*"—"God forbid that I should justify



you; till I die I will not remove mine integrity from me;" and when he ought in the fearless and honest showing of his reasons and his judgement, to protest against the plan which is unwise; the spirit which is unchristian; the zeal which is "not according to knowledge;" the system which is "not after Christ;" the measures which are contrary to the simplicity of the gospel; and having thus taken his ministerial life and reputation "in his hand," to be willing to wait—though it be under the trial of unjust imputations and of aspersions—till time, and results, and the voice of Providence, and the acknowledgements of those who for a time censured him, shall "bring forth his righteousness as the light, and his judgement as the noon-day."

Various other tests of ministerial decision might be mentioned; but these are sufficient.

Now let these several things be regarded by every minister of the present day as solemnly and unalterably true, in relation to the point before us.

(1.) That the safety of the Church depends, under God, very much upon ministerial decision. Its lofty and fearless exercise may *bless*, or its giving place under the pressure of circumstances, or from an erroneous idea of expediency, may *curse* the Church, and destroy souls. (2.) That nothing is ever gained by yielding established, long tried, and safe principles of action, to the rule of expediency, or to the gust of popular excitement, or to the workings of popular will. (3.) That a wounded conscience is as often gotten by a weak surrender of judgement and sound principle, to the feelings and taste of others as by an offence, outright against confessed duty. (4.) That a minister, at the head of a church, and at the altar of God, is the last man on earth who should allow himself to be trifled with by the preferences, prejudices, tastes, or excited feelings of others, or swayed from the straight course dictated by the simplicity of Godly sincerity. (5.) That one of the most effectual ways for a minister to prove his love to his people, and to his and their master, is to *stand* alone though it be, against them and their wishes and feelings and prejudices, when they have come under the influence of a spirit which is "not after Christ;" and when he finds them beguiled from the simplicity that is in Christ Jesus." Let the politician, if he please, turn, and trim; and accommodate himself in every conceivable way, to humour the misguided or corrupt pas-



sions of men around him. Let the statesman play the time-server, and become a revolutionist, because there are men who *will have* revolutions. Let the king from his throne, or the president from his chair of state, come down and timidly ask the dissatisfied and uneasy and disorganizing, what they wish, or are determined to have; let him "deliver over to their will" all he may know in his own conscience, to be right, and wise, and safe; because he cannot deny their wishes and still keep their favour. But never let the minister of Christ yield,—no, not to the demand of the whole Church, the rule which Christ hath written, the judgement which the grace of God has taught him; nor turn aside "to the right hand or to the left," from the path which his master has pointed out, and which the wise, and good, and great of all ages, have found safe, and safe alone.

6. *A spirit of patient waiting on God* needs to have much place in the ministry at this day.

This is important in relation to our trials, from such sources as those to which allusion has already been made, "I will seek unto God, and unto God will I commit my cause," should be the recourse of the minister, for the troubles and wounds of his spirit which come thus. "Study to show thyself *approved unto God*;" says the word. This done, the tried and afflicted minister may "in patience possess his soul;" in the delightful certainty that all shall yet be well.

But this spirit is of importance for other purposes, and from higher considerations than personal ones, simply. We are called, as ministers, to *a work which consists in following God's plan, and using the means God has appointed for bringing back this revolted world to himself.* And we are called to do this in the exercise of *confidence* unwavering, that this plan and these means are *the best*, and *will certainly succeed.* Human pride, and impatience, and unbelief, under the semblance of religious zeal, call for immediate results of means used, and labours performed; and invent and push expedients for forcing such results. Forgetful that "the husbandman waiteth for the precious seed, and hath long patience for it," many look for reward and encouragement, in sowing and reaping in the same hour; and complain of men, or distrust God, or both, or invent some new measure for operation, if the favourite scheme they have planned, or the work they have undertaken, is not endorsed



by the divine blessing, just when they please to look for it. And thus the slow success of the gospel abroad, in our missionary fields; or the reverses which the cause of missions suffers; and the inability of this, that, or another labourer, at home, to count his converts, and to show a numerous Church, are turned into occasions for discouragement, or complaint, or for judging the labourer unfit for his work, or for censure. In company with this spirit there has certainly seemed at some times, in men in the ministry, and in the Church, fellowship with the principle that "the end sanctifies the means," and that when a conclusion has been made what ought to be the results of given means and measures, the results have been grasped at as though neither providence nor grace, but only "the will of the flesh" and "the will of man" had any thing to do with their accomplishment. "Why should I wait for the Lord any longer?" said the impatient king of Israel; and so has felt many a minister when he did not find humble, industrious preaching of the gospel to answer his purpose. This spirit would do what it calls converting sinners, and sweep them immediately, and by scores, into the Church; would propose even to take possession of heathen lands by proclamation;—and would carry points against such an evil as that of slavery, by storm—the storm of accusation and denunciation; and would reform the various vices of men and the abuses of society, by weapons of warfare, not from the armoury of Immanuel, but from the arsenals of malice and slander.

Now, brethren, the work which God has assigned us as ministers, is not to be done "on this wise." An eloquent minister of our country, once remarked in this pulpit; "the Lord Jesus Christ is moving on his way in his might, for the salvation of the world; and you must keep up with him if you can." A quaint remark, it may be called, but worthy of consideration; and it points to a great and glorious truth respecting the manner in which God is bringing to pass his purposes of mercy for this wretched world. "Shall any teach God knowledge," as to the way in which the world is to be reformed and blessed? Shall any outrun the Majesty of Heaven, in the speed with which good is to be done? Can the wisdom of man devise plans wiser than the Bible, for the subjection of man to "the obedience of Christ?"

God in his wisdom, has appointed the *preaching of the gospel*, as the simple yet mighty means, by which a revolted



world shall be brought back to himself. When our Lord Jesus Christ said unto his disciples, "Go ye into all the world, and *preach the gospel to every creature*," he set forth this as the grand and all-sufficient remedy for every moral evil in the world; showed that there is not, and cannot be, a form of spiritual disease in all the human family, a shape nor a shade of deformity in the whole empire of wickedness on earth, for the reformation of which this simple direction is not sufficient, as indicating what man is to do, and all he is to do, aside from prayer for the Holy Spirit to bless it. And then he said, to those to whom he gave this command, on the presumption of their fidelity to it, "lo I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world;" a pledge of success, after which it certainly was not necessary nor becoming, for unbelief and pride to rise up and ask "*how and when* shall be the manifestation of the results?" What more can or need we do, as ministers, but move steadily and patiently onward; following the footsteps of Christ; preaching his gospel as he preached it; and looking and waiting for him to bless it? What have we to do with inventing expedients and measures, and with the practising of different kinds of religious necromancy, to help on and secure the success of the gospel, and to bring out what we can call results, and estimate them in the pride of our hearts? Is not the Spirit of the Lord abroad in the earth, and ready to bless abundantly and speedily, the faithful labours of those who wait on him, and who commit all to "the working of his mighty power?" Here is the Sabbath, given us with all its hallowed observances and influences; appointed as *the day of the gospel*, and of "the power of the Spirit;" one day in seven, owned, blessed; and when sanctified and devoted to the use of the gospel system of means, it has proved sufficient to keep the gospel in continual sway over the minds of men. What need is there that man should come in with his appointments to vie with that of God; to bury up the Sabbath in so good a thing even, as the protracted meetings; and to make the day of God secondary to the days appointed of men? Experience has proved for ages past, and is still proving it, that the steady, patient, prayerful exercise of the pastoral office in "preaching the word," week after week, year after year; and "watching for souls," in the faithful steadfast performance of the private or personal, and daily duties of the ministry,



is the system of service which God most signally and richly blesses. What need of the creation and calling into our pastoral fields, of a new order of men, to do the work belonging to pastors? Where is the necessity of seasons for special, exciting, and protracted effort; impossible to be long sustained, and invariably followed with spiritual lassitude and torpor, in both ministers and people, in exact proportion to the degree of over excitement which has been experienced? Inasmuch as "*it is the Spirit that quickeneth,*" and that He always thus gives his blessing when "prayer is made without ceasing," accompanied with the diligent use of all the means of grace God has appointed—where is the necessity of seeking to produce excitement; and thus running before, as it were, and pre-occupying the hearts and minds of men with false fervours, which will shut out the Holy Spirit's powerful, solemnizing, melting, subduing, sanctifying, and joy-inspiring work?

Were we called to say, this evening, in one sentence, what is the hope of Zion, for her increase and strengthening; and what the hope of this miserable world, for its recovery to God, so far as human instrumentality is concerned, we would reply in the language of Paul to a pastor; "*Preach the word; be instant, in season, out of season; reprove, rebuke, and exhort, with all long-suffering and doctrine;*" and better still might we reply in the language of Christ Jesus to his disciples, "*Go ye into all the world, and PREACH THE GOSPEL TO EVERY CREATURE.*" Let every minister "in his lot," thus "spend and be spent" for Christ; trusting in "the power of the Spirit of God," for the results; and the best success his heart can desire, the brightest days for Zion and the world which his highest hopes can conceive, will assuredly be given. The minister who lives and labours thus, and thus "trusts in the living God," will find and feel, at every step, *that he is executing the wise plan of a wise master*; to which nothing can be added for good; from which nothing can be taken without guilt and fearful hazard. He will have happy experience that he who thus "ploughs in hope," and sows in faith, shall have the dews and rains of the blessed Spirit richly descending around him, and the "Sun of righteousness" shining on his work; and know "the joy of harvest," of often returning to the footstool of his Lord "bringing his sheaves with him." And will he



not feel that this is to be a truly successful, and a richly rewarded labourer for Christ?

The spirit of the ministry in this day, needs much to be *the spirit of study*. This remark is not made in the apprehension that the ministers of our times are idle men, averse to study; but for these reasons following: there are more things to keep a minister out of his study in the present, than in former times. Many things are liable to occasion the business of the study to be pursued in a hurried manner, or under the influence of excitement, unfavourable to the efficient and successful investigation of divine truth. The minister needs to be able to sit down quietly among his books and at his writing table; and to study deliberately, calmly, and having time to prosecute the work of thorough investigation into the subjects on which he proposes to preach. There are, at the present day, more than commonly numerous temptations to ministers to depend on extempore efforts, under the influence and impulse of some temporary and exciting causes. There are calls for a great deal of pastoral labour; for the supervision of systems of effort, many of them useful, which have come into operation in late years; for attendance on meetings for benevolent purposes; and other public assemblages. There is a large amount of periodical literature calling to be read. And the stream from the press is constantly asking to be tasted, at least, if we have not time and dare not trust ourselves in the attempt to "draw up" its "Jordan" into our mouths. Under these circumstances there is danger that we shall live more by general and light reading, than by thinking, and the study of select and elementary works; and that we shall preach more in the current and popular reading of the day, than in the solid and instructive manner of former times. Especially we are in danger of not living enough, and teaching our people to do so, upon the rich mental and spiritual food of God's word; and are in danger of preaching, it may be, with texts to preface our sermons, but not in bringing forth "God's thoughts,"\* so much as our own sentiments and

\* A minister should have the Bible committed to memory; and be so accustomed to its instructions, that as he proceeds with the composition of a sermon, his mind shall turn easily and naturally to those Scripture passages which are appropriate to his subject; and weave them into the texture of his discourse. The classical scholar introduces with happy effect into his compositions, choice passages, or forcible expressions, from



reasonings. We may be providing for the gratification of the popular taste, in such a way of preparing our sermons; may keep up a good style of writing and speaking; and there may be evidences that we have not been idle nor careless, in our weekly preparation of our discourses. And yet, our sermons may not be rich in Scripture views. We may fail to "*feed the Church of God*" with our preaching, as it ought to be fed. And there may be occasion given to some of our more spiritual and discerning hearers, to say—with better reason than complaining Israel of old—"our soul loatheth this *light bread*."

Let us have regard to our dangers and temptations here, brethren, and watch and pray against them. Let this be settled in our minds, that our preaching will be so far scriptural, solid, instructive, and adapted to impart spiritual nourishment to our people, as it is always the product of *Biblical, systematic, patient, long-continued*, and, more than all, *prayerful study*. The sermons of Flavel, Doddridge, Baxter, Edwards, and many others like them, may have been written "*currente calamo*;" but they show abundant evidence that their subjects were not investigated and the materials for them collected "*ex improvise*;" and that it was not all the use they made of the Bible, before beginning to write, simply to find a text. Our hearers, let us be well aware—those of them who love "the good word of God," and seek their profit in its preaching—can always tell how much we have to do with the Bible in our studies; and how long, patiently, and carefully we have wrought in its rich mines of divine truth, that we might bring forth to them its precious treasures. Generally speaking, it is very small praise to say of a minister, or for a minister to say of himself, "such a sermon was made in the study hours of a single day;" or, "it was prepared at a single sitting." Its imperfectness, as an exhibition of some great subject, which deserved long-continued, patient, and laborious study; its evident marks of haste, and of having been written without a thorough investigation of the subject, may tell it for him. Far

some favourite and perhaps heathen author. Let the minister, from love to the precious "word of God," be more desirous to enrich his discourses from its sacred records, and have its beauties shine along his pages. Let it be the least of this motive, that he does it as a man of sacred taste. Let him do it, much more, as one whose soul is imbued with the spirit of the Scriptures; and whose mind is accustomed to soar by the aid of their exalted and glorious thoughts.



better for him to have occasion to say, that it has cost him the industrious study of a whole week; or that it has been accumulating in his mind and on his heart, and in the study of the Bible, and of providences, and of men, and of his own feelings, for months, yea even for years.

A minister ought to be cautious how he trusts to his powers, without study, because great things have sometimes been done by certain preachers, *ex tempore*, or with little *known* preparation. If the good and great, but eccentric Rowland Hill could prepare himself to preach an acceptable sermon, while riding in his phaeton from his house to the place of worship; and while, in absence of mind, plucking hairs from the back of his friend's spaniel, and arranging them on his friend's knee;—this does not prove that any other minister can do the same, or any thing like it. We have heard some quite remarkable anecdotes of the powerful preaching of ministers, upon the impulse of occasions, and from very short preparation. But, mark it well, *those men had studied their subjects*, at some time or other. They have not now, for the first time, looked through them as by *intuition*, and discussed them, *de novo*, on the spot. Question them upon the matter, and you would find that the subjects on which their efforts were so happy, had many times been in their minds, and had occupied their meditations, when not in the study; that they were subjects impressed upon them by providential occurrences, and by developments of human character; subjects which they had often felt when reading the Bible, and when in the closet, alone with God. And when they come to write or preach upon them—perhaps under the impulse of interesting circumstances or solemn impressions of providences—they have only been opening well-springs of thought which were already full; embodying and setting forth thoughts with which their minds were already familiar. An observing, meditating, studious, and prayerful minister will be always thus accumulating matter for sermons wherever he is, abroad among men, as well as in his study and over his books; and will be often happy in finding how Divine Providence has pointed him to some text which opens into a subject appropriate to given circumstances; and in feeling himself helped by the Spirit of grace and truth to arrange his thoughts, and present them with clearness, facility, appropriateness, and impressiveness. But be it remembered that this is the experience of *such ministers only*.



And a man who, with habits of mental inactivity and spiritual sloth, presumes on his ability to follow such men, will find that there is no spirit of enchantment or divination by which *he* can preach well, upon a subject on which he never troubled himself to think, observe, or write before. The Lord of ministers will not sanction such indolence and presumption.

Paul knew well the meaning of his own exhortation to Timothy: "*Till I come, give attendance to reading, to exhortation, to doctrine. Neglect not the gift that is in thee, which was given thee by prophecy, with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery. Meditate upon these things; give thyself wholly to them, that thy profiting may appear to all.*" Paul himself, though divinely inspired, never preached as he did, nor wrote such epistles to the churches, without being a student. He would not encourage loose or negligent habits of study in another, much less can we expect to be saved the trouble and effort of being, in the strict and severe sense of the word, *students*. The men of past years and ages, whose works are in our libraries, and who seem destined to live and last to "the end of the world," there is reason to believe, were students, in a sense of which many of us know comparatively little; and had habits of mental labour and application which we should find breaking in, most sternly and powerfully, upon the easy, generalizing, hasty and superficial habits which many things tend to foster in these days. To study as they did might make many of us far better ministers, to say nothing of its making us greater men.

A reason for our cultivation of the spirit of study is this; it is no small matter, in this age of fondness for the tasteful and showy and superficial, and of corresponding distaste for the solid and instructive, to induce even good people, in our churches, to *think*, and to be willing to be led into a course of thorough investigation of a subject, in a sermon; and to lead them to consider and feel the power of those applications of truth to the heart and conscience for which preparation is made in a scriptural, clear, extensive discussion. Our good people are not so willing as they ought to be to hear the thunder of such *inferences*, and to feel the arousals of such *applications*, as Edwards, and Bellamy, and Hopkins, and Smalley, and Emmons, used to bring to bear upon their hearers, in their sermons. It requires no very great effort of attention in a congregation to listen to a sermon which is



elegant; or which *rolls* upon the ear in sounding sentences; or which is, in some indescribable way, peculiar, perhaps *odd*; or which is piquant and smart, perhaps seasoned with anecdotes and flashes of wit, and oversets the gravity of an assembly at every other paragraph. And such sermons, with multitudes, pass for "great preaching." But to give a congregation, every Sabbath, *materials for thinking*, which shall *last* them "*six days*," and keep them awake and open for the dispensation of the like, again, on the *seventh*; to deal in "the words of the wise," which are "as goads and as nails *fastened*;" to bring before them instruction which they cannot help remembering; to press them with reasonings, clear and forcible, for the truth of God, from which they cannot get away; to speak things which shall lodge on their consciences, weigh on their hearts, and *keep them from week to week and from Sabbath to Sabbath, thoughtful, serious, tender, and filled with the feelings which men ought to have who live under the light of the gospel*;—to accomplish all this requires in the minister *study*—deep, tender-spirited, serious meditation upon the mind of God, as revealed in the Scriptures;—requires us to bring forth the results of researches in the Book of God, made in the tasking of the best energies of our minds, and in the fervent enlistment of the deepest and holiest affections of our hearts.

And a reason for such study is, the influence it would have on the tone of our piety as ministers. For, taking him for all in all, that minister is likely to be the best Christian, the man of deepest, warmest piety, and of most conscientious Christian habits, who is the most faithful and thorough *student*. His mind has an openness to the access of divine truth, his heart, associated with such a mind, is under the influence of such conceptions of the high and holy truths of God, as are eminently adapted to promote his growth in grace, and to give him the character of devotedness and holiness, so desirable in a Christian minister. This leads us to remark on the need, above all things else,

8. *Of the spirit of devoted, eminent piety*, in the ministry of the present day. The things of which we have always spoken, do indeed imply this. But we may properly comprehend the remainder of what should be said upon this general subject, under this head. And it needs a distinct and serious contemplation by our minds on this occasion.

What do we, brethren, in "the ministry of reconcilia-



tion," without "great grace?" For such a work as ours, we need not alone to be Christians who have just grace enough to save our souls; evidences, on the whole satisfactory, that our state is safe. We need a *tone* and *degree* of piety beyond that of common Christians in the more retired ranks of our churches; evidences which shall be clearer, brighter, more incontestible than theirs. "Set in the Church," as we are, as bearers of the high and holy office of "ambassadors for Christ," each of us has more concern than a man in any other station in the Church, with the question, "am I strong in the grace which is in Christ Jesus?" We preach well, perhaps; but, brethren, do we live up to our own sermons? Is our own hope "a lively hope?" Is our faith a faith in which we are "strong, giving glory to God?" Is our love to God and man a love "*stronger than death*," and which "many waters cannot quench, nor floods drown?" Is *every* grace not only "*in us*," but does it "*abound*?" Are we manifestly, in the eyes of the Church and of the world, "men of God,"—"holy men,"—men of apostolic spirit; men who, had we lived in other times, would have been martyrs "for the name of Jesus," if thus called to suffer?

We have all read the lives, and admired, and think we have loved the eminent piety, the devoted ho'iness of such men as Leighton, and Owen, and Baxter, and Flavel, and Doddridge, and Brainard, and Edwards, and Martyn, and Payson; and many others, whose memory is precious; and whose very *names* have become consecrated to our feelings. And as we have read, and perhaps wept over the pages which gave us the delineations of their experience, of the labours of their lives, and of the triumphs of their dying hours; and then have followed them, in thought, to their heavenly rest, their bright rewards, their ineffable bliss before the throne of "God and the Lamb;" has the desire never swelled in the breast of each of us, "Oh! that I were such a minister; that such grace might dwell, and rule, and shine in me; and make me thus faithful, and bring me to such blessedness." Brethren, it is to such "holiness and

\* "Mr. Shephard, on his death-bed (1649) observed to a young minister these things; 1. That the studying every sermon cost him prayers with strong crying and tears. 2. Before he preached any sermon, he got good from it himself. 3. He always went up into the pulpit as if he were going to give up his account to his God."



virtue" we are called ; and bound, by the vows of our sacred office ; and by all the instructions of the Scriptures, to us, on our appropriate character, and our duties of holiness. While we admire the characters of such men, and wish ourselves like them ; we should also ask ourselves, are we willing to use the means for obtaining such holiness which they used ? Are we willing to live up to the Scripture precepts for the ministry as did they ? Are we willing to watch and pray, and fast, and study, and keep our hearts, and fight with our sins ; willing to " deny ourselves, take up the cross, and follow Christ," as did they ? If we would have their consolations, are we willing to be partakers in their afflictions ? If we would die their death, are we willing to live their life ? If we would wear their " crown of rejoicing," in " the day of the Lord Jesus," are we willing to follow on in their way of conflict, " faithful even unto death ?" Brethren, we should test all our feelings respecting such men, and our professed desire for holiness like theirs, by many such questions as these ; or we may live admiring them, yet little like them, wherein they were like Christ. Yea more, we may, like the wrapt prophet of unholy heart, though seeing the beauty of Israel's tents, and the " visions of God," admire their excellencies, and covet their reward, but never follow their steps nor taste their bliss ; on the contrary, we may be, at last, among the most miserable men in all the regions of despair.

For the quickening of our feet in the ways of holiness, and the increase of our graces, and of our better fitness thus for our work ; we need, brethren, to live more, " looking to Jesus," and following his steps, studying his glorious character, and the whole spirit of his ministry, as conducted in the holiness of the " Son of God." He is designed to be *our example*. We should study, also, the ministry of his apostles, as conducted in the following of his steps. We must aim to live up to such portions of Scripture instruction for ministers, as our Saviour's sermon on the mount ; and as Paul's epistles to Timothy and Titus ; and to live by many other precepts for the ministry scattered throughout the Bible. How much, and with what solemn emphasis, the Scriptures do teach the *necessity of holiness in the work of the ministry*. Said our Lord and Master to his disciples, as to be teachers of his gospel, " ye are the light of the world," " *Let your light so shine before men that they may*



see your good works, and glorify your Father who is in Heaven." To every man who enters the sacred office, speaks the voice of the master we serve, calling to eminent holiness. Paul follows him, saying, "*Be thou an example of the believers, in word, in conversation, in charity, in spirit, in faith, in purity.*" The "perfectness" of "the man of God," of which he elsewhere speaks; his being "thoroughly furnished unto all good works," comprises, as the great and commanding qualification, devoted personal holiness. That excellent and delightful description of Levi, is also applicable to this subject: "*The law of truth was in his mouth, and iniquity was not found in his lips; he walked before me in peace and equity, and did turn many away from iniquity.*" Here is, indeed, both holiness of character, and its fruit, great usefulness. How many other traits of eminent holiness are enumerated in the New Testament. "*A bishop must be blameless,*" "must have a good report of them that are without;" must be "*a lover of good men, sober, just, holy, temperate, holding fast the faithful word.*" Mark again, the affectionate and solemn urgency of Paul to Timothy on this subject; "*Continue in the things that thou hast learned and been assured of;*" "*take heed unto thyself;*" "*In all things showing thyself a pattern of good works.*" "*Thou, oh man of God! follow after righteousness, godliness, faith, love, patience, meekness. Fight the good fight of faith. I give thee charge, in the sight of God, who quickeneth all things; and before Jesus Christ, who, before Pontius Pilate, witnessed a good confession, that thou keep this commandment without spot, unrebukable, unto the appearing of our Lord Jesus Christ.*" Who can read such descriptions of the appropriate character of ministers; and such solemn charges for holiness before God and man, and not feel that our spirit should above all things be *the spirit of holiness*? And what minister, with a tender conscience, can be satisfied with himself, who is not aiming at high attainments in personal religion?

With our eyes fixed upon "*Christ Jesus our Lord,*" and contemplating his ineffable holiness and glory, as the Head of the Church, and the Lord of ministers; let us think, who can be a suitable servant to such a Lord and Master, without possessing much of his spirit, as the spirit of holiness? Let us look, through him, upon *the glory of God, the beauty of the divine holiness*; and hearken to the praises of angels



and archangels, of cherubim and seraphim, who worship before him, and are "swift to do his commands," and think in ourselves, how can poor feeble man be a minister to such a God, and bear a part with such holy intelligences in his service, without much of the spirit of holiness? Let us look on *the high and holy truths* we are called to teach to others, and *the pure, broad, and searching law* we have to declare to our dying fellow men; and how well may we exclaim, "who can handle such high and holy mysteries," and teach men such sacred doctrines and commands, without eminent holiness! And considering of *God the Holy Spirit*, I speak with reverence, in connexion with whom, as the Great Renewer and Sanctifier of the souls of men, we, as ministers, are called to labour for the good of souls, with Him who may be grieved away from sinners, by the sin that is in the teacher of his holy truths, who must not feel,—deeply and solemnly feel—that he who is thus to be a "labourer with God"—with God the Holy Spirit—must himself be eminently holy. Oh! how often, as he stands at "the altar of God," may the minister feel as did Moses, when he stood on "holy ground," to receive his commissions; or like Isaiah, when, with all the holiness which dwelt in him, as a prophet of the Lord, he exclaimed, "woe is me, for I am undone, because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell among a people of unclean lips; for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of Hosts!"

To conclude these remarks; brethren, our ministry should have, in holiness, as much as possible on earth, of the spirit of heaven. There all is love, humility, fidelity, seriousness, devoutness, devotedness to God. There none is weary of the service of God. There holiness is the spring of action; and every action is done with an eye to the glory of God. The perfection of heaven is not to be expected in our character and service, in this world of sin. But of all which is holy in heaven there can be attained some degrees here on earth. To study the spirit of heaven; to cultivate it in our hearts; to rise by its aid, above this vain, distracted, and sinful world; to have "our conversation in heaven," and to endeavour to bring down into the Church and the world as much as possible of the spirit of heaven; and to live and act, as much as in us lies, as did the good men—now glorified saints—who dwell, and worship, and rejoice there; let these be our aim, and this our "manner of life,"



and of labour here. Then God will be glorified. Then the Church will be edified. Then shall we "teach transgressors God's ways, and sinners shall be converted to Him." Thus shall we be preparing for that, to which ministers, like all other men, must come, our account; and through infinite grace to render it "with joy and not with grief." Living and serving in such a spirit, shall we be, ourselves advancing in our own readiness, aiding the preparation of others, to rise and dwell amidst the holiness of heaven, and to be filled with "joy unspeakable," before the eternal throne.

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#### ART. IX. REVIEW OF UPHAM'S MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

*Elements of Mental Philosophy, embracing the Five Departments of the Intellect and the Sensibilities. By Thomas C. Upham, Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy, in Bowdoin College. 2 vols. 8vo. Portland, 1837.*

By HENRY B. SMITH, Tutor in Bowdoin College.

To discover principles, to adjust them, and to apply them, are the great objects of philosophy. Only when all this is achieved will it become the guide of life. By induction we disentangle and evolve principles, and this ought to be the first object of philosophy. The process of adjustment is more difficult and complex, and one which the spirit of sectarianism, and prejudices in favour of some exclusive system, have hitherto made well-nigh impossible. Deduction\* is the application to the same or similar phenomena of the principles, which reason has sanctioned and a scientific method harmonized. The greatest error of philosophy has been, that principles have been assumed before they have been inducted:—that deduction has preceded induction: that principles, obtained from a partial analysis of facts, have been dictatorially and presumptuously applied.

"He who studies particular sciences, without attending

\* In this use of the word we are sanctioned by Whewell, in his *Bridge-water Treatise*, and by Sedgewick, in his *Discourse on the "Studies of Cambridge."* S. quotes the authority of Newton and Herschel.



to philosophy," said an ancient sage, "is like those of Penelope's suitors, who paid court to the waiting maids in the ante-chamber." It is the *scientia scientiarum*—the science of ultimate truths. Its problem is, (it is the highest problem of the human mind) the scientific classification of all the facts and phenomena of spiritual and material existences; to bring them all into such an encyclopedical arrangement, that the central truths of nature shall be seen in their true relations and proportions, and around them shall be concentrated "the universal frame." In all the workings of mind and matter, principles and laws (laws are but principles developed) are *involved*. Philosophy would *evolve* them, and construct a system by which their movements and relations, their interdependence, interactions, and counteractions may be explained; and all phenomena be made as harmonious in our conceptions, as they are in their own workings. Such a philosophy is the want of the human soul; though oft baffled in its search, man will still seek again. The mind is constantly striving after those laws by which it may bind universal nature fast to the throne of God. When it has found a principle or a law, either by suggestion, or by induction from the phenomena of mind or matter, this is self-authenticated; and the instinctive homage which the soul renders is a sufficient attestation that we have come to the sole and immediate manifestation of the power and wisdom of the Infinite Mind.

"To make a coat that will fit the moon in all its changes," was the proposal of an acute buffoon; to construct a philosophy that will explain all the entangled movements of universal being, is, perhaps, a task equally arduous, and equally capable of fulfillment; yet one which has been more sedulously pursued. "Its twofold function is to reconcile reason with common sense, and to elevate common sense to reason."\* It must explain and collect the fragments of truth scattered through systems apparently the most diverse. Conflicting principles are to be harmonized; and when laws apparently counteract, the law of counteraction is to be explained, rather than the fact of counteraction assumed. All who know the difficulty in political philosophy of reconciling law with liberty, and in theology of harmonizing sovereignty and free agency; see in one science

\* Coleridge, Biog. Lit., p. 157.



the deepest problem in universal science. Whether this object be of possible attainment or not, it is still incontrovertible that nature (*natura naturans*, and *natura naturata*) is harmonious in its workings:—that there is no impassable gulf, no perplexing jar, between the infinite and the finite; that matter and mind, and all their laws, are in entire unison. With Jehovah, immanent in all his works, it cannot be otherwise. And, upon no other than the divine ear, can the myriad sounds which rise from the universe, strike in one unbroken strain of melody? Philosophy would place itself at that central point to which converge all the variously coloured beams in one line of unsullied brightness, even as the sun receives back the light which it has sent abroad, not in its reflected, terrestrial, and discoloured hues, but in its celestial, pure, unclouded brightness. It would take, from the broad features of universal nature a stamp, which it may again place upon them, and find the impression correct.

This is the sum and substance of *Philosophy*. Of such philosophy, *the science of mind*, *mental philosophy*, is but a part, differenced as the specific from the general. Though all philosophy is to be sought in the mind, and by the powers of the mind; yet the study of mental philosophy does not necessarily involve the search for or the attainment of all that is embraced in *philosophy*. The one is philosophy in its highest sense, all-comprehensive and exhaustive; the other takes the mind as its subject, analyzes and defines its powers or susceptibilities, and classifies its phenomena. The one may be called *metaphysics*; and it is sufficiently defined by the etymological signification of that term; for the other, the two-worded appellative, *mental philosophy*, is adequate and definite. Though this distinction of meaning in these words is not always maintained, yet we know not how, otherwise, to express a difference in the mode and object of philosophizing which are acknowledged and observed.\* *Metaphysics* examines, adjusts, and defines principles, and searches for those immutable, ever-extant laws which are developed in universal being. *Mental philosophy*

\* In the introduction to a review of Stewart's Moral Philosophy in Cousin's "Fragments Philosophiques," a distinction, essentially the same as that above stated, though applied to only a partial set of phenomena, is brought to view, under the appellations of "*philosophie preliminaire ou elementaire*," and "*philosophie premiere ou transcendante*."



classifies facts rather than principles; searches for the laws of the mind alone, and examines its specific faculties and various relations. The one is scientific in its character, rigorous and precise in its definitions, strict and definite in the application of its principles, carrying them systematically through the whole mass of phenomena. The other less sharp in its outlines, strives after general though not universal truths. In both the method is inductive. The former abstracts the law from the fact, looks for the "one in the all," and from large and distinct classes of phenomena evolves universal laws. The latter seeks the common principle of entirely analogous facts. The highest problems of human thought, the severest and most vexed questions that the mind ever proposed, are the appropriate subjects of the one, and it recognizes their validity; the other investigates the mind alone, in its various susceptibilities and powers, laws and processes; the intellect in all its involved operations; the sensibilities, in all their vast capacities; and the relations of the body to the mind, and the man to the world. Metaphysics treats mind generically, mental philosophy specifically. The one is the science of *mind*, the other the science of *minds*.\* In the latter, the laws and capacities, and ideas of the mind are ultimate facts; while metaphysics inquires into the ground and reason of these laws, and their consistence and consonance with universal laws. When Locke said that the question as to the origin of ideas formed no part of philosophy, he must have meant of mental philosophy, strictly so called. The one examines the bark, the leaves, the flowers, the fruit, the rind, the seeds; the other the vessels, the sap, and the principle of vegetable life. Mental philosophy has had its rise and growth, and received its character in the British schools; while the continental philosophy is almost exclusively metaphysical.

Both are useful, both necessary. There are those who recoil from metaphysics, and speak of it as if it were aridity personified. But the mind does seek, instinctively seek to ascertain those eternal principles by which God governs his universe; it does want to evoke into distinct consciousness all that God has put within it; and all who have studied philosophy know the vast influence of developed principles

\* Physical Theory of Another Life, p. 267—this happy discrimination is made.



upon the developement both of individual and of national character; and the intimate alliance of metaphysics with ethics, politics and theology. And as to the *dryness* of such speculations, Bacon's comment upon the maxim of Heraclitus the obscure, "that the dry light is the best soul," will be sufficient for such objectors. On the other hand, the importance of mental philosophy has been greatly undervalued by such as having attained to the "trans-alpine" consciousness, of basking in the light of the "*pure reason*," find no fitting employment for their minds but in the purest sublimations, the most attenuated analysis, and refined abstractions. Better count ourselves not to have attained, than thus loftily to soar. If it be important to know our minds, or to understand individual character, mental philosophy is important. It has the almost exclusive office of investigating the relation between the mind and the body, of analyzing and defining the mental powers, and the laws of their interaction; and where, in metaphysics, could our mental disorders and insanities find a place? or the physiology and pathology of the mind be classified? It is also the best preparation for those purely metaphysical investigations to which the superiority, both in intrinsic importance, and in forming exact mental habits must, in justice, be conceded. The praise of preliminary usefulness, of impartial and industrious collection and classification of facts is its just due. Both form a *decus et praesidium* to the mind. If mental philosophy initiates us into the domains of science, the mind will never be satisfied till it has tried its powers upon metaphysical subjects.

The work which we have placed at the head of our article, if judged by the distinctions thus brought out, will be found to belong to the class whose name it bears. It is not a metaphysical work, not strictly scientific in its character, nor rigorous in the developement of its principles. Nor was it intended to be such; and it may well be doubted whether, in the present state of science, a treatise upon the mind could, without mutilating the mind, assume a strictly scientific form. It would be easier to construct a metaphysical system, than a system of mental philosophy. The latter has been attempted. Hartley attempted to reduce all our powers to association. Brown classifies the mind, in view of the succession of its states. Condillac treats all our capacities as only so many modes of sensation. And even



in the History of Philosophy we have in Dr. Gerando an example of one who, by the single question of the origin of ideas, tried to measure all the philosophy of all ages ; which proves both the importance of the question and the one-sidedness of the historian. Others make all the mental powers and acts converge to some specific object ; such as belief, or happiness, or utility, and thus give a systematic outside to their work. But never has any satisfactory system which developed equally in their native proportions, and adjusted, in equilibrio, all our mental states and powers, been given to the world. In an inquiry which ought to be preliminary to every system of mental philosophy, as the best mode of treating the mind ; one cannot fail to be struck with the diversities of all our works upon this subject. One thinks there is nothing in the mind but ideas, and the whole of man and of life is the developement of ideas. Another in quantity, quality, relation and mode, gives us the *omne scibile*. One radiates from the *ego* as centre, and thus evolves all ; and another from the circumference rolls inward into the *ego*. And another assuming the Finite and Infinite, thinks, that in giving a *name* to the *relation between them*, the tertium quid of philosophy has at last been discovered. One gives us a set of laws, forgetting to ask of what special powers they are the laws ; and another resolves the whole mind into a succession of exercises granting no substratum for them but in the divine will, creating each successive state. And last and lowest of all, are those, who make our souls out of a faggot of material convolutions ; and who, if they have any pretensions to philosophy, must seek one which needs no generalizations and requires no abstractions. To these, other fashions might be added, yet all bearing upon a question which has not received its proper attention ; viz., what is the best mode of treating the mind by its faculties, principles, laws, states, ideas ; or by those higher principles of which each individual mind is but an exhibition ? Or, if in neither of these modes exclusively, by which conjointly, and the limits of each ?

In Professor Upham's work, the mind is generally treated by its faculties and laws and states. The danger of forgetting the unity of the substance, when its specific manifestations are the subjects of examination, is well guarded against. Though it may sometimes be wished that the strict meaning of the terms had been more explicitly de-



finer; the distinction between a law, and a power or faculty been pointed out; and the mode of treatment been more explicitly pre-announced, with the reasons therefor; and thus a more scientific character given to the work; yet it has always been the custom in the Scottish school to leave these points undefined, and there may be an impossibility, from the nature of the case, of maintaining, with rigid accuracy, any precise mode of treatment, or giving any more exact definition of these words than they ordinarily bear. We have said that his work is not strictly metaphysical. He assumes, as in ordinary consciousness is assumed, the validity (i. e. the subjective and objective coincidence) of our knowledge; the fact of personal identity is asserted, without an examination of its nature; the origin of the idea of cause and effect is given, but the idea itself not analyzed and separated from those with which it might be confounded; and the real existence of a material world is proved from our reliance on our senses. In such a work as his this is right; his design would only have been thwarted, and his progress impeded by the introduction of ontological and metaphysical subjects. They are often spoken of, and in general terms the belief of the author stated—and references made to those works in which a more thorough discussion of them is to be obtained.

Professor Upham has already obtained distinction as a mental philosopher, by the previous edition of this work, and more recently by his able "Philosophical and Practical Treatise on the Will," which was reviewed in a previous number of this journal. The two volumes now before us, will increase highly the reputation which he has already acquired. In connexion with his work on the will, they form a complete system of mental philosophy, embracing the three great departments of the mind, the intellect, the sensibilities, and the will. His plan is perspicuously stated and well developed. As compared with the previous edition, these volumes show more of self-reliance, originality of thought, compression of materials; comprehensiveness of principles, and systematic arrangement. His views are more fully matured, and a settled and specific character is given to his arrangement of the mental faculties. The style also is more condensed, though it still retains its ease and beauty, and shows an unusual power of adorning abstruse subjects with a graceful drapery, and relieving them



by the ornaments of a well-cultivated taste and a well-disciplined imagination. The *ars placide elabendi* is admirably exemplified. To the general reader they are thus made attractive; though, from the very simplicity and purity of the style, he will often be led insensibly to undervalue the importance of the thoughts; and because there is no pretension to originality, no uncouthness of phraseology, and no novel nomenclature, infer that there is no originality of thought. His originality is natural, not studied. The method is strictly inductive. From literature and biography, history and narrative, from medical and physiological works, from poetry and art, he has collected a vast number of facts, and evolved the mental laws and principles contained in them. A large and various general reading, a thorough study of his own mind, and of philosophy in all its phases, are exhibited in these volumes. He is the exclusive partisan of no sect in philosophy, neither an idealist, nor a sceptic, nor a dogmatic, nor a mystic; but from all has borrowed aids and illustrations to the perfecting of his system. His object is to furnish a full view of our mental operations in all their parts and complexities; to leave no class of facts unnoticed, no laws unexplained. We know of no work on mental philosophy (distinctly so called) which has so much completeness and inclusiveness. It is less vitiated by the spirit of a system than Brown's philosophy, and its style less cumbrous and involved; though at the same time it exhibits not such intellectual acumen, and is less scientific in its structure. It has not so much dignified reserve in treating difficult subjects as Stewart's philosophy, and has less the character of distinct essays on distinct subjects. It is much more systematic and comprehensive than Abercrombie's works, which, however *safe* they may be, will hardly arouse the mind to a trial of its powers. It is also eminently practical\* without being commonplace, and is cast in a form well

\* In a review of the previous edition of this work by Professor Beneke, in a German periodical, this characteristic is especially noticed in contrast with the German philosophy. We quote from a translation of the same in the Biblical Repository for July, 1834. "The North Americans, having once begun to occupy themselves in earnest with philosophy, have impressed upon this occupation their peculiar national character. Not only do they with great diligence appropriate to themselves whatever of philosophical knowledge is any where brought to light, especially in their mother country; and exhibit in the selection of that which they thus appropriate the same strong good sense which is apparent in their political institutions; but we also see them applying what they have thus gained, so



fitted for the purposes of instruction. To deeper and more fundamental investigations it is a safe and sufficient introduction, and by its impartiality will guard against that exclusiveness of spirit which may make a partisan, but never made a philosopher. We are glad to learn that it has already been introduced as a text-book into a number of our colleges and higher seminaries, and would recommend it to the attention of all who instruct in this department. But we proceed to prove these statements by a synopsis and examination of the work.

The subject of examination is the human mind. Are there any primary truths, which in this subject we may assume as the basis of our reasonings? The first chapter of the Introduction sets them forth. They are those of personal existence and identity, and of cause and effect; which last gives us a belief in the uniformity of the laws of matter and mind. These are not to be considered as all the primary truths which we have—those are given in the chapter on "Original Suggestion"—but, though this is not specifically stated, these must be considered as assumed in reference to mental philosophy alone. Another preliminary question concerns the nature of the substance we are examining; which is answered by the proof of the immateriality of the mind in the second chapter. The third, upon the laws of Belief, though it may be considered as having specific reference to belief in mental subjects, yet it has so decided a reference to the general power and nature of belief, that a just classification would take it from the Introduction and assign it a place among the other mental powers, where it is not specifically considered; though in the mind itself it is, certainly, not an introductory element, but a distinct susceptibility. The last chapter of the Introduction replies to another important query, Can we separate mental phenomena into distinct and analogous classes? it being of course understood, that any such divisions are made solely for practical use and philosophic convenience—somewhat on the division of labour principle—not substantially inherent in the mental

immediately and to such an extent to *practical* life, that it is very evident they have sought this knowledge from the very first only with a view to this application. This is a fundamental character in the work before us. It is hardly possible to conceive of a more thorough-going contrast than exists in the mode of treating philosophy here exhibited, and that which prevails among us Germans."—Bibl. Rep., pp. 611-13.



substance, but simply different modes of development of the same simple substance, as the fruit, leaf, and stalk are of the same seed. The whole business of mental classification is exceedingly important, and one of great difficulty. In a correct system of mind it is fundamental. Metaphysical classifications of principles we have in abundance, of all nature; but of the mind itself, few which comprehend all the phenomena, without annihilating or amputating any. In sec. 30, Prof. U. announces his as follows: "There are three prominent and well-defined points of view in which the mind may be contemplated, viz., the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will; otherwise expressed by the phrases *intellectual*, *sensitive* or *sentient*, and *voluntary* states of the mind. \* \* This is a fundamental arrangement, which, when properly and fully carried out and applied, includes the whole soul." We know not where the author's varied learning is shown to more advantage than in the sections in which he illustrates and defends this classification. The incidental remarks let fall by writers on any subjects he has adduced, and, as in circumstantial evidence, the very undesignedness of the quotations to be pressed into the service of philosophy, makes them more valid witnesses. Though this division is the fruit of his own reflection, and is more completely his than it ever was another's, as is proved by his being the only writer who has thus systematically treated the mind; yet he has enveloped it, as if to ward off all suspicion of originality, with a mass of authorities, of which the quotation from Dr. Burton's *Essays* seems to carry with it the fullest appreciation of its worth. To these we may add the name and authority of Jeremy Bentham,\* who, in his observations upon his masterly *Table of the Springs of Action*, thus speaks: "Of the *intellectual department*, the condition—of the *intellectual fa-*

\* The introduction of the authority of Bentham, gives us an opportunity to speak of his great yet almost unacknowledged service to mental philosophy. He possesses a mind almost unrivalled in acute and discriminating analysis, and yet capable of the loftiest generalizations. Though we believe his system of morals radically defective, yet in its development, his accurate discrimination of terms, and the many important views he presents, are valuable and instructive. A more stupendous work was never attempted, than that in the 2d part of his *Chrestomathia*, which gives the outlines of a logical and systematic plan of the whole "field of knowledge." If he failed, it is because the human intellect is too feeble for such a grasp. Important hints in mental philosophy are scattered through the volumes. Let not the serried ranks of a harsh and bristling nomenclature deter from its examination.



*culties*, the operation—is, on every occasion, exposed to the action and influence of the *sensitive* and the *volitional*." p. 28. In the second part of his *Chrestomathia*, the division is thus announced: sensitive, active-original or volitional, and derivative-active-human or intellectual faculties.\* The most usual classifications have been twofold; into the *understanding* and *will*, or the *intellectual* and *active* powers. Dr. Thomas Brown, in the 16th and 17th Lectures of his "*Philosophy of the Human Mind*," ably discusses and invalidates the propriety of these; and proposes a new one, threefold, into the *sensitive* and *intellectual* states, and the *emotions*:—thus annihilating or absorbing the will, besides making too broad a distinction between a sensation and an intellection; and giving us man in the spirit of a system, rather than as he came from his Creator's hands.† In regard to classifications

\* Since the beginning of this review, a work has come into our hands, giving additional confirmation to this classification. Professor Upham closes his examination of each of the divisions of the mind by a chapter upon the insanity of that class of mental acts; as, the insanity of the intellect, of the sensibilities, and of the will; and particularly in the sensibilities, carries this treatment through the subdivisions, and the special powers, adducing instances of the insanity of each of these. In the introduction to Dr. Pritchard's *Treatise on Insanity*, after relating the fact that Insanity was formerly considered only as an intellectual defect, and laying down his own classification, he refers to the classification made in a work of Professor Heinroth, a distinguished physiologist and philosopher, in the following terms. "The disorders of the mind, according to this writer, are only limited in number and in kind by the diversities which exist in the operations of the mental faculties. The mental operations are of *three kinds*, and are referred, *on the testimony of consciousness*, to three different departments in our inward nature, viz., to those of the *feeling* or *sentiment* (*des gemuths*), the *understanding*, and the *will*. These are so clearly and strongly distinguished from each other that it is impossible to confound them." Although Dr. Pritchard does not adopt this decision as the basis of his work, yet he confesses "that no systematic arrangement of mental disorders can be contrived more complete than that of Professor Heinroth." p. 10. This unexpected coincidence substantiates Professor Upham's general classification, and confines its applicability to our mental disorders.

† Another error of Dr. Brown's classification is, that thereby he is led to consider the mind in only one point of view, viz., the succession of the states. His first two divisions are into sensations and intellectual states. The antecedent of either of these states, as being *external* or *internal*, is avowedly the basis of this separation. The intellectual states are next subdivided into those of simple and of relative suggestion. His reason for the choice of this term is thus given: "Both composed of feelings which arise immediately in consequence of certain former feelings of the mind, may be technically termed, in reference to these feelings which have induced them, *suggestion*." Our emotions, too, which forms his last division, he can consider only on the division into *retrospective*, *immediate*, and *prospective*, still adhering to sequence. *The succession of states as antecedent or*



generally, let it be remembered, that they are to be subject to phenomena, and not phenomena to them; and that it is an abuse of them to endeavour to press into some one, exclusive of the others, many of the faculties of the mind, which seem to derive their character from the combined action of two or more classes of susceptibilities. The difficulty is not so great, however, in these generic classifications as in some of the subdivisions, where it will often occur that in the very process of classification the nature of the state will be unintentionally altered; or if it partake at all of an emotive character be destroyed in the very process of classification; for classification implies definition, and definition dissection, and dissection can only be performed upon the dead or the dying subject. To the division proposed and carried out by Professor Upham, there can be no valid objection, provided that (the real distinctness of the states being presupposed) in the further treatment or application of this classification there be no surreptitious inclusion of one class in another. This will be more liable to ensue between the sensibilities and will; and here special caution and precise definition are needed, lest the kindred science of Theology receive detriment. Even with an imperfect definition of the boundaries of these states, mental philosophy may be benefited, while it will require the sharpest distinctions to save Ethics and Theology in the application to their all-important doctrines of this threefold classification.

The first volume of this work embraces the intellect, which is again subdivided into intellectual states of external and those of internal origin, which are treated in their natural order. In looking at the titles of these divisions, and the various subjects embraced under them, we encounter a difficulty which has been previously mentioned. The caption of the first part is "Intellectual *States* of External Origin." But chapters III. to VII. treat of the senses, which are rather specific faculties than states. Chapter XV., on dreaming, represents a state of the whole mind, and that rather of internal than external origin; and chapter XIII., on Abstract Ideas, unless we can speak of the mind as existing in the

*consequent*—here is all that he can see in mental phenomena; as if the mind had no law but that of sequacity. Not solely his conception of the nature of cause and effect, but the whole of his philosophy, is vitiated by the predominance of the ideas of antecedence and consequence in his mind. See lectures 16, 17, 33, and 52.



state of ideas, is neither a power nor state. And in the second division, titled "States of Internal Origin," association is rather a law than a state, and memory, neither law nor state, but a power. With Brown's view of mind, the word *states* was applicable to all his divisions; but Professor Upham examining the mind by its laws, its powers, its states, its ideas or knowledge, thus gains in completeness what may be lost in precision. And these terms themselves are in philosophy still indefinite.

The difference between the two classes of states—those of external and those of internal origin, or, as he sometimes calls them, the External Intellect and the Internal Intellect—is defined to consist in the fact "that the intellectual action sometimes takes place in direct connection with outward objects, and sometimes independent of such connection." Our knowledge begins from external causes. Our mental powers are set in motion through our senses. "The soul, regarded in itself, is an invisible existence, having the capacity and the elements of harmony. The nerves, the eye, and the senses generally, are the chords and artificial framework, which God has woven round its unseen and unsearchable essence. This living and curious instrument, which was before voiceless and silent, sends forth its sounds of harmony as soon as it is swept by outward influences." sec. 37. Such is, undoubtedly, the general fact. It is not meant that all the powers enumerated and ideas described in the first division are developed before any of those in the second. Strictly speaking, the senses alone have direct intercourse with the outward world. In philosophical accuracy all that we can assert is this; that through the senses and the external world, the *ideas* and *capacities* of mind, as far as we know it in this world, are first waked up; that these are the *occasions* of the mind's primitive action. Then, retaining in mind the distinction between ideas and capacities, forgetfulness of which has caused much controversy: 1. As to *ideas*; all the necessary ideas of the mind are given contemporaneously with its first action, by *occasion* of experience, or intercourse with externals; and the existence of these ideas must, a priori, be supposed, in order to render this experience possible. These ideas in the youngest as well as the oldest are *the basis of all ordinary mental action*, even though they be not developed into distinct consciousness. 2. As to *capacities*; those having direct contact with and relation to the outward



world are undoubtedly first developed. With this view Prof. U.'s general arrangement coincides. All the primitive and fundamental *ideas*, existing in the youngest, are derived from a purely internal source. The first chapter of Part I. satisfactorily examines the question of innate ideas; which has been so perplexing from the incautious expressions of its adherents, and the figmentary suppositions of its opponents.

One word more as to the subdivisions under these two divisions of the Intellect. There will be often a difficulty in determining to which part any special faculty or law should be assigned. We find here *Abstraction* referred to the external intellect, and *Memory* to the internal. If we must give one to each, we should prefer a transposition. But hear Prof. U. in sec. 175: "All general classifications in mental philosophy, although they may be theoretically and philosophically true, are nevertheless not always easy and satisfactory in their application. Nothing more is to be expected than a general outline, approximating as near as possible to truth; but after all, *the value of our investigations will depend essentially on the accuracy of the details.*" Criticism upon classification is valuable only in a scientific point of view; while the completeness of the enumeration, and the thoroughness of the investigation of our powers is the main point in a work on mental philosophy and a text-book.

The true character of mental philosophy, in distinction from metaphysics, cannot be better illustrated than by the mode in which the senses are next considered, chap. II. to VII. The discussion of the ideas obtained by the senses, and, of course, the whole problem of externality, is here appended to a description of the character and laws of the senses. In metaphysics, these senses and the muscular apparatus are of *subservient* importance, valuable only as connected with the question of the origin of ideas. But in mental philosophy, they ought to take the place which in man God has given them; and that they have an independent value, apart from their bearing upon the genesis of our ideas, no man, in his senses, can deny. As such they are here treated, and their wise adaptations to our situation fully exhibited. The idea of externality is correctly described as suggested in *connection with the touch*; though in the discussions upon the ideas derived from this source, we think that Dr. Brown has correctly carried the analysis still farther, and with great acuteness demonstrated the necessity of *muscular effort and agency*



in evoking the idea of outness and its affiliated ones. Sir Charles Bell, in his papers in the Trans. of R. S., and in his Bridgewater Treatise, has still farther confirmed this position, both by anatomical dissection and psychological analysis; proving fully the necessity of a consciousness of the condition of the muscles, to the genesis of the ideas of which touch and sight are commonly considered the occasions;—such as extension, figure, &c. He supposes that there is also a specific muscular sense, and makes this hypothesis at least plausible.\* However minutely such an analysis may be made, it must still be borne in mind, that the idea of *externality* cannot be obtained from sensation. Bell falls into this error, asserting explicitly, that “the sensibility which gives the consciousness of resistance, enables us to distinguish what is external from what belongs to us.” There is the same difference between externality and resistance, (which last alone is given by the touch, &c.,) as between a sensation and a perception, as these words are discriminated by Reid and Stewart. And to suppose that because *outness* is given in *connection with resistance*, it is therefore a part of it, is a mistake less ludicrous, but showing no less want of analysis, than the belief of the New Zealanders that hats were congenital appendages of the first Europeans whom they saw. In regard to the sensations of heat and cold; if the sole idea derivable from the touch be that of resistance, it is difficult to see how, as in sec. 72, they can be referred to it. The impinging of a material substance will occasion resistance, hence the idea of heat, if caloric be material. But whence the idea of cold, which is only the absence of caloric? The difficulty is doubled if caloric be immaterial, a law, a mode of existence, or a state of particles. How can we re-

\* Anatomically he demonstrates that, “between the brain and the muscles there is a circle of nerves; *one nerve* conveys the influence from the brain to the muscle, another gives the sense of the condition of the muscle to the brain.” The former he calls “the motor nerve,” the latter, “the sensitive nerve.” “If the circle be broken by the division of the motor nerve, motion ceases; if by the division of the other nerve, there is no longer a sense of the condition of the muscle, and therefore, no regulation of its activity.”—Trans. R. S. for 1826 Pt. ii., p. 170. Thus is such a communication between the muscle and the brain proved, that a knowledge of the condition of the former may, by the sensitive nerves be at once given to the mind. This constitutes what he calls the muscular sense. For a very full and able proof of the necessity of our knowledge of the position of the muscles in order to explain the origin of some of our ideas, and of the fact that we do have such a knowledge, and of its daily use, see his Bridgewater Treatise “On the Hand,” pp. 212–30.



sist an immaterial substance, and especially, how, from the absence of an immaterial substance, can we get any idea of resistance? Shall we introduce a new agent, the air, and say that the air, existing in a certain state, impinges on the nervous filaments which take cognizance of this state? But the question still remains, Is this state one which is connected with *resistance*, which alone is the definite object of touch? There is left the supposition of a specific adaptation of the nerves to these sensations, and thus they have a new function; or else of a new sense, coinciding throughout the body with that of touch. The importance of a suggestion by Professor Sedgewick\* that some one "skilled in *physiology*, instructed in the laws of the *elastic fluids* around us, and able to analyze the nicer workings of the mind, should trace the progress of knowledge through the senses from childhood to manhood," cannot be easily overrated.

The remaining chapters of this part are occupied with Habits of Sensation and Perception, Muscular Habits, Conceptions, Simplicity and Complexness of Mental States, Abstraction, ("a process,") General Abstract Ideas, Attention, (which is not discriminated as a special faculty,) and Dreaming. These subjects are all ably and perspicuously discussed. By this brief enumeration, which is all that we can give, the inclusiveness of his philosophy will be readily seen. One characteristic of simple mental states which he gives, we quote for its importance, and to show the spirit of his system. Sec. 124. "Simple mental states always stand for and *represent a reality*. No simple idea is in its own nature delusive or fictitious; but always has something precisely corresponding to it." In regard to General Abstract Ideas he coincides mainly with Dr. Brown, making an exception, however, to his assertion that the feeling of resemblance is *all* that the general name truly designates, and stating justly the necessity of "combining with that the notion of those properties which are found to be possessed in common." In the chapter on Dreaming, rich in anecdote, is found, sec. 166, a beautiful and original application to somnambulism of Bell's discrimination of the motor and sensitive nerve—the muscles of somnambulists being in motion, and their senses sealed.

The second part of this volume treats of the "Intellectual States of Internal Origin." The first chapter is occupied

\* Discourse on the Studies of Cambridge, p. 47.



with the internal origin of knowledge. This is one of the most important subjects in mental philosophy, involving nothing less than the right reception of spiritual truth, whether philosophical or religious. In regard to the origin of knowledge, and the powers concerned in its production, three hypotheses may be made. 1. That of Condillac, which not only derives all our ideas from sensation, but considers all the faculties as only so many modes of sensation. 2. The mind has innate capacities, and by the operation of these upon the ideas got from the senses, are produced all our ideas, with the exception of those which are obtained from the very operation of these faculties, by consciousness; as, for example, memory acting, we have the idea of memory, and from the operation of imagination, we get the idea of imagination. Though Locke often seems to undervalue the innate capacities of the mind, yet this is essentially the position of his Essay. That our powers, when operating, give us, through consciousness, ideas of themselves and their operations, has been often overlooked. 3. Ideas, properly so called, are spontaneously originated by the mind in appropriate circumstances. They are not of the earth, earthy. They are fundamental in reasoning, and essential to intellectual activity. It is not enough to say that the mind is able to understand them, as truth, when presented to it; they are already in it. They cannot be referred to the external world as a cause, nor are they generated by the susceptibilities of the mind. They are there, in it, necessary to it—a natural revelation. We may give a name to the capacity which originates them; to the soul considered as having them, and call it the Reason; we may name it the inner sense, or designate it as the organ of spiritual discernment, or speak only of the law by which they are originated, and term it, as does Prof. U., "original suggestion." All that is essential to a right view of the origin of knowledge may be maintained with either name. And while we think that "The Reason"\* is the most appropriate designation, that it is sufficiently sanctioned by usage, and that it is preferable as significant of a permanent state, rather than (as is the case with "original suggestion") of the momentary act which evolves this state; yet, this is only a question as to the choice of terms. Let the following quota-

\* In the second volume of Dugald Stewart's "Elements," chap. I, are quoted for a different purpose, a number of authorities which confirm this usage of the word.



tions exhibit his views more fully:—"There is undeniably something distinct from sensation; thoughts which have an interior origin; ideas which are based upon the succession, relation, and infinite of things; which are the representatives and exponents of what is mental, rather than of what is material." p. 221. "The question is often asked, how it is possible that the mind should pass over from the circle of its own existence, the limits of its own actual personality, into the region and the knowledge of things wholly different from itself. If we will interrogate nature and rest satisfied with her responses, the matter is simple. It is the power which gives us a knowledge of mind, and uniting mind with its operations gives us the idea of Personality, and combining the present with the past originates the idea and the conviction of Personal Identity, which assures us also of outwardness, of an externality inconsistent with the assumption of all things into our own nature; the power overlooked too often, and still more frequently estimated too lightly, of Original Suggestion. Nature has implanted within us this spontaneity of thought, this intuitive directness of perception." p. 234. To this head of Original Suggestion, are referred most of our primitive ideas. The analysis of some of them, particularly those of space and duration is admirably made. To the origin of the idea of eternity in sec. 184, we have some objections, not being able to conceive how the mind can, by progression from the finite, attain unto it.

Consciousness, Association, and Memory follow, and converge upon Reasoning, whose various modes and offices are well described. Under the head of *a priori* reasoning, one *a priori* argument for the existence of God is well stated, and its validity acknowledged. An argument which has received the sanction of such minds as Cudworth, Howe, Clark, Fenelon, and Cousin, ought, certainly, not to be lightly condemned.

In Chapter XIV. "An exercise of the imagination in *itself considered*," is stated to be "purely an intellectual process," possessing "a close affinity with the reasoning power." The imaginative *process* in forming combinations may be intellectually conceived; but do we thus define the power itself? Cousin makes the Reason and Imagination the same. The old scholastic maxim, "*in omnem actum intellectualem imaginatio influit*," clearly differences it from the intellect. Without entering into any discussion of its nature, for which



we have not time, we would simply ask whether consciousness does not discern in it something different from any of our intellectual powers, properly so called; something which constitutes it imagination and nothing else; something such as might result from the combination of an intellection and an emotion? We may, for the purpose of classification, so extend the meaning of intellectual as to embrace this among such powers as abstraction and reasoning; but is not this to extend too far the spirit of systematizing?\*

The first volume, and the intellectual part of the mind, is closed by an instructive chapter upon Imperfect or Disordered Intellectual Action.

It is in the second volume, to the examination of which we now proceed, that Professor Upham's philosophical powers appear most fully. While the work retains its distinctive character as a mental philosophy, this portion of it is more comprehensive, more systematic, more a logical whole, and more the fruit of his own thoughtfulness. It is in its general arrangements emphatically his own. It is truly original; yet unpretendingly so. Nowhere do we find a zealous confutation of the opinions of other philosophers, for the sake of showing his own superiority: on the contrary he fortifies his opinions by all the authorities he can amass. There is nothing of affected novelty; but only a new, more perspicuous, and more natural arrangement of our sensibilities. Its wholeness and unity are made by the convergence of all our sensibilities upon the will, which thus makes a central point in his philosophy such as we have it in our minds. Upon this part of the mind we know no work of a similar

\* In illustration of what we have before said of Bentham's works; we may be permitted to quote at this close of our analysis of the intellectual portion of Professor Upham's volumes, a list of intellectual or "nooscopic" faculties, or rather *operations*, (a more general term), as given in his *Chrestomathia*, Part 2d, pp 143-148.

1. Perception. 2. Judgement. 3. Memory, or the "retentive faculty." 4. Deduction, or ratiocination. 5. Abstraction. 6. Synthesis, i. e. combination. 7. Imagination. 8. Invention, "inorganization directed to some particular end." 9. Attention, "the result of the exercise of the will." 10. Observation. 11. Comparison. 12. Generalization. 13. Induction. 14. Analysis, or resolution; the converse of synthesis. 15. Division; the converse of generalization. 16. Methodization; "the *tactic* faculty." 17. Distribution; which differs from division; "in that the last consider the parts of any object as having been antecedently aggregated into a *whole*; the former only the parts separate." 18. Communication. 19. Analogization. "An intricate subject of discussion would be the order in which the several articles might be most advantageously disposed."



character which treats all the phenomena so perspicuously, and constructs a system so complete, intelligible and natural.

The sensibilities are first separated into the great divisions of the natural or pathematic,\* and the moral; with which heart and conscience are nearly synonymous terms. "These leading divisions will be found to run, if we may be allowed the expression, in two separate channels, which, although they are for the most part parallel with each other, are, nevertheless, essentially distinct." The natural generally precede the moral, in action; for the former, "being the chief seat of motives, furnishes the principal field of operation for the conscience." The moral are higher in rank than the natural. Our natural sensibilities are divided still further into *emotions* and *desires*, and these last subdivided into *instincts*, *appetites*, *propensities*, and *affections*. "If we look," §12 "at the conscientious or moral sensibilities, we find that they divide themselves in a manner entirely analogous to the division which is found to exist in the natural. The first class of mental states which presents itself to our notice under this general head, is that of moral emotions; corresponding in the place which they occupy in relation to the intellect, as well as in some other respects, to the natural emotions. The moral emotions are followed by another class of moral feelings, which may be designated as obligatory feelings, or feelings of moral obligation; which hold the same relation to the moral emotions, which the desires do to the natural emotions." p. 31. Upon p. 117 we have, perhaps, the best view of his whole system which can be given. "The general division of the mind, is into the intellect, the susceptibilities, and the will. The external intellect is first brought into action; followed, in greater or less proximity of time, by the developement of the internal. The subsequent process of the mental action, when carried through in the direction of the pathematic sensibilities, is from intellections to emotions, and from emotions to desires, and from desires to acts of the will. When carried through in the direction of the moral sensibilities, it is from intellections to emotions, (not natural but moral emotions) and then diverging into a different track and avoiding the appropriate domain of the desires, passes from emotions to feelings of moral

\* This word adopted from McIntosh's Progress of Ethical Philosophy, to designate the emotions and passions, in distinction from the conscientious acts.



obligation, and from obligatory feelings, like the corresponding portion of the sensibilities, to the region of the voluntary nature." This arrangement is simple, natural, philosophical, and comprehensive, carrying us through all mental phenomena to the culminating point in the will's action.

The pathematic emotions are considered first in order. They are characterized by rapidity and variety. Like

"The passing breezes, gone as soon as felt;  
The flakes of snow, that in the soft air melt;  
The wave that whitening curls its frothy crest,  
And falls to sleep upon its mother's breast;  
They come, they go, they change."

Hartley Coleridge.

They are those of beauty, of sublimity, and of the ludicrous. A chapter upon intellectual taste intervenes in illustration of which we cannot forbear quoting the following passage from an admired article in the *Edinburgh Review*. "Taste and genius are essentially but one faculty. Genius is taste in its creative transport; taste is genius in its elective energy. In vain, says Schlegel, has an attempt been made to establish between taste and genius an absolute separation; genius, as well as taste, is an involuntary impulse that constrains to choose the beautiful, and perhaps differs from it in nothing but a higher degree of activity."\*

The fundamental characteristic of all the second class of the pathematic sensibilities is *desire*. Consciousness tells us what *desire* is in distinction from *emotion*. Desires, with unimportant exceptions, "never *immediately* follow an intellectual or cognitive act of the mind," an emotion intervenes. They are also fixed and permanent, or immanent. *Desires* are subdivided into *instincts*, *appetites*, *propensities*, and *affections*. "There is one important remark which is applicable to all the principles with the exception of the instincts, which now present themselves. They have a twofold action, **INSTINCTIVE** and **VOLUNTARY**. This remark is important in our estimate of these principles considered in a moral point of view." § 99. Just so in winking. The eyelids move instinctively or are moved voluntarily. As the statement of a *fact* in the sentient constitution, this is important. Professor Upham, we believe, for the first time in mental philosophy, carries it consistently through all our

\* *Edinburgh*, vol. 54, p. 39.



sensibilities, and by its aid, throws some new light upon many of our operations. We should, for reasons which shall hereafter appear, have preferred the word *deliberative*, or *rational*, to *voluntary*; for the latter, in its application to some parts of our sentient constitution, seems to involve a theory which we believe inconsistent with sound views in ethics and theology.

The *instincts* are first analyzed; and next in the grade of honourableness, and in the order of examination, are the appetites. The *propensities* are "less inflexible in action, than the instincts," and "less dependant upon the body, and higher in rank than the appetites." The *desire of continued existence*, the principle of *curiosity*, and *imitativeness* are all "implanted and original characteristics of the mind," and are exhibited in both their instinctive and rational action. Imitativeness we do not recollect to have seen so distinctly noticed as here in any but phrenological works; and phrenology must be allowed to have made valuable contributions to our knowledge of the sentient susceptibilities, though in a rough-hewn shape. Emulation is next considered, which Professor Upham by an ingenious analysis resolves into a mode of imitation. If it be, in its instinctive action, the *desire of superiority*, he justly thinks that it can produce only evil and that continually; and that "it would seem, that the contemplation of the Supreme Being himself, would excite the rivalries of this unhallowed ambition," and that envy would be its legitimate fruit. But, when this principle is considered as the desire of superiority, is not too limited and concrete a view of it taken in reference to only one class of our relations, viz., those of our fellow-feelings? Suppose it be called the *desire for excellence*; this is an essential constituent of both holy and perverted natures—of angels and fiends; and it is applicable to all our relations, and would stimulate us though remote from society. This, in a perverted nature, would degenerate into the desire of superiority, and thence envy be spawned. This view of it would save us on the one hand, from classing it, as does Reid, among the malevolent affections; and on the other, from its rather unsatisfactory resolution into imitativeness.

The desires of esteem, of possession, of power, and of veracity, are all considered as connatural. "In all ordinary cases, the probability is, that the action of the principle of veracity is *instinctive*. A thousand times a day, in answer



to the questions of others, we utter what is true in fact, or what we suppose to be true. And we do this without stopping to reflect whether it is a matter of duty, but apparently and in reality by a natural and instinctive movement."

§130. So clearly does his twofold division enable him to present this subject. Self-love, as "the desire of our own preservation and well-being, is next presented, and in this primeval, abstract, almost ideal character, is regarded as innocent; while "it is the perversion of self-love which is properly called selfishness"—sociality or the desire of society, as a connatural principle is defended against all cavils, and even in the enemies of society, as an aggregative impulse, shown to exist. Even among hermits it is found; and it was, we suppose, this principle which led St. Francis, in his voluntary banishment, to the somewhat professional salutation." "Salvete! Fratres Asini! Salvete! Fratres lupi."

The *affections* differ from the other desirous sensibilities in being "more complex, and more estimable." "They are a state of mind in which an *emotion* is combined with a *desire*." They have a twofold action, instinctive and voluntary, and only when voluntary do they possess a moral character. The "malevolent affections," (a designation which may have been civilized by its naturalization in philosophy) are all based upon resentment. This is so rapid that "quick as thought is allowed to be, there is no opportunity for its interposition between the harm which has been experienced and the resentment which follows." The "benevolent affections" have for their foundation love," which is a complex state of mind, embracing 1st, a pleasant emotion in view of the object, and 2d, a desire of good to that object." §165. They are, according to him, the parental, filial, and fraternal affections, humanity, patriotism, friendship, sympathy, and gratitude. The able and novel chapter on love to the Supreme Being, which closes the account of our benevolent affections, we reserve for another part of this article. Important as is the chapter which concludes this division, on the habits of the sensibilities, we can only refer our readers to it; while we hasten to the second part of this volume, which is occupied with the moral sensibilities or conscience; of which we need not re-enunciate the leading divisions.

Professor Upham has followed the course which his sys-



tem prescribed, by developing our moral nature as it actually exists, by answering the inquiry, *what is!* rather than that other inquiry, *what ought to be!* This difference, which Hume in his *Essays* has clearly pointed out, is important, being the difference between ethics and moral philosophy. For the former, the word Deontology has been proposed by Bentham, and adopted by Brougham, in his *Disc. of Nat. Theol.* In this department we also need a distinction, similar to the one before made between metaphysics and mental philosophy. Cousin, as above, uses the phrases, "*morale élémentaire,*" and "*morale transcendante.*" Metaphysical moral philosophy, and the philosophy of the moral sensibilities will, perhaps, be adequately distinguishing. The former agitates the problems of the nature of virtue; seeks the ultimate laws of conscience to prove their consonance with universal law; finds the relative position of morality to all other phenomena; digs to the foundations of moral obligation; discusses the question of the immutability of moral distinctions; and, in the developement of all our duties, forms a scientific system. The distinctive character of the latter will be shown in the subsequent analysis of this part of Professor Upham's work. Suffice it now to say, that it does not involve the discrimination and recognition of all our special duties.

Conscience is a concrete, not an analytic term. An impartial analysis of all its phenomena will enable us to distinguish four elements. 1. The ideas of right and wrong. 2. The emotions of approbation and disapprobation. 3. The perception of merit and demerit. 4. The feeling of moral obligation. By the first it is connected with the intellect; by the second, with the emotive sensibilities. With that class of the sensibilities which has desire for its element, it has no alliance. In place of desire, we have the sense of moral obligation, the imperative *ought*, which marks its distinctive character, and separates it from all other classes of mental acts. This is as calm as an intellectual decision; as strong as the most potent feeling; clear, pure, and direct. The intense feeling of remorse may likewise connect it with the sensibilities. Such being its full character, its classification is difficult, but we must constantly bear in mind that classification is subordinate to truth; and that phenomena must be examined, and their full nature developed, before they are classified.



In his chapter on "original suggestion," Professor Up-ham has given the origin of the ideas of right and wrong. Under the name of moral sensibilities, he proposes to include all the other facts of conscience. And if the distinctive character of our feelings of moral obligation be clearly recognized, the word sensibilities may, with some latitude of meaning, be applied to them. In his present classification, the abstract conceptions of right and wrong, the feelings of remorse, and the perception of merit and demerit, are not considered as an essential part of our moral nature, "though they have," (with, perhaps, the exception of the last which is not noticed,) "theoretically and practically an important connexion with it." "Our moral nature," thus considered, "is less complicated than the pathematic;" the "subordinate classification of it being into moral emotions, and the feelings of moral obligation." "Both divisions of the natural sensibilities, it will be recollected, viz., the emotive and the desirous, were found to be susceptible of numerous minor divisions. It is not so in the moral department. The class of moral emotions, and the obligatory feelings, which are based upon them, will be found, exclusive of any subordinate divisions, to comprehend the whole subject." §§ 223, 224.

After an introductory chapter upon the general proofs of a moral nature, the emotion of moral approval and disapproval, are separately considered. Their position, in the order of mental action, is "between perceptions or intellectual acts, on the one hand, and obligatory sentiments on the other." "We morally approve a thing, *because it is right*. This is ultimate." The chapters on the relation of reasoning to the moral nature, and the nature of moral beauty and sublimity complete the first class of our moral sentiments. In introducing the second class of moral sensibilities, viz., the feelings of moral obligation, the author remarks, "that this class of mental states, considered as separate and distinct, has received but little notice in philosophical systems; having generally been confounded, under the familiar designations of conscience and the moral sense, with the moral emotions which have already been considered." They are here carefully distinguished, their existence proved, and their character developed. Like the desires, they are subsequent to emotion; and counterpart to the desires, operate directly upon the will; "so that the will,



in making up its determinations, takes immediate cognizance of only two classes of mental states, viz., desires and feelings of obligation." § 263.

Does this complete the analysis of our *moral* nature? What mean the expressions, "*I love the law of God*," "*I love thy law*," "*I delight in the law of God*, after the inward man?" What is the difference between a man having a conscience, and a conscientious man? Conscience may act intensely, our perception of duty be clear and cogent, and yet there be no obedience to it. Is there not, or ought there not to be, and will not a view of human nature in its perfect state show the necessity of, a *love* of right or holiness; which, more than conscientious sentiments, are a man's *own*, and which alone can ensure full obedience to the rule of right? If this be so, though it would come in classification, more appropriately among our "pathematic" sensibilities, yet, will it not intervene between our feelings of moral obligation and the action of the will?

A single distinction in the introductory section to the chapter on the "uniformity of action of the moral sensibilities," gives the ground for the solution of all cases apparently conflicting with the doctrine; viz., "uniformity in fact or principle, and uniformity in manifestation or appearance." It is a sufficient reply to most of the objections, drawn from the conduct of heathen and savages, that it takes for granted, that all unnatural actions are done in obedience to conscience, when the fact is, that conscientious motives are more frequently disregarded than any other. From this chapter the transition is natural to that upon the "immutability of moral distinctions;" which subject it fully discusses, and convincingly establishes the eternal nature of these distinctions. The rule of rectitude is not arbitrary, but immutable; immutable as the very existence of Jehovah, in whom all rectitude inheres. It is not a question as to the unchangeable character of any set of actions or course of conduct; but simply as to the nature of the distinction between right and wrong. So in material things, a sour substance may become a sweet one, but sour itself never can become sweet. Nor can this distinction be considered as merely subjective in its character. It is objective also; and cannot be altered by the divine will. Professor Upham takes high ground upon this subject, and, if our limits permitted, we should be glad to quote largely. "Rectitude stands in



its own nature immutably and eternally based, not in the fickle foundations of personal interest and of mere positive enactments, but in the unalterableness of the constitution of things." This position is satisfactorily sustained by a course of argument, accumulative rather than analytic. The substance of Cudworth's posthumous, and unfortunately unfinished work, is first adduced in proof, and the position further corroborated by other instructive and cogent arguments. The ground which our author here takes, in connexion with his assignation of the highest rank to our moral sensibilities, saves ethics and theology from a sole reference to self-love as the basis of action. Duty, the *rectum index sui et obliqui*, is above all; and, by ultimate analysis, the love of duty, or of holiness, or of God, the source and sum of holiness, is left as the true ground for the Christian moralist, in distinction from that convergance of all moral action to happiness, or the sovereign good as the ultimate motive; which the unenlightened moralists of Greece might perhaps excusably adopt.

It is consistent with the character of this "Literary and Theological Review," it is due to the cause of religion, to inquire carefully into the bearing of any philosophical work upon religious truth and theological principles. Philosophy and religion have long been aliens, exchanging only angry or contemptuous glances; and the former has full oft insidiously plotted against our holy faith. The Christian philosopher has always sighed for a union, which has never been consummated. Oh! the glories of that hymeneal day, when they shall clasp inseparable hands, and "exult in overmeasure for ever." Philosophy has claimed an independence of Theology, and many reflecting minds have made it their idol. We ask not that the scholastic philosophy, with its submersion of philosophy in theology, return; but the Christian must take it as a canon of criticism, that no philosophy should advance principles inconsistent with, or subversive of, Biblical truth and Biblical facts. Coincidence and not identity is needed.

The Bible assumes and asserts that man is in a fallen and depraved state. Will mental philosophy, as an independent witness, corroborate this truth? None who are not in love with their degradation could suppose otherwise. Though the most dreadful havoc has been made in the heart, yet the intellect bears irrefragable attestation to this mental disorder.



How ceaseless and unavailing has been man's search for truth! The vase is shattered, the fragrance of its contents alone reaches him. Truth, *immer wird, nie est*, "never is, always is a-being." Like the search and wailings of Orpheus for his lost Eurydice, has been the ineffectual search of the human soul, in this world, for truth, its desire and aliment. And even in expiring agonies, the deathless seeking and the mournful lament are still repeated and anew heard:

———"Eurydicea vox ipsa et frigida lingua,  
Ah miseram Eurydiceen! anima fugiente vocabat:  
Eurydiceen toto referebant flumine ripae."

Georg. lib. iv. 524-27.

Where, by the reason, is that full recognition of the loveliness of virtue, and the perfections of Jehovah, and of that constant Presence, in which we live, and move, and have our being! The depravity of the heart is not all; and this intellectual disorder is not solely caused by that lurid blaze of the affections heating and warping and scattering our intellectual powers. It is not alone that the intellect is "blooded by the passions." This has done much. But where is that power of spiritual discernment, that "vision and faculty divine," whereby all spiritual truths are seen in their full reality? We see as through a glass darkly; the pure, face to face. How many *reconciling* truths in philosophy and religion might, otherwise, be discerned, which we now see not at all, or darkly see? In the intellect, what confusion! In the heart, what perversion! And can mental philosophy not see it? It is as the representation of chaos, in Haydn's Oratorio of the Creation. Can the ear not hear it? It is the angry lashing and foam of the deluge. Can the eye not see it? It is in ourselves. Can we not read it?

Throughout these volumes we see that their author loves and honours the Bible; that he is anxious for the honour of religion. In a chapter to which we have before referred, that on the "Love to the Supreme Being," he proves that mental philosophy, by its fairest deductions, and prosecuted in the true induction spirit, will lead to the fundamental (not the central) truth of the Christian religion, viz., the depravity of the heart. In the examination of our benevolent affections, he was led through all the relations which man in this life sustains, and proved amply the spontaneous development of affections corresponding to each relation. By a beautiful and original analogy, in sec. 189, he proves that man must



have been originally created with the principle of love to God, "possessing, like the other benevolent affections, a two-fold action, *instinctive* and *voluntary*." All our sentient principles, instincts, appetites, propensities, and affections, have their legitimate sphere, and are developed instinctively in conformity with the relations which man has to the external world and his fellow beings. But the most important relation we have is that to the Supreme Being. Hence, "if there was not originally in the mental constitution such a principle as love to God, was not the mind, in that respect, obviously at variance with what the analogy of its nature in other respects requires?" By scriptural evidence this view is substantiated. "This principle does not now exist as distinct and permanent." Mental philosophy, as well as Divine Revelation, clearly indicates, that there has been, at some period, a great mental convulsion; that the glory of the human mind, although not absolutely extinct, is greatly obscured; and that man, in respect to his intellectual and moral condition, is truly and aptly described, as a depraved and fallen being. And in this deplorable state of moral obliquity and mutilation, he will continue to remain, until the principle of supreme love to God is reinstated." p. 226. This is the highest of all our principles of action: its effects upon the character, when reinstated by regeneration, are dwelt upon, and its full influence exhibited in Christ's character. "Now take for a moment the opposite view; and let us see if we may not account for what has sometimes been called the depravity of human nature, without the necessity of supposing the implantation of principles, which in themselves, necessarily and under all circumstances, are evil." This view is carried out by direct argument, and indirect analogy from the hypothetical extinction of some one of the pathematic sensibilities which now spontaneously operate. This destitution constitutes depravity. For the first time, we believe, in mental philosophy, is this depravity fully asserted, and proved on purely philosophical grounds, by mental analogy and analysis. Many difficulties connected with the subject, in all its relations and dependencies, it was not suitable to discuss in such a work; but may we not suggest the hope that Professor Upham will at some future time continue the discussion, for which he is so well fitted, and show fully the coincidences on this subject between philosophical induction and theological truth.

Thus far in our long progress we have generally coin-  
VOL. IV.



cided with Professor Upham's views upon all important subjects. Though we have differed from him, and freely expressed our differences upon some points of classification, and in the analysis of some of the phenomena of the mind, yet there has been no important ground for radical difference. There is one subject, however, which we have reserved for the conclusion, and for this part of our article, which considers the bearing of philosophical truths upon theological subjects, on which we feel constrained to differ more fully, because we believe some important doctrinal views to be implicated in its solution. As we have done throughout, so shall we here, express our grounds of difference candidly and decidedly.

The question which we would bring to issue regards the moral character of our spontaneous, native affections; and, also, what it is in our minds which gives a moral character to our instincts, appetites, propensities, &c. Prof. Upham takes the view that it is the will which gives them a moral character; that we are accountable for them only as far as they are voluntary; that in their native, instinctive action, they are innocent. In his *Treatise on the Will* there is little bearing directly upon this question, except that, (on p. 156,) in enumerating the constituents of a moral nature, our affections are not included. In his mental philosophy, also, the second part of the second volume is devoted exclusively to our *moral* sensibilities; and of these conscience is the centre, and the head, and the all; or, at least, conscience in union with the will, which it directs and determines. Thus the feelings of moral obligation, as we have before seen, are made to bear directly upon the will, counterpart with the desires; and virtue is obedience to conscience, by the will, rather than the *love* of such obedience, or the love of right, of duty, of holiness, or of God, in whom all right and holiness inhere. To this we have previously adverted; and in its bearings upon the present question, we think it important. It may also be recollected that, in speaking of his threefold division of the mind into Intellect, Susceptibilities, and Will, we expressed some fear, lest, unless discrimination between them, especially between the two last, were sharply made, there would be danger of a covert inclusion of the one in the other, which would render difficult the discussion of some theological and ethical questions; and, if the existence of such a distinction were claimed, and then the distinction applied



before it was actually and accurately defined, indistinctness of conception, which might have important practical bearings, would result. Especially, if the distinction in question were applied to long litigated doctrines, which can only be understood by a precise definition of terms. In those systematic classifications which do not separate will and desire, there exists no such difficulty, and no such necessity; although even in the writings of these a distinction between an imminent and an imperative act of the heart or will is generally observed. But where they are separated the danger is, either that in the definition of the will we implicitly involve in it as an element something of the sentient nature, and then apply it to discussion, &c., as though we meant only abstract volition; as when we say that the will *prefers*; or, that we define it as the sheer power of choice, and apply it as if it involved something of the character of an affection; as may have been noticed in some discussions about a *governing purpose*. Such confusion may be fatal to clear and correct views. Either make no discrimination or maintain it rigidly. Make no such distinction as will lead any to suppose that the "I would" embraces all that religion and holiness require, or that *preference* means only abstract choice, and an intellectual recognition of something being worth the having; and followed by only a momentary resolution, inscribed perhaps on paper or uttered in words, but as perishable as the former and as fleeting as the latter. Whatever source of fallacy there may be in Professor Upham's works in not making such distinctions sufficiently clear, the chief error, we believe, consists in his application of that twofold action of the sensibilities, into instinctive and voluntary, which has been above remarked upon. We said, and think, that, as a *fact* in mental philosophy, as showing differences in phenomena, the distinction is true and important; but that we should have preferred to substitute deliberative, or rational, for voluntary. Professor Upham's application of the distinction makes us the more inclined to such a change. According to him, it is this *voluntary* action of all our sensibilities, propensities, appetites, and affections, which alone makes us accountable, and alone gives them a moral character. For example, sec. 110, "It is only so far as they [the appetites] are *voluntary*, so far as they can be reached or *controlled by the will*; that they can, *by any possibility*, be morally good or evil, virtuous or vicious." So also with our



affections; e. g. Resentment, sec. 156: "A moral character attaches only to the voluntary exercise of it." "So far as the domestic affections have a voluntary action, they will be either good or evil." The distinction is evidently introduced for the sake of pointing out what, in regard to our sensibilities, gives them a moral character. The affection of love to the Supreme Being, "like the other benevolent affections, possessed a twofold action, *instinctive* and *voluntary*."

His views upon this point may be reduced to the two following statements: 1. Our natural instincts, appetites, and social affections, have no moral character in their instinctive operation. They are moral only as far as they are *voluntary*. 2. The same of our affections. Deliberate volition alone gives to them a character. We have separated these two propositions, because, though denying them both, we do this upon different grounds. In opposition we hold, 1. That our instincts, appetites, and social affections, are innocent in themselves, and receive a moral character from the ruling, central affection of the mind, (not from deliberate volition or choice,) being holy when that is holy, and sinful when that is sinful. 2. Our affections, inclinations, and desires, so far as we are answerable for them in the view of law, have in and of themselves, in their spontaneous movements, a moral character. Utterly different from this last proposition is that vulgar view which makes the spontaneous impulses of pity, gratitude, and other amiable instincts, virtuous. Virtue and vice are predicable of these only according to their subordination to some supreme affection of the soul. Another preliminary difficulty may be started from Professor Upham's analysis of the specific sensibilities, and examination of them individually, instead of taking them in groups, as we have done in the preceding propositions, and as is generally done in the discussion of this point. Does he allow the existence of any such central and all-diffusive affections as those which we assume? The existence of the affections which alone can be called all-pervading and central, he does grant, viz., love to God, and love of self; and he makes these to be of the highest rank, although a diffusive, and virtue-and-vice-imparting character is not assigned to them. Of moral motives he proposes conscience as the converging point, but we have already given reasons for what we consider a more ultimate analysis. We need not, then, delay upon this point before we can acquire sufficient momentum to proceed with



the more direct discussion. The existence of the two affections, which alone can be central, is granted. Love to God, (an affection which may be also expressed by the synonymous terms, love of right, duty, holiness—or, if these last be not identical, they imply the same character—) when existing in full action, can alone be the converging point of all the other sensibilities; when there is a defection of this love, love of self, which before was subordinate, becomes by moral necessity supreme, and can be only *selfishness*; and then forms the true antagonist of love to God.

The two propositions, then, as contrasted, stand thus:—The one makes the moral character of the affections dependent upon deliberate volition; in their spontaneous impulses they are neither virtuous nor vicious; that they are a man's own only by deliberate choice; so that thus, not simply a man's personal character, but the character of his affections also, is based upon the exercise of his voluntary powers, and the will is the source and fountain of moral character, with conscience for its guide. The opposite view is, that those affections which are the direct objects of law, which theologians and the Bible generally group under the word Heart, have in and of themselves a moral character; that they are the central affections of the soul; and, according to their character, whether holy or unholy, determine the moral character of the whole man; that, both as spontaneous and deliberate, they have such a character in the view of law; that of this character law and conscience are only the judges; and that, though we may make a division of their action into instinctive and voluntary, yet for both of these states we are accountable; and consequently, that the affections are a fount of moral character, separate altogether from deliberate volition.\* To the examination of these contrasted propositions

\* With this statement, we believe that the views of our older New England theologians substantially coincide. However they may have differed in their classification of mental phenomena, or in their view of the nature of mental acts, yet they all held firmly to the position of the moral character of our spontaneous affections. Edwards, by making no distinction between will and desire, forstalls the discussion. Dr. Burton, who lays down the same classification with Professor Upham, explicitly detaches the desires, affections, and inclinations of the mind so far as they are of a moral character *from the will*, and assigns them to *another faculty called the heart*. The Taste, Exercise, and Edwardean systems "all agree in assigning the same place to the animal appetites and social affections; holding that they are innocent in themselves; holy when subordinated to the holy love of God; unholy when the ruling principle of the mind is selfishness,



we shall confine ourselves, because the other point upon which we differ with Professor Upham, viz., as to voluntary choice being that which gives a moral character to our instincts, appetites, and such of our relative and social affections as are not the direct objects of law, (which we agree with him in considering as innocent in themselves,) is so unequivocally involved in the solution of the above question, that a separate discussion is unnecessary; and in its ethical and theological bearings the last is of the greater moment.

As to the meaning of volition, its synonymes and adjective forms, ordinarily deliberate choice is the idea conveyed; and Professor Upham, by his contradistinguishing it from instinctive, manifestly confines it to this signification. That there is such a phenomenon as deliberate choice or volition, no one can doubt; but does this embrace the whole of the will? Is there not a spontaneous as well as deliberative volition? Does not the will, "the synonyme for the I," so permeate our whole being, that in spontaneity, as well as in deliberative we are free? Are not many of our spontaneous acts the very highest developement of freedom? What more delightful freedom than in spontaneous love? In our affections, this instinctive action is manifest in its most perfect state. These extremes of the will's action, as spontaneous or deliberate, may always be accurately discriminated by these or coincident epithets. As connected with our present discussion, this distinction is important, as enabling us to show the grounds for the solution of a question, with which that which now interests us, is often confounded; viz., the character of the agent, the man, as distinct from the moral character of affections. By spontaneous volition, the affections are a man's own; because self, I, the will is interfused through them all, and thus is he accountable; and we apprehend that most of the objections as to the moral character of the affections, belong to the very different subject of the character of the man, the agent, the affection-holder. And in this connexion let it be remarked, that it is not even *spontaneous* voluntariness which gives a *character* to an affection. It makes the affec-

and enmity with God; and sufficient in their exercise to bring the soul under total moral depravation when divine love is gone."

Rand's "Vindication," p. 11.

"They [the three systems] all consider the moral character of determinate and imperative volition, as fixed by the character of these previous operations and exercises." Ditto, p. 10.



tion a man's own, makes him accountable for it ; but independent wholly, as we have said, of the accountableness of the agent (which we are content to rest upon volition in its two phases of spontaneous and deliberate) is the question of the moral character of *affections*, with which alone we are now concerned, and with which, as we conceive, and proceed to show, the will has nothing at all to do ; using throughout volition, &c., in the sense of deliberate choice, and considering the discrimination between spontaneous and deliberate volition as of no relevancy except to unwise and misapprehending objections.

By supposition—affections exist in the mind antecedent to volition. Have they an antecedent character, or is character imparted by deliberate volition ? By what conceivable process *can* volition, the sheer, abstract act of choice, give character to an affection. There is something intelligible in the proposition, right or wrong, that as is a man's choice so is a man's character ; but is there any such intelligibleness in the assertion that choice gives character to an affection. If a man chooses an apple that has no taste, his choice does not make it either sour or sweet : and so if he chooses some neutral thing, which by courtesy may be called an affection, his choosing it cannot make it right or wrong ; if he choose neutral, he remains neutral ; if he chooses innocence, he remains simple. It seems to be thought that affections are something *ab extra* to a man, presented to him like a sour and sweet orange for his choice, and that he can by choosing, make them his or not. But affections are wholly internal, not objective entities, but subjective exercises ; and they are *in* the man, *his* by spontaneous voluntariness, before any choice can be supposed possible. And even if they could be objectively presented, still, how could choice alter their character ? It is said that a man *prefers* such or such an affection. Where is that affection ? Must it not be already in him—his ? His preference, too, may have something to do with his own character, but what is its supposable connexion with the thing which he prefers, as to giving *it* a virtuous or vicious character ? How is *it* transmuted by abstract choice ? Moral distinctions, according to Professor Upham, are immutable, not arbitrary, nor personal, nor relative, nor accidental. That the essence of the virtue and vice of the dispositions of the heart, and acts of the will, lies not in their cause but in



their *nature*," is the proposition which forms the title to the 1st section of the 4th part of Edwards's "Inquiry." It is fundamental. Virtue and vice either inhere in the affections, or they can no more get a moral character than a stone. If spontaneous, native affections are neutral, not objective, how does a man know which of any two to choose? God's law and conscience tell him. These never told him to *choose*, but always tell him to *have* holy affections; and run right counter to the position that his choice is to make them virtuous or vicious, because they speak of them as having a settled and immutable character. And after the will has chosen something, how does it know the character of what it has got? By any standard which makes deliberate choice a constituent part of this character? By the term voluntary, those who hold this view must, in consistency, mean something more than sheer, abstract choice; they must have a new definition for the will; and in that definition confound to some extent what is ordinarily called volition with some of our affections. The utmost that can be said is, that by choice the affection becomes a man's own—and this, too, is false, if choice refer only to deliberate volition. The idea of having the affections to choose from, implies that they are already in the man, by what we have called, spontaneous voluntariness, and consequently they are his. And this, too, is to change the discussion from the character of the affection to the character of the man. Or will it still be said, that a certain affection being objectively presented, by the Bible or the preacher; and the man thereupon intellectually seeing that it would be rather better he should have it than not, he can deliberately will himself into this state? This is contradicted by all experience. A "governing purpose" may be talked about, but a holy or unholy emotion cannot be evoked by unimpassioned volition. -By the spontaneous, the unguarded emotions of the soul, we know best our own character; and it is not that the agent determines the character of the affection, but that the affection determines the character of the agent.

By the right of nature, our spontaneous, native affections, so far as they are directly cognizable by the law of God, and the law of conscience, which is but "the flaming eye of God in the soul of man," have a moral character. This is evidenced by consciousness. Does not a man feel guilty simply for having an immoderate desire? Though



he "*would not*" have it, does he not loathe himself for it? Before we can feel remorse and self-abhorrence, must we be perfectly certain, that by deliberate resolve, and direct, voluntary efficiency we have brought into being an unholy affection? It is also evidenced by the fact, that these affections are the objects of direct command. This makes a disposition, however acquired, to disobey any moral rule, in itself sinful. The decision of what their character is, must rest upon the single point of their conformity or non-conformity to the law of God, as interpreted to us by an unperverted conscience. "God looks at the heart," and Christ expounded the law as reaching to the first, spontaneous movements of desire. And this law, as far as the instincts, appetites, and relative affections are concerned, inquires only as to their *inordinateness*; and in regard to self-love would ask, is it subject or supreme? If the former are spontaneously inordinate, they are spontaneously vicious. If the latter be spontaneously supreme, it is spontaneously selfishness; the enemy of Jehovah; man is the idol of himself, and the creature is preferred to the Creator. Defection of divine love, on which Professor Upham has so ably written, necessarily results in the spontaneous inordinateness of our appetites, and in the instinctive supremacy of self. And the absence of the first, the inordinateness of the second, and the supremacy of the other, are all sinful, by the law of conscience and the law of God. Is selfishness any the less wrong because it is instinctive and spontaneous? This affection is certainly a man's own—we cannot get behind it, till we get behind the man. We, moral, responsible, accountable agents, oppose self to God; and because we do this spontaneously, do we not sin?

In such spontaneous acts man's highest freedom is exhibited; and if philosophy cannot explain how, then, man is accountable, it is because philosophy has not reached as far as fact, and does not know all wisdom; and because man in that self-abhorrence and remorse which he feels in view of the sinfulness of these spontaneous native inordinate affections, finds in himself sufficient ground for accountableness, which some philosophy has not yet fathomed. God has not left it to philosophy to give man a moral nature, and to tell him just what constitutes a moral character. Some Italian villagers once hissed an eclipse because it did not equal their expectations. An equal presumption, if not an



equal ignorance, is manifested by such as complain of a deficiency in man's accountableness until they have given him more power than God ever saw fit to impart.

Not as theologians only would we discuss this question. We have rather treated it as a part of mental philosophy and on the ground of the general consciousness, and by induction from principles recognized both in theology and philosophy, endeavoured to educe the right conclusion. It is not one thing for philosophy and another for theology; one set of principles for and from the Bible, and another for and from man; but when they run together, parallelism; when they unite, identity. And on purely philosophical grounds, by induction from the Christian and the general consciousness, we believe that it can be proved, that our spontaneous native affections have a moral character; that of such character, conscience is not the fountain, but the judge; that man's will in its spontaneous and deliberate action making these affections his, and thus ensuring his accountableness, still has not in itself the power to change or make their character; has not in itself those elements of virtue and vice which alone could impregnate a neutral emotion with the decisive and eternally immutable character of holiness or unholiness.

We intended to have specifically objected to Professor Upham some of those views and principles in his philosophy, with which his positions upon this point disagree; especially to have applied his views upon the immutableness of moral distinctions, and the rights and authority of conscience, both to the elucidation of our own, and to a contrast with his positions upon this subject; and likewise to have shown that, in making, as he does in his chapter on "Love to the Supreme Being," the elements of our Saviour's character to be different from our own, he assumes what consistency would have required him to deny, and places the doctrine of our Saviour's sinlessness upon a different basis from such as those could rest upon who make the character of our affections determinable by our personal wills alone. But we have room only to adduce one point and ask one question, which, we think, will show that his views upon this subject have not permeated his whole philosophy. He allows, as we have seen, in man a defection of the principle of love to God; and that, like the other benevolent affections, this ought to have both a spontaneous



and a voluntary action. If this principle should spontaneously flow forth in love to Him who is the ground and source of right and holiness, would it have no moral character? Would not all that we can conceive of virtue be comprehended in this spontaneous issue of divine love.

We would not be understood as affirming that Professor Upham adopts in full the views which we have thus combated. There is no regular discussion of this subject in his work. In his section on self-love there is no direct remarking upon what constitutes its moral character. And in that our love to the Supreme, though the distinction is pointed out between its instinctive and voluntary character; yet there is no precise assertion that it is only in the latter capacity that it has such a character. Analogy, then, from those affections in which such an assertion is explicitly made, is the ground for supposing him to hold the same opinion in regard to these central affections. This is ground enough in a systematic treatise; but, perhaps, if he had attempted to apply his general position to these affections, and found the difficulty thereof, a considerable modification in his statements regarding the subordinate appetites, desires, &c., would have resulted. When we also recollect that there is an ambiguity in the terms which are employed, and that as he was not writing upon this specific subject he might be less cautious in his phraseology; and that also many other of his views are inconsistent with logical results of the doctrine which we have thus opposed; we should be slow to affirm that he had adopted it in the definite form in which it is here stated; though a systematic development of this instinctive and voluntary action, in the sense in which he uses these words, could result only in this doctrine. And therefore we have opposed it; because Professor Upham's principles would lead to this result, at war with the interests of sound theology and vital piety; and not because he has come out unequivocally in defence of this position. This subject, too, in all that is said upon it, occupies only a few pages in these volumes; and but for its theological bearings, and the use which would be made of his authority in support of these doctrines, we would not have so carefully pointed out this defect in a work, whose value in other respects we unhesitatingly acknowledge; and for which, as a contribution to American philosophy, he deserves the most hearty thanks.



## NOTICE.

*Complete Hebrew and English Critical and Pronouncing Dictionary on a new and improved plan. By W. L. Roy, Professor of Oriental Languages in New-York. New-York, published by Collins, Keese, & Co., 130 Pearl-street. University Press, J. F. Trow Printer, 1837.*

WE believe that it is not generally known that, to a very great extent, the clergy of this country are ignorant of the language in which far the greatest part of the Bible was written.

It is certainly somewhat singular that those who would feel ashamed to read Virgil or Cicero, or Horace, through a translation are nevertheless, very few of them, able to read the text-book from which they constantly teach in the original. How happens it that a polite scholar would be mortified not to be able to hold a conversation with a Frenchman in his own language, and the clergyman is content to hear God converse on the most momentous subjects only through an interpreter.

One great obstacle to the progress of Hebrew knowledge among those who have not been favoured with a teacher, has been the bulk and formidable appearance of most Hebrew grammars from which the selection of the knowledge most requisite to beginners is not easy. Another has been the fact that lexicons in their construction, have presupposed an intimate acquaintance with the grammar of the language, and even the assistance of able teachers. In the present work these obstacles are removed. The learner who can read the words of the language, and has acquainted himself with the paradigms of the nouns and verbs, may immediately commence the study of the Hebrew text, and acquire the vocabulary and grammar of the language at the same time.

The distinguishing excellence of this work, and that which in our view places it far before all others of its kind, is this, it is at once a lexicon and a concordance. It furnishes the student with the only means of genuine scholarship in any language; it points him to all the passages of the Bible where the most important words are found, and permits him to ascertain their meaning as lexicographers themselves have done. We believe that this is the most direct and least laborious way of attaining not only an exact acquaintance




with the Hebrew, but a critical knowledge of the Bible. The truth is, that lexicographers of the Hebrew of the Old Testament, and the Greek of the New, have hitherto been unsafe; and the work before us puts it in the power of every man to be his own lexicographer. In Biblical literature, as in all other studies, we spend more time and labour and study in attaining second hand, desultory, and miscellaneous knowledge, than would be necessary, with well-directed, systematic, and persevering effort, to make us really learned. That so few are exact and solid scholars, is not from the lack of labour and study, but that they do not aim at it.

Let a person spend but half an hour every day in reading the Bible in the original for a year, and he will always prefer to read it in that language. Let him but take the true secret of learning a language—habitually read every chapter eight or ten times, and he has not only the Hebrew language, but the Bible itself—all theology—the word of God fixed and dwelling within him.

We fully concur in the high commendations which this work has received with regard to execution, though we confined our observations wholly to its general plan, which makes it alike useful to beginners, and the most advanced scholars. We will only add that the talents, industry, Biblical and oriental learning of the author, have given it a copiousness, exactness, and completeness which will make it an invaluable treasure to every clergyman who is ambitious of eminence in his calling; and the unexampled rapidity with which the first edition has disappeared, shows that its value is already appreciated.







## INDEX TO VOL. IV.

Addis, Rev. Alfred, Review of Stewart's <i>Cædipus</i>	564
Africa, Western and Central prospects of	125
Agency of Miraculous Powers in the Establishment and Propagation of Christianity	489
Alden, Rev. Joseph, On the Study of the older English Writers	423
" " Thoughts on the mode of producing Moral Results	56
Appleton, President, Life and Writings of	351
Baptism, Infant—are Pedobaptist Churches in receiving members warranted to dispense with it?	159
Benevolent Action, False Principles of	373
Celsus	219
" "	584
Christian Psalmist, Review of	59
Codman John, D. D. Sermon, Review of	33
Creation, Epoch of	526
Dana, Rev. Daniel D. D. Fathers of New England	305
" " On Infant Baptism	159
Deficiency of the Churches in Spirituality, Origin of	40
Depravity, Total and Native	3
Dickinson, Rev. R. W. False Principles of Benevolent Action	373
" " Inquiry respecting the Agency System	280
Dwight's Hebrew Wife, Review of	182
Election, Doctrine of	326
Editor, Translation from Schleiermacher on Election	250
" do. do.	326
Inquiry respecting the Agency System	280
Epoch of the Creation	526
Fathers of New England, by Rev. Daniel Dana, D. D.	305
Folsom, Rev. N. S., Interpretation of Isaiah 7: 14-16	167
Footes, Rev. Joseph L., On the Theological origin of the prevailing deficiency of the Churches in Spirituality	40
" " Review of Memoir of Rev. L. Haynes	429
Hamlin, Cyrus, Prospects of Western and Central Africa	125
" " Philosophy and Science auxiliary to Christianity in Pagan Lands	518
Hengstenberg's Christology, Review of	75
Hooker, Rev. Edward, Spirit of the Ministry	595
Howe, John, Review of	538
Inquiry respecting Voluntary Societies	81
Interpretation of Isaiah 7: 14-16	167
Literary Notice	304
" "	124
Lunt, Hon. George, Thoughts on Modern Literature	149
Marshall, Rev. William, Review of Dwight's Hebrew Wife	182







445  
3  
429  
595  
212  
124  
304  
574  
409  
518  
275  
219  
584  
393  
294  
59  
574  
469  
429  
33  
256  
621  
393  
81  
564  
21  
351  
489  
148  
56  
21  
221  
81  
393  
294